

A N  
A N S W E R

To the Reverend

Mr. W A R B U R T O N ' S

*Divine Legation of MOSES,*

I N T H R E E P A R T S.

In which are considered,

- I. Some of his Quotations from the ANCIENTS.
- II. His Manner of Reasoning: And,
- III. His Notion of Moral Obligation.

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By T H O M A S B O T T, A. M.  
Rector of Spixworth, Norfolk.

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—*Hoc mihi juris*  
*Cum venia dabis.*      H O R.

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L O N D O N:

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M D C C X L I I I.



# ADVERTISEMENT

IF the following sheets come up to what is  
 proposed in the Title-Page, it is all that  
 should be expected from them. A particular  
 and exact Consideration of Mr. Webster's  
 whole Book would tell in Answer too much,  
 and perhaps make a tedious Paper this Ac-  
 count I have published. A Letter in the first  
 Part as might have been done. A great many  
 Quotations were made of unrepresented  
 have been pulled over. Though in the Ac-  
 count that is given of the Author's Reasoning,  
 in the Review of the Reviewer's good many  
 inexact, prejudicial and incorrect notions largely  
 considered. As I am not sensible of any Pre-  
 judice to the learned and ingenious Author, I  
 believe that will not say I have been found in  
 this Review inopportune with good Breeding.  
 There is only one thing more to be mention-  
 ed, that is, that the Reviewer's treatment of them  
 drawn up from the first Volume of the Discourse  
 I have published, my References  
 are to the first Edition: But yet I have not  
 failed to take Notice of the principal Alter-  
 ations and Additions in the second that have  
 come in my Way, on Enquiry &c.

MDCCLXIII.  
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# ADVERTISEMENT.

**I**F the following Sheets come up to what is proposed in the Title-Page, it is all that should be expected from them. A particular and exact Consideration of Mr. *Warburton's* whole Book would swell an Answer too much, and perhaps make it tedious. Upon this Account I have not enlarged so far in the *first Part* as might have been done. A great many Quotations wrongly made or misrepresented have been passed over. Though, in the Account that is given of the Author's Reasoning, in the *Second Part*, there are a good many more produced, and some of them largely considered. As I am not sensible of any Prejudice to the learned and ingenious Author, I believe there will not any Thing be found in this Review inconsistent with good Breeding. There is only one Thing more to be mentioned; that as these Remarks were most of them drawn up when the first Volume of the *Divine Legation* was first published, my References are to the first Edition: But yet I have not omitted to take Notice of the principal Alterations and Additions in the Second that have come in my Way.

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A N

Mr. WARBURTON'S  
*Divine Legation of MOSES.*

*Mr. Warburton's Manner of quoting the  
Ancients.*

Whether Mr. *Warburton* has paid a due Regard to these necessary Rules, must be left to the Reader's Judgment, when he has considered the following Instances: which Instances I shall take, pretty much, in the Order of his Book; and begin with that Quotation from *Herodotus*, which we find pag. 92.

Mr. Warburton has been hitherto endeavouring to shew from Poets, Philosophers and

Historians, the *universal* Belief of Religion in all *policied* States; and then immediately observes, *But of all Nations the Egyptian was most celebrated for it's Care in cultivating Religion in general, and the Doctrine of a future State in particular.* And how does this appear? Why, Herodotus, one of the most ancient Greek *Historians*, affirms, that they were the first who built Altars, and erected Statues and Temples to the Gods; and the first who taught that the Soul of Man was immortal. Then he immediately adds, the Sense of which only amounts to this; that the Egyptians were the first and wisest *policied* People.

Herodotus's Words are these.—Βωμές τε καὶ ἀγάλματα καὶ νηὲς θεοῖσι ἀπονεῖμαι σφέας πρώτες. *Euterp.* c. 4. Πρῶτοι δὲ καὶ τόνδε τὸν λόγον Ἀιγύπτιοι εἰσὶ εἰπόντες, ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος ἐστὶ. *Ibid.* c. 123. Now as to these Passages, it is to be observed in the first Place, that the Historian properly *affirms* nothing. He only relates a couple of Facts which the Egyptians *affirmed* to him when he was in their Country. He tells us expressly he pretends to no more, and leaves every one to judge for himself as to the Credibility of them. Τοῖσι μὲν νῦν ὑπ' Ἀιγυπτίων λεγομένοισι χάρις τοῦ ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα πιθανὰ ἔστι· ἐμοὶ δὲ παρὰ πάντων τὸν λόγον ὑπέκειναι, ὅτι τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἀκοῇ γράφω. *Ibid.* c. 123. *initio.* Hence it may be reasonably inferred, in the next Place, that the Historian had no Thought of connecting these Facts with the Nature of the Egyptian Policy, or discovering from



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from thence the Excellency of it, or, lastly, celebrating at all the Care the Egyptians took in cultivating Religion in general, or the Doctrine of a future State in particular.

But there is farther Evidence that *Herodotus* had nothing of this in his Mind when he related these simple Facts. As to the former of them, viz. "that the Egyptians were the first who built Altars and erected Statues and Temples to the Gods;" whoever can think the natural Construction of it is, "the Care the Egyptians took about Religion and Policy," or that the Historian intended we should draw any such Inference from it; let him consider what Construction he will put upon a directly contrary Fact which the same Author had related before concerning the *Per-  
sians*. *Clio* c. 131. Ἀγάλματα μὲν καὶ νηὲς καὶ βωμὸς οὐκ ἐν νόμῳ ποιευμένους ἰδρύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖσι ποιεῦσι μωρίην ἐπιφέρουσι· ὡς μὲν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνθρωποφυέας ἐνόμισαν τὰς θεάς, καθάπερ οἱ Ἕλληνες, εἶναι. "They are so far from setting up Images or building Temples and Altars to the Gods, that they esteem it even *Madness* to do so. The Reason of which the Historian reckons to be, because they do not think the Gods sprung from Men, as the *Greeks* do." And from whom the *Greeks* had this mean Notion of the Gods, the same Historian sufficiently hints to us, when he tells us, *Euterp.* c. 4. immediately before the Citation we are now considering. "That the *Greeks* borrowed the Names of the twelve Gods from the *Egyptians*."

"*tians.*" Δωδέκα τε Θεῶν ἐπωνυμίας πρῶτες Ἀγυπτίους νομίσαι, καὶ Ἕλληνας παρὰ σφέων ἀναλαβεῖν. I believe no one will now think, that *Herodotus's* Meaning, when he relates only what the *Egyptians* told him of their being *the first that built Temples and Altars and set up Images to their Gods*, was at all either to let us know their extraordinary Care about cultivating Religion, or to tell us, they were the *best and wisest policed People*.

On the contrary, we see he tells us, that the Reason why the *Persians* did not erect Images and build Temples and Altars to the Gods, and even reckoned it *Madness* to do so, was, in his Opinion, because they had not the same Notions concerning the Origin of the Gods, as the *Greeks* had. And as the *Greeks* took these Notions of the Gods from the *Egyptians*; the true Reason why the *Egyptians* erected Statues and built Temples and Altars to the Gods, was their entertaining the very meanest and lowest Notions concerning them: So far were these Actions from signifying the early Care they took about cultivating Religion, or the Excellency and Wisdom of their civil Policy. If they were the *first* that entered into this Practice, they were the *first* that so grossly corrupted the ancient Notion of the Gods, as to assign them the very lowest, meanest Original: ἀνθρωποφύεας ἐνόμισαν τὰς θεάς. And this is the only proper Consequence the Historian teaches us to draw from it.

And as to the latter Quotation; let it be observed, first of all, that it is made in so concise a Manner,

a Manner, that the Historian's Sense cannot be at all discovered in it, or rather the Sense of the *Egyptians* who gave *Herodotus* his Information. But then, in the next Place, it may be observed, from the Manner of the Expression, that what the *Egyptians* told *Herodotus* concerning the human Soul, was not a mere Assertion of it's Immortality, but their Notion of the Nature, or Ratio, of this Immortality; what Conception they formed, and what Account they gave of it's Immortality. Πρῶτοι δὲ καὶ τόνδε τὸν ΛΟΓΟΝ

—οἱ εἰπόντες Ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος ἐστίν.

And then immediately follows the Account they gave of this Matter. Τῷ σώματος δὲ κατὰ φθίνοντος, &c.

“ When the Body died, the Soul  
“ entered into some other animal Body; and  
“ from thence passed into another and another,  
“ till it had circulated through all the Bodies of  
“ Beasts, Fishes and Birds; and then it return-  
“ ed into an human Body again. And the  
“ Time required to finish one of these Revo-  
“ lutions in, they said, was 3000 Years.” This is the Notion of the Soul's Immortality, which *Herodotus* informs us, the *Egyptians* said, they were the Inventors of. And it may be added, *Herodotus* mentions it, not only without giving the least Hint of any moral Designation in it, but plainly speaks of it as a mere *natural* Revolution, which all Souls equally made without any Distinction or Difference whatsoever, and were to make and repeat for ever. This at least is all that appears in the Historian's Representation. It is hard to see what View



such a Notion as this could have; harder to conclude it a *political* Invention; but hardest of all to discern how the *particular Doctrine of a future State* could be *cultivated* by it. In Time indeed it might be, and certainly was, improved to serve many Purposes, both civil and religious. *Herodotus* however gives not the least Hint of any such Thing among the *Egyptians*, either here or any where else.

It will not be amiss to take Notice farther, that the Historian, immediately after giving this Account of the *Egyptian Metempsychosis*, or their Notion of the Soul's Immortality, tells us that several of the *Greeks* had held the same Notion, as if it had been their own; some earlier, some later: And says he could mention their Names, but does not care to do it: No Question having his Eye here upon *Pythagoras* and his Followers. Τέτω τῷ λόγῳ εἰσὶ οἱ ἑλλήνων ἐχρήσαντο, οἱ μὲν πρότερον, οἱ δὲ ὕστερον, ὡς ἰδίῳ ἑωυτῶν εἶναι· τῶν ἐγὼ εἰδὼς τὰ ἐνόμαζα εἰ γράφω.

## II.

The next Quotation from the Ancients I would make a few Observations upon is the famous Preface to *Zaleucus's* Laws, mentioned by Mr. *Warburton*, p. 112.

Allowing at present the Genuineness of it, we are only to consider whether Mr. *Warburton* has rightly understood and fairly represented the Sense of it. We must here a little consider how this *Preface* is introduced, and what it is brought to prove. It is here brought in to

prove this Proposition, "The second Step the  
"Legislator took to inculcate Religion was, by  
"making the Doctrine of a Providence in it's  
"full Extent the grand Sanction of their  
"Laws; with which their Systems of Insti-  
"tutes were prefaced and introduced." By  
the Way, it is very hard to account for it, how  
Mr. Warburton came to express it in this Man-  
ner, "to inculcate Religion," when the Point  
to be made out was, "the Legislator's Care to  
"inculcate a future State of Rewards and  
"Punishments." However here it is (and we  
must take it as it is) to *inculcate Religion*; and  
in Order to inculcate this, the Legislators made  
the *Doctrine of a Providence in it's full Extent*  
*the grand Sanction of their Laws.*—It is true  
indeed that Providence in *it's full Extent*, will  
include a future State of Rewards and Punish-  
ments. But then it is upon the Supposition,  
that the ancient Legislators had a previous No-  
tion of such a State. For if they had no such No-  
tion (and those who have read the *Divine Lega-  
tion* with any Care will best judge whether it  
has been at all made appear hitherto that they  
had any such Notion), then a future State will  
not be included in the *widest Extent* of their  
*Providence*: And then though *Providence*, in the  
fullest Extent of it, was the *Sanction of their*  
*Laws*, it will not follow, that the Doctrine of  
a future State made any Part of that Sanction.  
Nor does Mr. Warburton in what follows en-  
deavour at all, or at least with any Appearance  
of Success, to make it probable, that the Doc-

trine of a future State was included in their general Notion of a Providence.

And here it may be observed in general concerning the ancient *Heathens*, that they had a much stronger Apprehension of a present Retribution than *we* have, and than perhaps the Course of Things would justify. They talked very freely of the Appearance of one God or another in Favour of good Men; (imagining there was one Deity or other always ready to succour and assist them,) and on the other Hand as freely of *Jupiter* and his *Bolt*; and of *Nemesis*, (a Goddess appropriated to the Work) who would sooner or later in the present Life punish evil Men for their Deeds. What *Herodotus* says with Relation to the final Ruin of *Troy*, expresses the general Sentiment of the *Heathen* World; and he adds, that it was the Design of that exemplary Destruction to confirm the same Opinion \*.

But to return now to *Zaleucus's* Preface.—

It is brought to prove that the ancient Legislators sanctioned their Laws with future Rewards and Punishments, and as being itself an Example of this Practice. Mr. *Warburton* cites it at large, and gives us his Translation of it. Let us now see what it says to the present Purpose.

Now it may be observed, that there is not in this *Preface* the least mention made of a future State at all; nor any Thing in it but what is

\* Τῶν μεγάλων ἀδικημάτων μεγάλης ἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιμωρίαι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν. *Euterp.* c. 120.



capable of being understood without the least Reference to such a State. The one only Thing that would seem to hint at it is what *Zaleucus* says concerning *Death*. I will therefore cite this Part of it in the Margin †, and here give a true Translation of it. He advises those who have strong Inclinations to Injustice, “ to re-  
“ member the Gods as really existing and in-  
“ flicting (or always ready to inflict) Punish-  
“ ments upon unjust Men (or, as Mr. *Warbur-*  
“ *ton* himself very well expresses the Original,  
“ *δικας ἐπιτεμπόνων τοῖς ἀδίκοις, the judgments*  
“ *they always have in Store, to inflict upon wick-*  
“ *ed Men*); and likewise to set before their  
“ Eyes that Time, when there will be an End  
“ of the present Life. For when People are  
“ at the Point of dying (or parting with the pre-  
“ sent Life) they reflect with Concern upon what  
“ they have done unjustly, and wish they had  
“ acted otherwise. Therefore it will be proper  
“ for every one in his whole Conduct to set this  
“ Time before him, as if it was actually pre-  
“ sent.”—This, I hope, will be judged the  
true Sense of the Passage before us.

I observe then, in the next Place, that Mr. *Warburton* has very much overcharged *Zaleucus's* Sense in *his* Manner of translating it. He

† —μνησθαι θεῶν ὡς ὄντων καὶ δικας ἐπιτεμπόνων τοῖς ἀδικοῖς, καὶ τίσεσθαι πρὸς ὁμμάτων τὸν καιρὸν τῶτον, ἐν ᾧ γίνεται τὸ τέλος ἰκάνω τῆς ἀπαλλαγῆς τῆς ζῆν· πάνσι γὰρ ἐμπέπει μελαμίλεια τοῖς μέλλουσι πελευτᾶν, μνησθέντες ὅτι ἀδικήκασι καὶ ὅτι τῷ βέλεσθαι πάντα πιπράχθαι δικαίως αὐτοῖς· διὸ δι' ἑκάστου παρ' ἑκάστην πρᾶξιν αὐτοὶ συνοικεῖν τὸν καιρὸν τῶτον, ὡς δὲ παρόντα.

says—*the dreadful Hour of Death*.—But what is there in the Original that answers to it, or is at all like it? By adding indeed such an Epithet as *dreadful*, a Reader's Thoughts are presently carried to a future State of Things. For what but this can make the Idea of Death *dreadful*? And *Cæsar*, as wrong as he was in other Things, was certainly in the right in representing *Death* as a Blessing rather than otherwise, upon the Supposition of there being nothing to be feared beyond the Grave\*. — Again, *seize with Remorse*,—is quite overdoing μετὰμέλεια; which signifies any Change of Mind, upon reflecting on the very lowest Degree of Guilt, or even without supposing any morally wrong Behaviour, or any Guilt at all.

And I observe farther, that all that *Zaleucus* says, with Relation to *Death*, here, may be accounted for without any Supposition of a future State of Things. For he might think, that all *Injustice* proceeded from too great a *Value* for the Enjoyments and Accommodations of the present Life. The Way for Men to lower their Esteem for these Things, and bring it nearer to what it ought in Reason to be, would be to habituate the Thought of *Death*, which will so certainly put an End to all the Acquisitions of the present World: That in this View, as mutable, uncertain, perishing Things †, they must

\* *Mortem ærumnarum requiem, non cruciatum, esse: eam cuncta mortalium mala dissolvere.* Sallust.

† A Sentiment one is often meeting with among the Ancients.  
Tanquam

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must appear vastly less valuable, and consequently the Pursuits of them more moderate and better proportioned.—Those who assert there is more than this in *Zaleucus's* Meaning, should at least endeavour to prove what they say.

Lastly, I observe, there seems to be some *internal Evidence* (beyond the Language) that this *Preface* was really not *Zaleucus's*, but the Composition of some Philosopher or Sophist; since it does not appear to be in the proper strain of a *Legislator*, nor very agreeable to such a one's Character. What a Direction is that for a *Legislator* to give to a *Subject*, viz. “Not to fear so much the Loss of Substance, “as what leads to Dishonour and Ignominy; “and to esteem him the best Citizen, who “will part with his Substance, rather than “with his Virtue and Integrity? \*” For is this a Supposition proper for a *Legislator* to

*Tantum*

*Sit proprium cuiquam, puncto quod nobilis hora  
Nunc prece, nunc pretio, nunc vi, nunc sorte suprema,  
Permutat dominos—*

*Sic quia perpetuus nulli datur usus, & hæres  
Hæredem alterius, velut unda supervenit undam,  
Quid vici profunt aut horrea—* Hor. Ep. L. 2. Ep. 2.

Again, Sat. L. 2. S. 2. in the Person of *Osellus*;  
*Nam propriæ telluris herum natura neque illam  
Nec me, nec quenquam statuit, nos expulit ille,  
Illum aut nequities, aut vafri insentia juris,  
Postremo, expellet certe vivacior hæres.*

————— *Quocirca vivite fortes,  
Fortiaque adversus opponite pectora rebus.*

\* Καὶ μὴ φοβῆσθαι τὰς εἰς χεῖματα ἐπὶ τῆς μάτης τῶν ἐν αἰσχυρῇ τελευτῶν. Καὶ πολὺν ἀπομύσει ἐν τῇ ἀσπίδι τοὺς ἐν ἀσπίδι προσημειωμένους μάλλον τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ δικαίῳ.

make,



make, and to preface his Laws with; the whole Business and Design of which Laws is to preserve every one's peaceable Enjoyment of his Substance †? Such a one, surely, is not to suppose, that a *good* Subject can be stript of what he has; and the true and only Design of his Legislation is to prevent it. But if it be supposed, that this Discourse, said to be a *Preface* to a System of Laws, was composed by some *Philosopher* or *Sophist*, the whole will be in Character exactly.

## III.

We will now proceed to a Citation from *Tully's first Tusculan*, c. 12, 13. which we find, *Div. Legat.* p. 151. and is here brought by Mr. *Warburton* to prove, that the *Error of Polytheism* and the *Unity of God* were the Secrets of the *greater Mysteries*.

He has been endeavouring to prove this from *Cudworth*, *Chrysippus*, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, and *Jamblichus* in the Life of *Pythagoras*; but, last of all, cites *Tully* for this Purpose; and lays the greatest Stress upon his Authority. For thus he introduces it: "But *Cicero* fully  
" reveals the whole Mystery, and confirms  
" every Thing we have said concerning it." For which he cites two Passages; one from the *first Tusculan*, the other from the *Nature*

† *Hanc enim ob causam maxime, ut sua tenerent, respublica civitatesque constitutæ sunt.* Cic. *Offic.* L. 2. c. 21.

*Neque vero hoc solum natura, id est, jure gentium, sed etiam legibus populorum, quibus in singulis civitatibus respublica continetur, eodem modo constitutum est, ut non liceat sui commodi causa nocere alteri. Hoc enim spectant leges. Hoc volunt, incolumem esse civium conjunctionem.*—*Ibid.* L. 3. c. 5.

of

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*of the Gods.* Both which shall be considered presently.—

In the mean while one cannot but be a little concerned for the Author's Consistency with himself. Here he says, *Tully has revealed the whole Mystery*; yet if we look no farther back than p. 145. we shall find him complaining, that the Design of the greater Mysteries "seems to lie altogether in the dark; so religiously was the Secret kept." Upon which he adds, "We shall therefore proceed cautiously, and try, from the obscure Hints dropped up and down in Antiquity, *Pandere res alta terra & caligine mersas.*" And if we look no farther forward than p. 157. we find him renewing again the very same Complaint, and with somewhat more Particularity: "Little is to be met with in Antiquity about it: *Varro* and *Cicero*, the two most inquisitive Persons in it, affording us but a glimmering Light. The first giving us a short Account of the Cause only of the secret Doctrines, without mentioning the Matter; and the other, an *Hint* of the Matter, without any Notice of the Cause."—Now what is this but to say, that an *Hint*, and that but an obscure one too, is equivalent to a full Discovery?

But now for the first Citation.

"*Quid? totum prope cælum, ne plures persequar, nonne humano genere completum est? si vero scrutari vetera, & ex his ea, quæ Scriptores Græciæ prodiderunt, eruere coner; ipsi illi, majorum gentium dii qui habentur,*  
" *hinc,*

" *hinc à nobis profecti in cælum reperientur.*  
 " *Quære, quorum demonstrantur Sepulera in*  
 " *Græcia : reminiscere, quoniam es initiatus,*  
 " *quæ tradantur mysteriis ; tum denique quam*  
 " *hoc late pateat, intelliges.*"

There is no Objection to this Quotation, as to the Manner of it ; nor to Mr. *Warburton's* Translation of it : But there is very good Reason to find Fault with his taking no manner of Notice of the Context and Connexion : without which the true Design and Meaning of this Passage cannot be understood, nor consequently the Evidence it affords in the Case before us. What therefore he has omitted, I shall endeavour to supply.—

The *young Man*, at the Beginning of the 12. c. desires *Cicero* (or *M* ; whatever that Letter stands for ; at present we may suppose *Tully* himself to be the Speaker, under this Character) to prove to him, if he can, that " the human Mind has a proper Existence after Death : — *animos remanere post mortem.*" In Answer, *Tully* says, " He could produce the very best Authorities to support that Opinion — and that it had all Antiquity (even the earliest, which was therefore the best) in it's Favour : That this was in particular the Opinion of the old Inhabitants of *Latium* : That the same Opinion was manifest from a Multitude of Circumstances, besides that remarkable one, the Care every where taken to celebrate and preserve the Memory of the Dead by funeral Rites and Monuments, " Which,



" Which, says he, cannot be accounted for  
 " otherwise, *nisi hæsisset* (I choose to give the  
 " Original here for several Reasons) *in eorum*  
 " *mentibus, mortem non interitum esse omnia tol-*  
 " *lentem atque delentem, sed quandam quasi Mi-*  
 " *grationem commutationemque vitæ, quæ in cla-*  
 " *ris viris & fæminis dux in cælum solet esse,*  
 " *in cæteris humi & retineretur & permaneret*  
 " *tamen.*" Then he goes on to this Purpose:  
 " Hence, says he, with us *Romans* it is the  
 " common Opinion, that *Romulus* lives with  
 " the Gods in Heaven; and with the *Greeks*  
 " (from whom we have derived the same No-  
 " tion, and it reaches much farther) that *Her-*  
 " *cules* is deified, and esteemed a God of great  
 " Power and Influence. And the same Opini-  
 " on obtains of *Bacchus* and *Castor* and *Pol-*  
 " *lux* and *Ino*.—But why should I go on in  
 " naming Particulars, when Heaven is even  
 " filled with those illustrious Personages, who  
 " once lived here upon Earth? And if I should  
 " search farther into Antiquity, and particu-  
 " larly consider what the *Greek Writers* have  
 " said upon this Subject, it would appear, that  
 " even those, who are stiled the *Dii majorum*  
 " *gentium*, were themselves once Inhabitants of  
 " our World. For this Purpose you may in-  
 " quire too, whose those Monuments are,  
 " which may be met with in several Parts of  
 " *Greece*, and also recollect (for you have been  
 " initiated) what are the Discoveries that are  
 " made in the *Mysteries*: And then you will  
 " easily understand how large a Field here is  
 " before us." —

And

And thus having supplied Mr. *Warburton's* Omissions, and given this Passage with it's Introduction and Connexion with the rest of *Tully's* Discourse, I am at Liberty to make a few Observations upon it.

*Tully* is here proving it to be agreeable to the Sentiments of all Antiquity, even the earliest and best, "that the Souls of Men have a distinct and proper Existence after Death." This appears from the Deification of many Persons, who once lived in this World. Nay, he says, that even the *Dii majorum gentium* were no other than illustrious Personages, who, though by their extraordinary Merits they had qualified themselves for supreme Honours in Heaven, yet were once Inhabitants of this Earth. This, says he, appears from the ancientest *Greek* Writers, who have treated of this Matter, and given us the very Genealogy and History of these Gods. It appears too from even the sepulchral Monuments, which are yet remaining in several Parts of *Greece*. And, lastly, it appears from the Things related and discovered in the *Mysteries* instituted to and celebrated in Remembrance of such and such Gods. — Hence it is plain, that, whatever was the general View of the *Mysteries*, and how far soever the Discoveries made in them were carried, yet the *only* Intention of mentioning them *here* was on Account of their Agreement and Coincidence with what was related by the ancientest *Greek* Writers, and expressed by the very sepulchral Monuments, which are still remaining in

in Greece. The Discovery made by these Writers and Monuments plainly shewed, that these Gods, who were now supremely happy (according to the universal Opinion) in Heaven, were once no more, nor other, than Men and Women Inhabitants of the present World. This, I say, is the *special* View, with which the *Mysteries* are here mentioned by *Tully*; and to extend them any farther, to any other Particulars whatsoever, is to go beyond *Tully*, and extort Meanings, which, for any thing that can be known to the contrary, he never thought of. And how can mentioning them with this special View, be *revealing the whole Mystery, and confirming EVERY THING Mr. Warburton has said about that Institution?* Whatever it was that was discovered in these *Mysteries* (and *Tully* does not say what it was) yet at least it must be something which plainly shewed, that the particular Gods to whom they were instituted, had formerly been Inhabitants of the present World; otherwise they had not been mentioned *here*. And the intire View of mentioning them *here*, was this, and this only: And consequently, to say, that here is any Revelation of the *whole* Secret of these *Mysteries*, (or indeed any proper Revelation of the Secret at all) is going greatly beyond what *Tully* says.

IV.

We will now examine the other Citation, which is brought from the *Natura Deorum*, c. 42. which Mr. *Warburton* reckons still more for his Purpose. For thus he introduces it.

C

“ But



" But *Tully* goes further ; he tells us in another Place, that not only the *Eleusinian* Mysteries, but likewise the *Samothracian*, and the *Lemnian*, taught the Error of *Polytheism*, agreeably to our Hypothesis."—The Quotation follows thus ; "*Quid qui aut fortes, aut claros, aut potentes viros tradunt post mortem ad Deos pervenisse, eosque esse ipsos, quos nos colere, precari, venerarique, soleamus — ab Eubemero & mortis & sepulturæ demonstrantur Deorum. Omitto Eleusinam sanctam illam & augustam—prætereo Samothraciam eaque*

"*Quæ Lemni*

"*Nocturno aditu occulta coluntur*

"*Silvestribus sæpibus densa.*"

The Remarks I have to make upon this Citation, are these : It is so imperfectly made, that no one can possibly make Sense of it, without consulting the Original. And yet it is made in such a Manner, as would too naturally lead an overhasty Gueffer into a very wrong Notion of it. Instead of that Break after *soleamus*, which leaves the Sense quite imperfect, had he added what immediately follows, it would presently have been seen, that this Passage contains a severe Censure, instead of an Approbation, of the Persons here meant : For thus the Sentence ends ; "*Quid ? qui aut fortes aut - - - - - soleamus, nonne expertes sunt religionum omnium ?*" And then *Eubemerus* is particularly mentioned as having treated of the Nature of the Gods in this Manner, i. e. as having represented them as mere human

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man Beings, who had died out of this World, and whose Sepulchres were known, and many of them still remaining. Now, can any Reason be assigned for Mr. Warburton's maiming his Quotation as he has done; but only, that it would not have been for his Purpose had he done otherwise, and given it us intire? for here *Eubemerus*, and all the rest, that were in the same Way of thinking, are really censured, as overturning and destroying *all Religion*. And then, how would it have looked in Mr. Warburton, to have put the *Eleusmian*, and the other *Mysteries*, upon the same footing with *Eubemerus* and his Followers; and represented them as void of, and inconsistent with, *all Religion*?

But then further; it should have been considered in the next Place, *who* is the *Speaker* here; and upon what Occasion this is said. *Tully* himself is not the *Speaker*; but *Cotta*: and what he says here is in Answer to *Velleius*, who had argued just before concerning the Gods, in the Person of an *Epicurean*. By way of Answer to him, *Cotta* observes, "That the  
" *Epicurean* Notion of the Gods utterly sub-  
" verted all Religion, as really and effectually  
" as Atheism itself: as effectually as those do,  
" who make the Notion of the Gods a mere  
" political Invention to awe such as will not  
" be governed by Reason; as effectually as  
" *Chius Prodicus* did, who thought the Gods  
" were nothing else but the useful Things of  
" Life personated; and as effectually as those,

“ of whom *Eubemerus* was one, who reckon-  
 “ ed the Gods were no other than dead Men  
 “ deified.” All these *Cotta* ranks under the  
 same Predicament, as Subverters and Destroyers  
 of all Religion. After which he glances ob-  
 liquely at the *Mysteries* instituted at *Eleusis*, and  
 other Places, in this manner: “ *Omitto Eleusi-*  
 “ *nam sanctam illam & augustam,*  
 “ *Ubi initiantur gentes orarum ultimæ,*  
 “ *prætereo Samothraciam eaque,*  
 “ *Quæ Lemni*  
 “ *Nocturno, &c.*

And with Relation to all these concludes thus  
 (which Conclusion Mr. *Warburton* has thought  
 fit to drop) “ *Quibus explicatis, ad rationem-*  
 “ *que revocatis, rerum magis natura cognoscitur*  
 “ *quam Deorum.*” By which he plainly seems  
 to hint to us (and perhaps he did not care to  
 say more) that the *Mysteries*, under the Pretence  
 of Religion, were really and truly nothing else,  
 but an Explanation of natural *Phænomena*, and  
 not of the *Nature of the Gods* at all. In this  
 Sense, there will be some Connexion of this  
 Incident of the *Mysteries* with the rest of *Cot-*  
*ta's* Discourse: (especially, if in these Explicati-  
 ons of natural *Phænomena*, it was, as possibly  
 it might be, intended to reduce the Actions of  
 the Gods to Effects produced by natural Causes;  
 like that in *Homer* of *Apollo's* shooting his  
 Darts among the *Grecians*; which might be  
 nothing else but a Pestilence produced in a  
 warm Climate by the Heat of the Sun.)

And



And now I think, upon this Review, it will appear, that what *Cotta* says, or hints here, concerning the Mysteries, is so far from being to the present Purpose, that it is very much against it.—

Yet I must just observe farther, with Relation to this Passage; that *Tully* must not be censured as inconsistent here with what was cited before out of the *Tusculans*. For, perhaps, *Tully* himself speaks in neither Place; but most certainly not *here*: And perhaps *Cotta* was an uninitiated Person, and spoke only according to such Report as was at that Time common.—Nor yet is there an absolute Inconsistency: For possibly there was in the *Mysteries* something of both, *viz.* the Genealogy and History of the Gods, without any *direct* Intention to lessen their Authority and Influence; and a Solution of many Fictions concerning them (such as *Saturn's* castrating his Father *Cælus*, and devouring his own Children, and *Jupiter's* imprisoning him, &c.) by the ordinary Effects of physical Causes.

And whereas he cites *Plutarch* next as *speaking much to the same Purpose* with *Tully* (meaning, I suppose, in the last Quotation;) where, *censuring the strange Stories the Dramatic Poets told of the Gods*, he says, “ They seemed to do it, as if industriously to oppose what was taught and done in the most holy Mysteries.” I shall venture to say, that in his Manner of understanding *Tully*, there is no Resemblance at all between him and what *Plu-*

*tarch* says upon this Occasion. But if the Sense of *Cotta* in the *Natura Deorum*, be what is above observed, then there will be a plain and very easy Agreement. *Cotta* hints at an allegorical Sense being put upon the History and Actions of the Gods in the *Mysteries*; and *Plutarch* thinks it very absurd to persist in relating such Things concerning the Gods, as could not be understood otherwise than in a figurative Sense: Since this was only opposing the Business and Design of the *Mysteries*; which, even without such Opposition, were never likely to attain their full Effect, and prevent all the ill Influences of such, to Appearance, idle Stories concerning the Gods: As the Numbers of the initiated would always fall vastly short of those that were otherwise.— But this from *Plutarch* might have passed without Notice, as the Author himself has thought fit to drop it in the second Edition of his Book.

But I must not leave the two Quotations above from *Tully*, without making the three following Observations upon them both.

1. Whereas Mr. *Warburton* brings them (and as the best Evidence he has) to prove that the Secrets of the greater *Mysteries* were the Error of *Polytheism* and the Unity of God, peculiarly so; it does not any Ways appear that *Tully* in either of the said Passages is speaking of the greater *Mysteries* at all. He speaks only of the *Mysteries* at large or in general. And whether he knew of any such Distinction of them as that

that into *greater* and *less*, does not appear from these Passages, and I believe, from no other of his Writings (though this is by no Means any Evidence either that there was really no such Distinction of the *Mysteries* into *greater* and *lesser*, or that *Tully* knew absolutely nothing of it.)

2. I observe that *Tully* (or whoever speaks in the Passages above) seems to put the Discoveries that were made in the *Mysteries* upon the same Footing and Level with those that were made by the *Greek Writers*, and *Eubemerus* in particular, who related the Histories and Genealogies and Sepulchres of the Gods. But these Gods were *Jupiter*, *Bacchus*, *Ceres*, *Proserpine*, &c. Men and Women who had once lived upon Earth, and were afterwards for their Merits deified. Therefore,

3. If these and such as these were the only Discoveries that were made in the *Eleusinian Mysteries*, it is much too hasty merely from hence to conclude, that the grand *Ἀπορρητὰ* were the *Errors of Polytheism* and the *Unity of God*. Since neither of these will follow from the mere proving *Jupiter*, *Bacchus*, *Ceres*, *Proserpine*, &c. to have been formerly Men and Women Inhabitants of the present World. For the Godship of the *Sun*, and *Moon*, and *Οὐρανός*—would still remain inviolate and untouched. As it certainly does, for any Thing that *Tully* has said in either of the Passages above.

Here, as it comes in under the Head of the *Mysteries* in our Author, I shall incidentally ob-



serve a Mistake of Tully's Sense in a Passage quoted from him, p. 161, 162. A long Quotation is here made from the *Second Book of Laws*, c. 14. the Conclusion of which is this; "*Quid autem mihi displiceat in nocturnis, Poetæ indicant comici. Qua licentia Romæ data, quidnam egisset ille, qui in Sacrificium cogitatum libidinem intulit, quo ne imprudentiam quidem oculorum adjici fas fuit.*" In nocturnis is undoubtedly the true Reading. And by *sacrificium* here Tully no question means the same as by *nocturna sacra*, and *nocturna sacrificia* just before, viz. That Sacrifice, *quo ne imprudentiam oculorum adjici fas fuit*; that is the *Mysteries of the Bona Dea*. How does Mr. Warburton then render this Passage? Thus: "But what it is that displeases me in nocturnal Rites, the comic Poets will shew you, Which Liberty of Celebration, had it been permitted at Rome, what Wickedness would not he have attempted, who came with a premeditated Design to execute his Lust, to a Sacrifice, where even the *Misbehaviour of the Eye* was highly criminal." Now I think we may at the first Sight discern, that this Translation cannot give us Tully's true Sense. For does it not manifestly allow that there were *Sacrifices*, where the *Misbehaviour of the Eye* was not criminal? But can it be imagined Tully would allow the *Misbehaviour of the Eye* in any Acts of Religion to be innocent? Not at all. *Misbehaviour* is the same as *wrong Behaviour*, and imports something of Will and Design.

But *Tully* does not here oppose one *faulty* Will or Design to another; but what is much more emphatical, he contrasts one even in itself innocent Action, with another which was in itself wicked, in order to set the latter in the more glaring Light, and help us the more strongly to apprehend the Iniquity of it, when applied to a particular Occasion, upon which Occasion, even the other, in itself innocent Action, was esteemed a criminal one. Thus, if a *Man* came to a Sacrifice with a directly wicked Intention, at which Sacrifice it was contrary to the Law, *i. e.* established Custom, and what was universally thought to be right, for *any Man* whatever to be present, though it were even by Accident, would not the observing this set that wicked Intention in the strongest Light that was possible? Now this was *Tully's* Thought, "What would not that Man (*Clo-dius*) have done, what Wickednesses could he have been thought capable of bogling at, who could come to the Mysteries of the Mother of the Gods with an incestuous Design, to which Mysteries yet *no Man* was allowed to approach, and which were judged to be polluted if a *Man* did but cast an Eye upon them, though it was by mere Accident, unknowingly, unwittingly, without any the least Intention of so doing?" This is the *Imprudencia oculorum* mentioned here by *Tully*, not the *Misbehaviour*, or wrong Behaviour, of the Eye (which imports something of Design) but absolutely the most casual, fortuitous Use of it

what-

whatsoever. And this is exactly the very same Sentiment with that which *Tully* expressed upon another Occasion, with Relation to *Clodius's* Guilt; and he contrasted it in the same Manner: When he said of him, *Orat. de Harusp. Respons.* that he did *non solum adspectu virili, sed flagitio stuproque violare, viz.* the Mysteries of the *Bona Dea* (that is, he did intentionally violate them: For the actual Execution of his Design was in great Measure prevented.) This is farther plain from the Manner of *Clodius's* Discovery: Which likewise shews too, that what might not be looked upon "*virili adspectu,*" might be in any Manner looked upon "*muliebri adspectu;*" but was not in Truth fit for any Body's Sight at all, and proper only to be covered with thick Darkeness.

## V.

Mr. *Warburton* p. 295. comes to give us the Opinion of the ancient Sages concerning the Necessity of the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments to the well Being of Society. He speaks of them as being unanimous in this Point, how discordant soever and at Variance among themselves, in all other Matters. But out of the great Variety of Testimonies which he has here before him, he selects only four, as a Specimen of the universal Voice of ancient Wisdom in the present Case. These are *Timæus's*, *Polybius's*, *Strabo's*, and that of *Pliny the Elder*. How far they all speak to his Purpose, is not within the present Design to shew. But I believe, every one who thoroughly



ly considers what they say, will find a surprising Failure in their Evidence. —

It is *Polybius's* I would say something to. —

Mr. *Warburton* has given us his Words at large, and his own Translation of them, which the Reader may see, p. 297, 298. *Polybius speaking of the Excellence of the Roman Constitution, expresses himself after this Manner:* Then follows the Translation: “ But the superior Excellency of this Policy above others, manifests itself, in my Opinion, chiefly in the religious Notions the *Romans* hold concerning the Gods. That Thing, which in other Places is turned to Abuse, being the very Support of the *Roman Affairs*; I mean, Superstition, &c.” See the rest in the *Div. Legat.*

Mr. *Warburton* appears to have made this Translation with the greater Liberties, in order to serve the present Purpose a little more effectually. But whoever examines the Original with any Care, will, I believe, find it may be rendered much better and with greater Exactness, thus——“ And that which seems to me (though others find Fault upon that Account) to have kept the *Roman Affairs* in the State in which they are, is their Superstition (*λέγω δὲ τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν*) which in publick, in private, as to the State, and as to Individuals, is come to such a Pitch, that nothing can exceed it.” ——Where the Historian plainly has his Eye upon those superstitious Practices, with which not only private Persons, but even the

the State begun, carried on, and ended every Thing they undertook. Something of this Kind mixed itself with every Transaction in both publick and private Life. This is what *Polybius* first takes Notice of, and he goes on :  
 “ Whereas, says he, this may and does seem  
 “ very surprizing to many, to me it appears to  
 “ have been contrived and carried on in the  
 “ Manner it has been, on Account of the *Vul-*  
 “ *gar,*” (or *Multitude*, as Mr. *Warburton* him-  
 self presently renders the Word  $\omega\lambda\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$  ; and  
 should here have rendered it in the same Man-  
 ner, and not as he does *Community*). The  
 Historian’s Meaning is very evident from what  
 immediately follows : “ If indeed a civil Soci-  
 “ ety was to consist only of wise Men, perhaps  
 “ such a superstitious Manner of acting would  
 “ not be necessary. But the *Vulgar*, who are  
 “ the most numerous in all States, (or in one  
 “ Word, the *Multitude*, as Mr. *Warburton* him-  
 “ self here very well expresses it) are fickle,  
 “ various, full of, and always apt to be hurried  
 “ away by, irrational, impetuous Affections :  
 “ And the Way left to govern and restrain these,  
 “ is the dread of invisible Powers and such like  
 “ amazing Apprehensions.” (Mr. *Warburton*’s  
 Translation and mine must *here* be submitted to  
 Correction). “ For this Reason the Ancients  
 “ appear to me, in introducing among the *Vul-*  
 “ *gar* [or in bringing into the publick Belief]  
 “ the Notions of the Gods and of a future  
 “ State, not to have acted foolishly or inconfide-  
 “ rately. But on the contrary, those Moderns  
 “ are

“ are justly chargeable, or much more charge-  
 “ able with acting in that Manner, who are  
 “ for rejecting every Thing of this Kind.”  
 It is hard to guess how Mr. *Warburton* came  
 to render ἐκ εἰκῆς καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν, *with great Judg-*  
*ment and Penetration.* If he took it for a  
*Meiosis*, it surely is not so; for then *Polybius*  
 could not have expressed himself as he does in  
 what follows, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ νῦν εἰκῆς καὶ ἀλό-  
 γος ἐκβάλλειν αὐτά. Is this—and the present  
*Age as absurdly and inconsiderately—?* No: The  
 Meaning is: “ Whatever may be thought of  
 “ those who first introduced Superstition,  
 “ whereby to govern the Vulgar: Some may  
 “ and do think they acted inconsiderately, cer-  
 “ tainly those Moderns act much more so, who  
 “ are for rejecting and exploding every Thing  
 “ of this Kind.”

Mr. *Warburton* in his Translation here, has  
 made another Addition to *Polybius*; and like-  
 wise at the same Time such a one to the Folly  
 of those Infidel Moderns, as renders it extreme,  
 much beyond what *Polybius* supposes.—*And*  
*encouraging the Multitude to despise their Ter-*  
*ror*, viz. of the Gods, and what is to be in  
*Hades.* There is nothing of this in the Orig-  
 inal: And *Polybius* goes on to illustrate what  
 he has been saying, by an Observation or two  
 concerning the different Conduct of *Greeks* and  
*Romans*, in parallel Cases. A *Roman* intrusted  
 with Money will be honest; a *Greek* will not  
 be so, &c.—



It is not easy to avoid making one Observation, on Occasion of this Passage out of *Polybius*.—He plainly insinuates, that these libertine Notions concerning the Gods and a future State, had now for some time spread themselves over Greece, and that the Infection was general. Yet the *Eleusinian Mysteries* were now, and for Ages afterwards, in high Vogue. *Sopater*, who lived long after *Polybius's* Time, and is quoted a little before by Mr. *Warburton*, p. 182. said, that they gained their End; which was to establish the general Doctrine of a Providence, and inculcate the Belief of a future State, and so, cleared up all Doubts concerning the righteous Government of the Gods. But the Truth of all this is strangely shaken, when one reflects seriously on the Account which the Historian here gives of his Countrymen. It cannot be pretended he did not know them: Perhaps, no Man at that Time had better Opportunities than himself. Yet we see he represents them as thoroughly corrupt in their Sentiments concerning Religion, invisible Powers, a Providence, and a future State; and, in Consequence of this, as quite wicked and abandoned in their Practice. And let it be observed, there is no History that contradicts this Account of them: Nay, there is none but what confirms it.

I cannot dismiss this Head without just taking Notice of another of Mr. *Warburton's* Sages; who, though an *Epicurean*, is supposed by him to be so sensible of the Necessity of the Doctrine of a future State, to the Continuance  
and

and well-governing of a Civil Society, that he would by all Means have it thoroughly inculcated. This must needs appear wonderful, and will therefore deserve to be a little attended to. The Person here meant, is *Pliny the elder*: And Mr. *Warburton* thus expresses his Sense: “It is necessary to Society, that Men should believe the Gods concerned themselves in human Affairs; and that the Punishments they inflict on Offenders, though sometimes late indeed—yet are never to be evaded.” *Pliny’s* Words are these: “*Verum in his Deos agere curam rerum humanarum credi, ex usu vitæ est: pœnasque maleficiis aliquando seras, occupato deo in tanta mole, nunquam autem irritas esse.*” It would be strange indeed, if a Punishment inflicted, could be evaded. What is evaded, cannot be inflicted; and to say, what is inflicted, is evadable, is a Contradiction. Therefore one might conclude, that *Pliny*, though an *Epicurean*, and gross enough in his Manner of Expression, yet could not express himself in so absurd a Way as this. And indeed he does not. “*Pœnas maleficiis*” is the Punishment of or for Crimes, i. e. due to Crimes.—“*Nunquam irritas esse,*” will never fail of taking Effect; or, cannot, by avoidance, be made of no Effect. Well; *Pliny* says, “That to believe the Gods concern themselves in human Affairs, and inflict Punishments for evil Deeds, is useful in Life, “*ex usu vitæ est.*” It is convenient and useful, that Men should believe this.” This is not saying, or  
own-

owning it to be *necessary to Society*; or, that Society cannot subsist without such a Notion. But, if it was so, it would fall greatly short of the present Purpose. For here is not a Tittle concerning Punishments in a *future State*. And, by far most probably, *Pliny* had them not at all in his Thoughts, when he wrote this grave Reflection; but meant only such Punishments as the Gods were wont to inflict on Offenders in the *present Life*; or were commonly represented as so doing.

## VI.

How Mr. *Warburton* came so much to mistake the Meaning, as he does, pag. 352. of one of the plainest and easiest Passages in all *Tully's Works*, is not easily to be accounted for. It is in the *first Tusculan*. But before we come to the Passage itself, it will be proper to inquire a little into the Occasion and Manner of it's being introduced. Mr. *Warburton* is here inquiring into the Character of *Plato* and his Philosophy, and finding that he was infinitely fond of the *Double Doctrine*, and more *professedly than any other avowed the Principles on which that Distinction was founded*; and, in a Word, that the Ancients thought this Distinction a necessary Key to his Writings; he then particularly observes, that *Albinus*, an old Platonist, reckoned all those Books to be of the *exoteric Kind*, where *Plato* details out the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments; *Criton*, *Phædo*, &c. I believe every one that reads what Mr. *Warburton* says here, will imagine, that



that *Albinus* in his Introduction to *Plato's Dialogues*, had expressly distinguished *Plato's Doctrine* into the *Exoterick* and *Esoteric*. And yet throughout that *Introduction*, this Distinction is never once mentioned, nor, I think, in the least hinted at. And here in this Chapter, to which we are referred, viz. the 5th, *Albinus* is so far from ranging these Dialogues under those two Heads, that he makes *eight Divisions* of them. It is true, he ranges the *Criton*, *Phædo*, &c. under the same general Head, and he calls it *πολιτικόν*. Mr. *Warburton* thinks this decisive in his Favour, and that *πολιτικόν* is exactly the same as *ἐξωτερικόν*. For thus he expresses himself: "From whence," viz. from *Albinus's* Introduction, "it appears, he says, that those  
"very Books, in which *Plato* details out the  
"Doctrine of a future State—are all of the  
"exoteric Kind. For in that Class *Albinus*  
"ranks the *Criton*, *Phædo*, *Minos*, &c." All the Evidence here is the mere Word *πολιτικόν*, which yet determines nothing in his Favour, and probably means no more than *social, ad societatem pertinens*; in much the same Manner as when the Ancients called Man *ζῷον πολιτικόν*; i. e. a *social Animal, ad societatem aptum, societati idoneum*. And it does not appear from any Part of this *Introduction*, that *Albinus* himself thought there was less of *Plato's* real Sentiments in these *Dialogues*, than in any of his other Works. And it may be farther added, that had any other Ancient, whether *Platonist*

or not \*, ranged the Dialogues under general Heads, it is greatly probable he would have done it differently from *Albinus*. What Evidence therefore can this Division afford ?

Now comes in the Quotation from *Tully* ; concerning which Mr. *Warburton* thus expresses himself—

“ There is an odd Passage in *Cicero*, which  
 “ seems to regard the *Phædo* in this very Light,  
 “ of a mere *exoteric* Composition, as it con-  
 “ cerns the Doctrine of a future State of Re-  
 “ wards and Punishments. The *Auditor* is ad-  
 “ vised to read the *Phædo*, to confirm his Be-  
 “ lief in this Point ; to which he replies—  
 “ *feci mehercule, & quidem sæpius : sed nescio*  
 “ *quomodo, dum lego assentior, cum posui librum,*  
 “ *& mecum ipse de immortalitate animorum cæpi*  
 “ *cogitare, assentio omnis illa elabitur.* The on-  
 “ ly reasonable Account I can give of this Re-  
 “ flection is, that the *Phædo* being an *exoterical*  
 “ Dialogue, and wrote for the People, was  
 “ esteemed by the Learned, as a Kind of phi-  
 “ losophical Romance.” First of all, I have  
 pointed this Passage differently from what Mr.  
*Warburton* has done in his Book †, in order to  
 make the true Sense and Force of those Words,  
*nescio quomodo*, more easily apprehended by the

\* Mr. *Warburton* must know very well, there are several other Divisions of these Dialogues by different Hands: Some of which may be seen in *Stanley*.

† Mr. *Warburton*'s Pointing is thus:—“ *feci mehercule, & quidem sæpius : sed NESICIO QUOMODO dum lego assentior : cum posui librum, & mecum ipse de immortalitate animorum cæpi cogitare, assentio omnis illa elabitur.*”

Reader. Mr. *Warburton* plainly lays a mighty Stress upon them, for he has printed them in Capitals. But he seems to confine the Sense of them to the first Member of the Sentence, "*dum lego assentior*:" Whereas they equally extend their Meaning to the latter: "*cum posui librum & mecum, &c.*" The Meaning is this: "While he read, he assented; but as soon as he laid the Book aside, and begun to think with and by himself upon the Subject, he was presently all in Doubt and Suspense: And he knew not how to account for this."

And in the next Place, where is the *Oddness* of such a Passage? Might not such an Answer as this be put into the Mouth of a *young Man*, without the least Insinuation, that in the Opinion of the *Learned* in *Tully's* Time, the *Phædon* was only a *philosophical Romance*, wrote on Purpose to deceive the People? There is certainly nothing in this *Tusculan*, either preceding or following, that encourages such a Construction in the least. And methinks it is as natural a Sentiment too, in the ordinary Manner of understanding it, as could be put into the Mouth of a *young Man*, or indeed an *old* one, not in a good Degree habituated to Reflections on this Subject. There have been since *Tully's* Time a great many Books written on the same Subject with the utmost Seriousness (Mr. *Warburton* himself somewhere in this Work takes Notice of one, I believe the last upon the Subject; and commends it highly,) and have been generally read. Now, would he ask these Readers, what



their Opinion grounded upon the Reasons produced by these Authors is, after having perused the Books and laid them for a while aside: Doubtless he would find nine in ten would return much the same Answer. From hence therefore nothing can be concluded of *Tully's* ranking the *Phædon* among the *exoterical* Compositions.

## VII.

The next Quotations I would take Notice of, are likewise from *Tully*; and the most remarkable of them, and what will require the most to be said to it, is from that *first Tusculan*. See *Div. Legat.* p. 366. Mr. *Warburton* is here inquiring particularly, into *Tully's* own Opinion concerning a future State of Rewards and Punishments. He finds it difficult to come at *Tully's* real Sentiment upon almost any Subject, but thinks we are most likely to meet with his real Sentiments in the Point before us in his *Epistles*; though in his other Writings “there are many “signal Instances of his Disbelief;—as in his “*Offices* \*, which bids the fairest of any to be “spoke from his Heart, he delivers himself to “purpose against it——.” What Evidence the *Offices* afford in the present Case, will be afterwards considered: As likewise that Passage from the *Oration for Cluentius*, which is here

\* This Book is often mentioned as one of the likeliest where to find *Tully's* own Sentiments. Yet in this Performance he professedly plays the *Stoic*, and seldom appears in his own Person, in any very material Point. “*Sequemur igitur hoc quidem “tempore & hac in questione potissimum Stoicos——.*” L. 1. c. 2.

## Divine Legation of Moses. 37

produced. After which come several Quotations from the *Epistles*, which might have been a great many more.

They are these that follow. To *Torquatus* he says;—“ *Sed hæc consolatio levis est; illa gravior, quâ te uti spero: ego certe utor. Nec enim dum ero, angar ulla re, cum omni vacem culpâ: etsi non ero, sensu omnino carebo.*” Again, to the same Person:—*Deinde quod mihi ad consolationem commune tecum est, si jam vocar ad exitum vitæ, non ab ea re publica avellar, qua carendum esse doleam, præsertim cum id sine ullo sensu futurum sit.*” And to his Friend *Toranius*—“ *Cum consilio profici nihil possit, una ratio videtur, quicquid evenierit, ferre moderate, præsertim cum omnium rerum mors sit extremum \*.*” The first of these Passages is, I think, misquoted in the emphatical Part of it. Instead of—“ *Etsi non ero*”—it should be, “ *Et si non ero*”—and so, I believe, it generally is in the printed Editions. Why it is here altered, I know not. But any one that looks into the *Epistle* will see, the Sense is much fuller, and more in *Tully's* Manner, as it is commonly printed, than as it is here given us by Mr. *Warburton*. And, as to the Sense of this and both the other Citations, it may be only this: “ That Death will put an End to all the Wants of the present Life.”

\* As to the Meaning of these and such like Expressions, which are to be met with in *Tully's Epistles*, the learned Dr. *Middleton* may be consulted: Who gives very good Reasons why they should not be taken in Mr. *Warburton's* Sense.

And if Tully, in *Letters of Consolation* to a few *Epicurean* Friends, whom in the main he had a good Opinion of, has expressed that plain Sentiment in a Way, which rather seemed to fall in with and allow their own favourite Opinion (of no future State) it needs not be the Occasion of either Censure or Wonder.

Mr. Warburton himself (in the 2d Edit. of his Book) acknowledges the *Conciseness* of these Passages; but tells us, that Tully himself has given us in his *Tusculan Disputations* a *clear Comment* upon them, though what he delivers there is only *hypothetical*. And for this Purpose he cites the following Passages out of the *first Tusculan*. “ M. Video te alte spectare & velle in cælum migrare. A. Spero fore, ut contingat id nobis : sed fac, ut isti volunt, animos NON remanere post mortem.—M. Mali vero quid affert ista sententia ? Fac enim sic animum interire ut corpus ; num igitur aliquis dolor, aut omnino post mortem SENSUS in corpore est ? — Ne in animo quidem igitur SENSUS remanet : Ipse enim nusquam est.—Hoc premendum etiam atque etiam est argumentum, confirmato illo, de quo, si mortales animi sunt, dubitare non possumus, quin interitus in morte sit, ut ne minima quidem suspicio SENSUS relinquatur.” Mr. Warburton taking these Passages for a *clear Comment* upon those from the *Epistles*, leaves them to speak their own Sense, without either translating or giving us the least Account of the Occasion of them. Whether they are at all to his Purpose will be presently seen,

This



This *first Tusculan Disputation* is intended to prove that *Death is no Evil*, and consequently, that it is not an Object of *Fear*, but rather of *Slight* and *Contempt*: And it proceeds upon these two Suppositions: "After Death we shall either be happy, or, not be at all." In the former Part of this Disputation, *Tully* goes upon the *first Supposition*: Which he endeavours to prove by this Medium, *viz.* "that our Minds will survive the Body." And here he brings a Variety of Arguments, chiefly from *Plato*: Not to prove the mere *Permanency* of the Soul, but it's distinct Existence, as a reasonable, self-moving Nature, and capable therefore of distinct personal Enjoyment. And from hence, according to him, it follows, "that *Death* is so far from being an *Evil*, that it ought to be looked upon as the greatest Good, upon several Accounts, but chiefly as it delivers the Soul from the Clog and Restraints of the Body." Having done this, he then, *ex abundanti*, goes upon the latter Supposition, *viz.* "of the Soul's not surviving the Body." And he prefaces this Part of the *Disputation*, with the Reason of his making this Supposition: *viz.* because he had a Mind *thoroughly* to convince his Auditor or young Man, that in no possible Case whatsoever *Death* was an *Evil*. "*Ego autem nunquam ita te in hoc sermone dimittam, ulla ut ratione mors tibi videri malum possit.*" He owns indeed that there was some *Obscurity* in the preceding Arguments made Use of to prove the proper Existence of the Soul after the Dissolution

of the Body; and likewise takes Notice of the natural Mutableness of Mens Minds, even in Matters more obvious and more easy of Conception: And for these Reasons desires to be prepared against all Events. His young Man had told him, that "as to proving Death to be  
 "no Evil, upon the Supposition of nothing  
 "future, he might do as he pleased: But for  
 "himself, he should never let go his Hold of  
 "Immortality." "A. *Ut videtur: sed me nemo de immortalitate depellet.*" Tully (or M.) answers; "*Laudo id quidem: etsi nihil animis oportet confidere: movemur enim sæpe aliquo acute concluso: labamus mutamurque sententiam clarioribus etiam in rebus: in his est enim aliqua obscuritas. Id igitur si acciderit, simus armati.*" The young Man replies; "Very well: But he would however take Care that no such Alteration should happen in his Sentiments." "A. *Sane quidem: sed ne accidat providebo.*" Tully then asks him, "Whether there was any Reason why they should in this Case take any Notice of the Stoics (those of them) who held the Soul would indeed survive the Body for some Time, but not always." And it being granted, that there was no Reason, Tully then digresses to refute the Opinion and Arguments of Panætius, who, though a Platonist, differed from his Master in this Point of the Immortality of the Soul \*. But this being here a mere Digression

\* Upon this Occasion I cannot omit asking: Since Tully says,

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Digression he checks himself and says, "*Sed quid agimus? oblitine sumus, hoc nunc nobis esse propositum, cum satis de æternitate dixissemus, ne, si interirent quidem animi, quidquam mali esse in morte.*" The young Man answers to this: "That as to himself, he remembered very well the Subject proposed, but was very willing to hear him running away from it, and discoursing farther concerning the Immortality of the Soul." "A. *Ego vero memineram, sed te de æternitate dicentem aberrare à proposito facile patiebar.*"—

Now with this is immediately connected the first Part of Mr. Warburton's Quotation. For thus Tully goes on: "I see, says he, your Views are raised very high; and you would go from hence to the Gods." "Yes, says the other, I wish and hope it may so fall out to us.—But methinks, upon that Supposition of the Soul's dying with the Body, *we are at least deprived of the pleasing Hope of a better Life.*" "What then? answers Tully; Does that Opinion of the Soul's dying with the Body imply any real Evil? For suppose the Soul should die with the Body, will the

says, that *Panætius*, *Plato's* Disciple, thought fit to differ from his Master in this Point of the *Immortality of the Soul*; what did Tully mean when he observed this? Was it at all his Meaning, that *Panætius* differed from *Plato* concerning the Soul's being taken from the Substance of God, and it's being to be reinfused into the same Substance again? Or, must not Tully be understood to speak of the proper distinct Existence of the Soul, after it's Separation from the Body? Is it possible to be at a Loss in which of these Senses to understand him? Look into Tully, and a Moment's Doubt will be impossible.

" Body,



“ Body, in that Case, have any uneasy Sen-  
 “ sations? Or, can we suppose, that after  
 “ Death there still remains any Sense at all in  
 “ the Body? No one says this; (though *Epicu-  
 “ rus* would charge *Democritus* with such an  
 “ Absurdity; but all his Followers deny it.)  
 “ And in the Soul there can be no Sensation;  
 “ for, by the Supposition, it is not in being.  
 “ Where then is this Evil? A third Hypothe-  
 “ sis cannot be made—” *Tully’s* Words are  
 these. “ *Fac enim sic animum interire ut cor-  
 “ pus: num igitur aliquis doler, aut omnino post  
 “ mortem sensus in corpore est? Nemo id quidem  
 “ dicit; etsi Democritum insinulat Epicurus:  
 “ Democritici negant. Ne in animo quidem  
 “ (igitur) sensus remanet: ipse enim nusquam  
 “ est. Ubi igitur malum est? quoniam nihil ter-  
 “ tium est—*”

The latter Part of *Mr. Warburton’s* Quotati-  
 on is in *Tully*, at too great a Distance from the  
*first*, (now considered) to be connected in the  
 same Manner as has been done with that. I  
 shall therefore only say, that *Tully* proceeds to  
 illustrate this Position, *viz.* that, supposing  
 Death to be the utter Extinction of us, “ it is  
 “ yet rather to be looked upon as a *Blessing*,  
 “ than an *Evil*.” This he does from Observa-  
 tion and Example of the *Miseries* of the pre-  
 sent Life; to all which Death will put as cer-  
 tain an End, as it does to our Being. And  
 whereas it might be objected, “ but Death,  
 “ at the same time it frees us from the *Evils* of  
 “ Life, robs us likewise of the *Blessings* of it;  
 “ and

“ and it must be miserable to *want* these.” —  
 Tully goes on to observe, “ How absurd and  
 “ unintelligible it is to say, he can *want* any  
 “ thing, who himself is *nothing*.” This Thought,  
 and, if you will, the Manner of Expression, he  
 dwells upon, and considers in a great many  
 Lights; and, to illustrate how quite absurd it is  
 to say, concerning such as are dead, and have  
 no *Sense* of any thing, that they can *want* any  
 thing, even to Life itself. He observes, even  
 concerning the living, that they may have a  
 Sense of their not having many Things, and yet  
 cannot, with any Propriety or Meaning, be said  
 to *want* them. Thus, though a Man finds he  
 has neither *Horns* nor *Wings*, no body says, that  
 he *wants* them; since these and such like Things  
 are not adapted to him, either by Use or Na-  
 ture. “ *Quia cum id non habeas, quod tibi nec*  
 “ *usu, nec natura sit aptum, non careas, etiamsi*  
 “ *sentias te non habere*” —

Then immediately follows the latter Part of  
 Mr. Warburton's Quotation, and which we are  
 now considering: “ *Hoc premendum etiam at-*  
 “ *que etiam est argumentum, confirmato illo, de*  
 “ *quo, si mortales animi sunt, dubitare non pos-*  
 “ *sumus, quin tantus interitus in morte sit, ut ne*  
 “ *minima quidem suspicio sensus relinquatur.*”  
 That is, “ This Argument must be insisted  
 “ upon, and urged home; the other thing be-  
 “ ing granted and fixed, which cannot possibly  
 “ be denied, viz. that if the Soul itself is mor-  
 “ tal, there must in Death be so thorough a  
 “ Destruction of all *Sense*, that not so much as  
 “ a Sha-

“ a Shadow, or Suspicion of any remains.” After which he goes on in the farther Pursuit of his Argument, to shew how utterly impossible and absurd it is to say, that the Soul, after it has been by Death deprived of all *Sense*, can want any thing. And whereas it may be said, “ But this very Thing, viz. to be without *Sense*, to be deprived or bereaved of it, is in itself hateful,” he observes finally, “ That it would indeed be hateful, if there was any want of it : But since it is absolutely clear, that nothing can be in him, who is himself nothing ; nothing can be hateful in or to him, who himself neither wants nor feels.”

Now what there is in all this, that comments so clearly upon the Passages cited out of the *Epistles*, must be left to others to judge. There Tully says, or seems to say, “ That Death deprives us of all Sense :” Here he only considers, “ what may be said to beget in us a *Contempt of Death*, on the Supposition, that the Soul itself dies with the Body.” And what he says is this ; “ That in that Case all it’s *Sensations* and *Wants* must be at an End ; and consequently no *Evil* remains.” But if any one shall suspect, that Tully talks here in the least otherwise than *merely hypothetically*, or at all according to his own absolute Judgment, let him read the former part of this Dissertation, and he will think otherwise ; especially, that Argument which Tully translates from the *Phædrus of Plato* ; beginning thus : “ *Quod semper movetur, æternum est, &c.*” c. 23. and follows



follows it with this Encomium; "*Licet concurrant plebei omnes Philosophi (sic enim ii, qui à Platone & Socrate, & ab illa familia dissident, appellandi videntur) non modo nihil unquam tam eleganter explicabunt, sed nec hoc quidem ipsum, quam subtiliter conclusum sit, intelligent.*"

And this reminds me of one Observation more, with which I shall conclude this Head, viz. That whereas Mr. Warburton several times tells us, that *Socrates* and *Plato* were not in the same Way of thinking with Relation to the Soul, it's Immortality, *Tully* here (as well as in other Parts of his Works, and even in this Disputation too) plainly insinuates, nay tells us the contrary; and calls all those who differed from them and their Sect in this Point (for so *Tully* is most naturally to be understood) *Plebei Philosophi, Vulgar Philosophers.*

VIII.

I shall now turn back to a very remarkable Passage from *Livy*, quoted by Mr. Warburton, p. 167, 168. who is here endeavouring to account for the extreme Corruption of the *Mysteries*; which made it at last necessary to abolish them every where.

"The third and last Cause, which he mentions, of this Corruption, was, the Celebrators of them withdrawing themselves from the Care and Inspection of the Civil Magistrate." An Instance of which is this Story from the *Roman Historian*; of a little Priest, who of his own Head brought the *Mysteries of Bac-*

*Bacchus* into *Etruria*; from whence in Time they reached *Rome*; and in both Places produced the wretched Effects, so emphatically described by the Historian \*.

Mr. *Warburton* says, “ The Words of *Livy* “ shew, that the Mysteries were in their own “ Nature, quite another Thing; and invented “ for the Improvement of Knowledge and Virtue : ” For the Proof of which Reflection, he cites the following Passage; and it is the only one brought in support of it. “ *Græcus ignobilis in Etruriam primum venit, nulla cum arte earum, quas multas ad animorum corporumque cultum nobis eruditissima omnium gens invexit, sed Sacrificulus & Vates.* ” Which Mr. *Warburton* translates thus: “ A Greek, of “ mean Extraction, a little Priest and Sooth- “ sayer, came first into *Etruria*, without any “ Skill or Wisdom in mysterious Rites, many “ Sorts of which that most improved People “ hath brought in among us for the Culture “ and Perfection both of Mind and Body.”

To this Manner of rendering the Historian’s Words, and representing his Sense, the following Objections may be justly made. “ *Græcus ignobilis* ” is not, a Greek of mean Extraction, but, an obscure Greek; a Greek of no Note or Fame for any thing commendable: On the contrary, as the Historian goes on; “ he had “ none of those Arts, or had no Skill in any “ of those Arts, which the Greeks had invented for the Improvement both of Body and

\* *Livy*, Hist. L. 39. c. 8—14.

“Mind.” And this is said by way of Contrast to his real Character; which was diminutive enough, and immediately follows, in two Words; “*Sed Sacrificulus & Vates*,” rendered very well by Mr. Warburton, *a little Priest and Soothsayer*. And when the Historian had said this, he seems plainly to have thought, little more was necessary to explain his Character, and that every one would presently guess what was to be expected from so worthy a Person. Therefore it was not well in Mr. Warburton, to place *this* Character of the Greek, in his Translation, before the Historian’s Account of his Ignorance in the polite Arts of his own Country: Since, if it had been so placed in the Original, *Livy* must have been guilty of a Fault in Writing, which he is as little chargeable with as most Authors. It would have been very superfluous, after telling us, that he was *a little Priest and Soothsayer*, to have added, that he was likewise ignorant and unskilled in the *Arts* for which *Greece* was most famous. And accordingly we see, he has done just the contrary, and made, “*Sed Sacrificulus & Vates*,” the Contrast to a Man skilled in the *Arts* by which *Greece* had been so useful to itself and other Countries; *Italy* in particular.

But this brings in another Exception to Mr. Warburton’s Translation of this Passage; and which will make the first, I think, more easily allowed of. To every unprejudiced Person, that reads this Passage in *Livy*, it will presently appear, that by the *Arts* which the Historian

here



here speaks of, and commends *Greece* for the Invention and Cultivation of, improving and perfective of both Mind and Body, many of which had by this Time been carried as far as *Rome*, he means their Improvements in Knowledge of all Kinds; Philosophy, Politics, Oratory, Poetry, Musick, Architecture, Painting, Statuary, Medicine, Surgery, the Gymnastic Exercises, &c. Many of these the *Romans* had by this Time received from *Greece*, by Means of their Expeditions into that Country. For the Time we are now speaking of was even subsequent to the Expedition which the *Romans* made against *Antiochus*.—But how does Mr. *Warburton* understand these *Arts*, mentioned by *Livy* upon this Occasion? Why, he refers them all, without Exception, to the *Mysteries*. For so his Translation runs—"without any  
" Skill or Wisdom in *mysterious* Rites, many  
" Sorts of which, that most improved People  
" hath brought in among us, for the Culture  
" and Perfection both of Mind and Body."  
Nothing is more easy than to say how, or in what Sense, many of the *Grecian Arts* were intended for the Improvement of the *Body*, and the Enlargement of the sensible Enjoyments of Life: But it is not so easy, surely, on the contrary, very difficult, to shew what Relation *mysterious Rites* (in their original Purity) had to the *Body*, whatever they might have to the *Mind*.—Another Thing likewise will be very difficult to do, *viz.* whereas *Livy* expressly says, that many of these *Arts* had been already by the  
Greeks

Greeks brought in among the Romans, "*quas multas—eruditissima gens invexit*," to shew, that any *mysterious Rites* at all had been carried thither *before* this Expedition of the *little Priest* to *Italy*. If I be not much mistaken, this *little Priest* was the very *first* that came from *Greece* to *Italy*, upon such a Design, and with such Business; and the Manner of *Livy's* Relation would lead any one to think, these *Bacchanalian* Mysteries might be the very *first*, that were known at *Rome*. Besides; it is very hard to see, how it was possible for Mr. *Warburton* to put such a *Construction*, as he has done, upon the Words of *Livy*. Supposing the Historian could have reckoned the *Mysteries* a *Grecian* Art, he could not reckon them the Sum total of the *Arts* of *Greece*, nor the *only* Arts by which *Greece* had profited *Rome* at this Time. How came Mr. *Warburton* then to imagine, that the *many Arts*, which *Livy* speaks of, were only the several Sorts of *mysterious Rites*? —Lastly; common Grammar should have suggested a different Sense of this Passage. "*Nulla cum arte earum*" *sc. rerum*; or, *nulla cum arte earum*," for, *cum nulla earum artium*—"*quas multas ad animorum, &c.*" *Rituum*, or *Mysteriorum*, will neither of them stand in this Sentence. And to every unprejudiced Mind, it must be plain, the Historian does not accuse this Man of Unskilfulness in the *Mysteries*, or Ignorance of his Trade, but absolute Unacquaintedness with any and every really useful Art in Life. In short, the Character of this *Priest*

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and

and Soothsayer, as it stands in *Livy*, is, that of a mean, obscure, ignorant Fellow, who had nothing but his *Mysteries* to import into *Italy*.

By this time, perhaps, Mr. *Warburton* may see how little Reason he had to appeal to this Passage in *Livy*, for the good Intention and Purity of these *Bacchanalian Mysteries* in their Original. For *Livy* does not so much as by the most distant Hint concern himself with the original Institution of them. Let them have been ever so much better in their Beginning than in their Progress; let them have been invented ever so certainly, and with Judgment, for the Improvement of Knowledge and Virtue; *Livy* must not be appealed to for the Truth of this; because he is silent upon this Head. But,

Mr. *Warburton's* next Observation upon this Story, *Livy* will not countenance so much as by his Silence; but expresses himself to a very contrary Purpose. "It is farther observable," says he, that this Priest brought the Mysteries pure with him into *Italy*, and that they "received their Corruption there."—For the Truth of which, he appeals to *Hispala's Story to the Consul*: and all the Evidence (taken Notice of by him) is, her telling the Consul, that at first Women only celebrated the Rites. It might have been farther observed, that according to her Account, the Rites were celebrated only by Day-light, and Women only presided as Priestesses, chosen among themselves, by Turns; and more, that the *Mysteries* were celebrated but seldom; only three Times a Year, upon



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upon certain Days \*.—But how little Evidence all these Things, put together, will afford, that the Priest brought the *Mysteries* pure with him into Italy, may appear from many Considerations. It cannot be supposed, this Priest had any Thought of bringing the *Mysteries* into Italy in greater Purity than that in which they were celebrated in his own Country. And there they were not only celebrated in the Night (a Circumstance †, as generally and necessarily attending the *Mysteries* of every Sort, as any other that can easily be mentioned;) but likewise without any Distinction or Separation of the Sexes. And, as to the Numbers admitted at any Time to celebrate these *Mysteries* together, nothing limited that, but the Inclinations of the People: As many as would were always received, and sometimes even Force was used to increase the Company. The greater

\* *Tres in anno statos dies habuisse, quibus interdum Bacchis initiarentur; sacerdotes invicem matronas creari solitas.*

† It was this Circumstance that disgusted Tully so much at the *Mysteries* in general, and obliged him to insert in the first Law, “*Nocturna mulierum sacrificia ne sunt*—” In his Comment upon this Particular, he hints, plainly enough, how well it would be, if such a Law obtained in all Nations: He takes Notice too upon this Occasion, of the Severity with which the Senate animadverted upon these *Bacchanalian Mysteries*, in the Time of their Ancestors, agreeably to Livy’s Account here; and, lastly, to prevent the Charge of Singularity and Moroseness in this Conduct, he observes, that *Diagondas*, the *Theban*, was in the same Sentiment with himself; and, even in the Middle of Greece, absolutely prohibited all nocturnal Sacrifices. “*Quo in genere severitatem majorum Senatus vetus auctoritas de Bacchanalibus, & Consulum exercitu adhibito, quæstio animadversioque declarat. Atque omnia nocturna, ne nos duriores forte videamur, in media Græcia Diagondas Thebanus lege perpetua sustulit.*” De Legib. L. 2. c. 15.

the Number was, the more they countenanced one another; and likewise (which was a principal and very natural Effect) mutually inspired one another with the greater enthusiastic Fury. Such Fury, or Frenzy, was, eminently, the Effect of these *Bacchanalian* Rites; as appears from all the Accounts and Memorials of them we meet with any where: And we shall presently have a remarkable Example of it from *Herodotus*.

Now with *such Purity* as this, we may suppose, and allow, this *Priest* might bring these *Mysteries* into *Italy*; and, even from the Historian's Account, we are not at Liberty to allow any more.

And here it must be observed farther, that *Mr. Warburton* is in the wrong to attempt proving the *Purity* of these Rites as they came into *Italy*, from the Relation which *Hispala* gives of the State of them upon their Arrival at *Rome*. For, as they were first brought to *Tuscany* by the *little Priest*, the only Way to know in what Condition they were at their Arrival in *Italy* from *Greece*, or in what Manner they came out of the *Priest's* Hands, is to consider the Effect of them in their first Station. We do not know the *little Priest* ever was at *Rome*; nor do we know how long it was (it might be some Years) before these *Mysteries* reached *Rome*. Indeed, the Historian resembles them to a *Plague*; the Infection of which at last spread itself to *Rome* \*. But I am not appre-

\* *Hujus mali labes ex Etruria Romam, velut contagione morbi penetravit.*

hensive, that any body will, upon the Strength of so *disagreeable* a Similitude, argue for the quick Passage of them any whither.

Let us then consider the State of them in *Tuscany*, where they first arrived.—

We left the Historian above giving the Character of the *Greek*, who brought these *Mysteries* into *Italy*;—An *obscure* Fellow,—fraught with no *useful Art* of *Greece*,—a *diminutive Priest* and *Soothsayer*.—Let him now proceed:

“ But though a Priest, he was not one of those, who publickly professing their Business, endeavour to strike Men’s Minds with Reverence and Dread by any open Species of Religion \*.” What was he then? why, “ he professed and was President over certain *secret Rites*: They were *Mysteries*—†” Every one that reads the Original here, must presently observe, in what Manner the Historian expresses himself with Relation to this Priest and his Business: Displeasure and Contempt are equally blended in almost every Word and Syllable.

But he next proceeds to the actual Communication of these *Mysteries* to the *Etrurians*.

“ At first they were communicated but to a small Number.” Whether these were Men only, or Women only, is not said. “ But presently the Numbers were increased, and a great many, both Men and Women, were

\* *Nec is qui aperta religione propalam & quæstum & disciplinam profitendo, animos horrore imbueret.*—

† *Sed occultorum Antistes sacrorum: Initia erant.*



“initiated into them. And the Pleasures of  
 “Wine and Feasting, joined with the Cere-  
 “monies, were the Bait, by which the great-  
 “est Part were to be drawn in and ensnared\*.”

And what followed immediately upon this, the Historian tells us in the next Place, and gives a most lively Description of the Enormities which these poor Wretches ran into without Remorse, and without Bounds; which I shall throw into the Margin, without translating it, as Mr. Warburton has done by the almost equally emphatical Description which *Hispala* gives of the terrible Effects of these *Mysteries*, when they reached *Rome*: Only the learned Reader will observe, here are some Enormities mentioned, which *Hispala* has taken no Notice of†.

If then, we either consider in what State these *Mysteries* were in *Greece* at this Time of Day, and long before, or attend to what the Historian says was the Effect of them immediately upon their being brought to *Tuscany*, and before they reached *Rome*, we cannot but see

\* *Primo paucis tradita; deinde vulgari capta per viros mulieresque additæ voluptates religioni vini & epularum, quò plurimum animi illicerentur.*

† *Quum vinum animos & nox & misti sæminis mares, ætatis teneræ majoribus, discrimen omne pudoris extinxissent, corruptelæ primum omnis generis fieri capte; quum ad id quisque quo natura promioris libidinis esset paratam voluptatem haberet. Nec unum genus noxæ, supra promiscua ingenuorum sæminarumque erant; sed falsi testes, falsa signa, testimoniaque & iudicia ex eadem officina exhibant. Venena indidem, intestinæque cædes, ita ut nec corpora quidem interdum ad sepulturam extarent. Multa dolo, pleraque per vim audebantur. Occulebat vim, quod præ ululatus tympanorumque & cymbalorum strepitu nulla vox quiritantium inter supra & cædes exaudiri poterat.*

how.

how intirely without Reason it must be to conclude the *Purity* of them, merely because *Hippala* tells the *Consul*, " that at first *Women* only were initiated into them, and presided over them." Women were as capable as others, to say the least, of working themselves up into an enthusiastic Frenzy; and then, equally incapable of judging what they ought, or ought not, to do. And whoever reads the Account of a female *Bacchus* among the *Greeks*, or sees the Representation of one in Sculpture, or Statuary-work in Pieces of Antiquity; or, lastly, attends to the *Manner* of *Clodius's* Discovery, when he attempted the Violation of the *Mysteries* of the *Bona Dea*, will be abundantly sensible of the extreme Nothingness of such an Argument.

It may indeed be easily granted, that while the *Mysteries* were thus confined among the *Females*; while none presided, and none were initiated but of that Sex; and while they were celebrated too only in the *Day-time*, and this but seldom; they were not capable of producing so many violent Disorders as they afterwards did. But then, it must, on the other hand, be observed too, that *none* of these Circumstances were *Grecian* Instances of the *Purity* of these Rites. Because nothing is more certain, as was before observed, than that none of these Limitations attended the Celebration of these *Mysteries* in *Greece*.

However, it was not long before these *Roman* Women were under the full Influence of the

God, whose Mysteries they celebrated; and *Paculla Minia Campana*, who happened to preside at that Time, initiated, by the special Direction of the God, her *two Sons* into the Mysteries; and of a *diurnal*, made it a *nocturnal* Assembly; (both which indeed she might very well have done, without any special Commission; since it was thus every where else, and particularly in *Greece*; ) and farther, for *three Times* in the *Year*, appointed *five Days* in every *Month* for celebrating the Mysteries. By this last Alteration effectual Care was taken, that the initiated should never be cool enough to admit of much Reflection, and the religious Fury being continued from one Assembly to another, was by that Means necessarily increased; and it need be no wonder the poor Creatures, under such Influence, should be hurried beyond all Bounds.

How quick the Infection spread, so as in a Manner to become general, appears from *Hispala's* Confession; "that they were become a  
" vast Multitude, and indeed, almost another  
" *People* \*." And it appears, the Consul was so struck with her Relation, as also with what he himself had learnt otherways upon a little farther Enquiry, that he judged it necessary to lay the Affair immediately before the *Senate*. And the Senate itself appears to have been as much alarmed upon the Occasion, as if another *Hannibal* had been at the Gates; and therefore directly committed to the Consuls an extraordi-

\* *Multitudinem ingentem, alterum jam prope populum esse.*



nary Power to "Enquire into the *Bacchanalian*  
" and all nocturnal Mysteries †."

Mr. Warburton limits this Decree to the *Bacchanalian* Mysteries only, and says, it did not extend to the *Mysteries in general*; they being of too important Use to the State to be parted with *ob unius delictum*, p. 169. What it was that could lead him to this Reflection, it is impossible to say: But sure I am, that *Livy's* Account is so far from countenancing it, that it is directly the contrary. What he may mean by *Mysteries in general*, is not easy to say: But it is very hard to say, what particular Mysteries those were, which the Senate would, or did, except out of the Law of Abolition, as being of important Use to the State: And yet hardest of all would it be to shew, that the Senate in any Age of the Commonwealth had at all declared itself in Favour of any Sort of them whatsoever, "as being really in themselves useful to the State." On the contrary; it is plain, the Decree of the Senate gave the Consuls Power to inquire into, not only the *Bacchanalian*, but all Sorts of *Mysteries* whatsoever: "*De Bacchanalibus sacrisque nocturnis.*" The Consuls themselves plainly understood it in the very largest Sense; and therefore gave it in Charge to the *Plebeian Ediles*, to see "that no Mysteries were celebrated any where \*;" and to the *Triumviri Capitales*, "that there were no nocturnal Assemblies upon any Account

† *De Bacchanalibus sacrisque nocturnis.*

\* *Ne qua sacra in aperto fierent.*

" what-

“ whatsoever †.” The same Thing farther appears, from the *Speech* which the Consuls made to the *Assembly of the People*, presently after having given these necessary Orders to the inferior Magistrates. The Consul that spoke, took Occasion from the *Prayer*, which usually preceded these more solemn Orations, to observe, “ that the *Gods* they had been just addressing to, were the *Gods* whom their Ancestors had taught them to worship upon all Occasions; and not those, who with corrupt and foreign Rites first drove their Worshippers into Madness, and then, into all Manner of Wickedness \*.” — He afterwards observes, “ that their Ancestors had taken all imaginable Care to keep out all external Rites whatsoever; by excluding from their City, in the strictest Manner, all those rambling Priests and Soothsayers, *sacrificulos vatesque* — and by prohibiting every Manner of sacrificing; that was not, *more Romano*, according to the Roman Custom and Ritual. For, says he, those wisest of Men, who understood so well both divine and human Right, thought nothing could so enfeeble Religion, as the suffering People to sacrifice, *non patrio sed externo ritu*, not after the Manner of their Forefathers, but some new and foreign Form ||.” — Then he tells

† *Ne qui nocturni cantus fierent.*

\* — *hos esse deos, quos colere, venerari, precarique majores vestri instituerunt: non illos, qui pravis & externis religionibus captas mentes velut furialibus stimulis ad omne scelus & ad omnem libidinem agerent.*

|| *Quoties hoc patrum avorumque ætate negotium est magistratibus*

tells them, " that he had mentioned these  
 " Things beforehand, for this Purpose among  
 " others; that no vain Fears might affect their  
 " Minds, when they should see the Magistrates  
 " destroying the *Bacchanalian* Mysteries, and  
 " breaking up all clandestine unlawful Assem-  
 " blies whatsoever &c." And in a Word, there  
 can be no Doubt, but it was owing to this  
 Decree, and the vigorous Execution of it, that  
*Rome* continued for so many Years, even down  
 to the Time of *Livy* and *Dion. Halicarnassensis*  
 (for his Testimony will be likewise presently  
 produced) so free, as it did, from mysterious  
 Rites of all Kinds.

The Passage in *Hierodotus* above taken Notice  
 of, is in the 4th Book, c. 78, &c. and contains  
 a very memorable Account of a royal Initiation  
 into the Mysteries of *Bacchus*, with the unlucky  
 Consequences of it. The Historian observing  
 concerning the *Scythians*, how utterly averse  
 they were to, and how much upon their Guard  
 against all foreign religious Rites and Customs,  
 whether publick or private; but those of *Greece*  
 especially (to which they seem to have had a  
 peculiar Antipathy); proceeds to confirm what  
 he says, by two Examples, viz. of *Anacharsis*

*tibus datum, ut sacra externa fieri vetarent? Sacrificulos vatesque foro, circo, urbe prohiberent? omnem disciplinam sacrificandi, præterquam more Romano, abolerent? Judicabant enim prudentissimi viri omnis divini humanique juris, nihil æque dissolvenda religionis esse, quam ubi, non patrio, sed externo, ritu sacrificaretur.*

*§ Hæc vobis prædicenda ratus sum, ne superstitio agitare animos vestros, quum demolientes nos Bacchanalia, discutientesque nefarios cætus cerneretis.*



the Philosopher, and *Scyles* one of their Kings. The Philosopher it seems, in his return from his Travels to his own Country, touching at *Cyzicum*, found the People there celebrating with great Pomp the Mysteries of the *Bona Dea*, or the *Mother of the Gods*. With which he was so much taken, that unhappily forgetting the Temper of his Countrymen, he vowed, if he got safe Home, he would immediately celebrate there the same *Mysteries* \*. Accordingly he no sooner arrived, but he set himself to the Performance of his Vow; and being caught in the Fact, the Prince shot him dead upon the Spot.

But the other Instance is more remarkable, and much more distinctly related by the Historian. It is that of *Scyles*, one of their Kings: Who having had a *Grecian* Woman for his Mother, was instructed betimes in the *Greek* Language, and very early got a Relish for the *Grecian* Manners and Customs. Which Taste he was afterwards so far from losing, that he daily improved it more and more, by indulging himself in the Initiation of them. This was what he took every Opportunity of doing; though with some Privacy and Caution, for fear of his People; who, he well knew, would never give him a Toleration for it. But, in order to indulge himself with more Freedom, and at the same Time with greater Security, he often marched his Army towards the *Boristhenites* (who pretended to be a *Greek* Colony); and there, leaving his *Scythians* behind him at some Distance

\* ——— διόσω τε κατὰ ταῦτα ——— καὶ πανυχίδα ἔποιον.

## Divine Legation of Moses. 61

from the Town, went himself into it, and gave a free Course to his Inclinations for the Habits, Manners and Customs of all Kinds, civil and religious, of the *Greeks*. And for his better Accommodation in these his Retirements from the *Scythians* (which were very frequent, and would last sometimes a Month, or even longer) he built himself a House there in the Manner, and with the Decorations, of the *Greeks*.

At Length he, had an extraordinary Impulse to be *initiated* into the *Mysteries of Bacchus* \*. Accordingly he was so; and with all the Effect that could be. For immediately upon *Initiation* his Brain was turned, and he became as errant a Madman for a Time, as any *Bacchans* of them all. The *Boristhenites* being, as it seems, wonderfully pleased with seeing a *Scythian*, and a *Scythian King*, under such Influence of their God, one of them presently ran with the News to the Army, and told them; "You have often  
" ridiculed our Mysteries, but come with me  
" and I will shew you the Effect of them upon  
" your own Prince †."

Some of the principal Officers went, and having, not without the utmost Surprise and contemptuous Indignation, seen the Truth of what was told them, returned immediately and made their Report to the Army. Which represented the Matter to such a Degree, that they presently deposed the King; and not long after

\* ἐπιθύμησε Διονύσω Βακχείῳ τιθεσθῆναι.

† νῦν ἔτι ὁ Δαίμων καὶ τὸν ὑμέτερον βασιλεῖα λιλάσθη καὶ βακχεύει καὶ ὑπὸ τῷ θεῷ μάννισαι.

(it seems he fled for it) they punished him with Death. The evil and violent Effect of *these Mysteries* upon the Brains of the *Initiated*, appears from the Reflection which the *Scythians* made upon it. Who, for this very Reason, reproached the *Greeks* with these *Bacchalian Rites*; and argued, how impossible it was, that he should be a *God*, who thus drove Men into Madness \*.

And since in the *Quotations* above, so many of them have related to the *Mysteries* (which Mr. Warburton calls the *most sacred Part of Pagan Religion*) give me Leave just to mention the Opinion of a well qualified and credible Historian concerning them in general, and I will close this *first Part*. It is that of *Dionysius Halicarnassensis* ||; who speaking of *Romulus* tells us; “ He cannot but admire him, among  
 “ many other Things, for the just Sentiments  
 “ he had concerning the Gods, and the Care  
 “ he took about the publick Religion. Which  
 “ was indeed his first Care. For this Purpose  
 “ he built Temples and Altars, appointed Festi-  
 “ vals and proper Sacrifices: And here he fol-  
 “ lowed what he judged to be the best Customs  
 “ and Practices of *Greece*. But as for the pro-  
 “ fane or idle Stories of the Gods, which ob-  
 “ tained among the *Greeks* and other Nations,  
 “ he rejected them all. Such as that of *Cælus’s*  
 “ being castrated by his Children; *Saturn’s* de-

\* Σκόδαί δὲ τῷ βακχεύειν περὶ ἑλλήσι ἐνιδίξασιν· ὃ γὰρ φάσι ἡ-  
 αὐδὲ ἵνα· οἶδν ἐξευρίσκειν τῶτον ὅστις μάνισθαι ἐνάγει ἀνθρώπους.

|| *Antiq. Rom. l. 2. c. 18, 19, 20.*



“ vouring his, for Fear of like injurious Treat-  
 “ ment from them; or *Jupiter's* imprisoning  
 “ his Father in *Tartarus*. Among the *Romans*  
 “ nothing is heard of the Wars of the Gods,  
 “ their Wounds, Chains, or being in Servitude  
 “ to Men: They have no Days of Mourning  
 “ and Lamentation for Violences offered to the  
 “ Gods, like those among the *Greeks*, for the  
 “ Rape of *Proserpine*, the Misfortune of *Bac-*  
 “ *chus*, or any Thing of such a Nature. And  
 “ (though indeed, it must be owned, the Man-  
 “ ners of the *Romans* are, by this Time, some-  
 “ what depraved; yet) one shall not hear of, or  
 “ see among them any hair-brained Fanatics;  
 “ the Wildnesses of the *Corybantes*, clandestine  
 “ Assemblies, *Bacchanals*, SECRET MYSTERIES  
 “ (τελετὰς ἀπορρήτους), or nocturnal Vigils kept  
 “ in the Temples by Men and Women pro-  
 “ miscuously, or any other monstrous Practice  
 “ of a like Kind \*; which are so common a-  
 “ mong *Greeks* and *Barbarians*.——But, not-  
 “ withstanding (though I cannot but commend  
 “ the *Romans* on these and other like Accounts)  
 “ I would not be thought ignorant that some  
 “ Good may lie at the Bottom of some of the  
 “ *Greek* Fables, and some Usefulness attend them.  
 “ Some of them may allegorically represent  
 “ certain Effects and Phænomena of Nature:  
 “ Others may instruct how to bear the Calami-  
 “ ties of Life: Some may be calculated to cure  
 “ the Mind of vain Terrors and unsound Opi-  
 “ nions: And others may be useful in other

\* —ὅτι ἄλλο τῶν παραπλησίων τέτοις τερατευμάτων ἔδιν.—

“ Respects. But yet, though I know these  
“ Things as well as any Man, as I am myself  
“ upon my Guard against Things of this Na-  
“ ture, I cannot but much more approve the  
“ *Roman Theology* ; recollecting how little the  
“ Good is, in itself considered, which is gain-  
“ ed from the *Grecian Fables*, and how nar-  
“ rowly, or to how few, it is confined. For  
“ they can be of Service to none but such as  
“ can enter into the Reasons for which such  
“ Fables were originally composed. And as  
“ these are but few, the rest, who are exceed-  
“ ingly more numerous, always understand  
“ these Fables in a wrong Sense ; and learn  
“ from thence either to despise the Gods, or  
“ else to imitate them in the worst Practices a-  
“ scribed to them.”

The Reader cannot fail, I think, of observ-  
ing, how much this Account of the *Grecian*  
Fables and Mysteries resembles, and at the same  
Time supports, what *Tully* and *Cotta* say above,  
in the Passages cited out of the *first Tusculan* and  
the *Nature of the Gods* ; and he will likewise  
be the better prepared to understand thoroughly  
a Passage which will be hereafter cited from  
*Macrobius*, relating to the *Mysteries*.

## PART II.

### Mr. Warburton's Manner of Reasoning.

HERE I propose to take a much larger Compass, and consider Mr. Warburton's Manner of Reasoning, not merely in the occasional or incidental Parts of his *Book*, but in those, that relate to, and more or less affect the Truth of the *two Propositions*, to which this first Volume of the *Divine Legation of*, &c. is confined.

#### I.

And I begin with his Manner of proving the *first Proposition*, viz. "That the inculcating the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments is necessary to the Well-being of civil Society;" from the *Imperfection of civil Society with Regard to that Power which it wants*, p. 14. He has just before been treating briefly of its *Imperfection*, with Regard to *that Power which it has*. And this is the *Power* which he had *inlarged upon* in his *Alliance*. But it seems, there is a *Power*, which civil Society is destitute of, and yet is absolutely necessary to its Support. The Consideration of *this Power* did not enter into the *Alliance*; and as the present Remarks are not intended to be concerned at all with that Performance, I shall only consider what Mr. Warburton says concerning



this latter Power, in order to see what Support it will give to his *Proposition*.

All that Mr. *Warburton* says upon this Head, (so far as he appears to be right) might have been comprised in a very narrow Compass. The Violences exercised in a State of Nature, were what drove Mankind into civil Societies: The End therefore of civil Establishments, was to preserve Peace in the Preservation of natural Right and Property.—Therefore, again, the primary and chief Business of the Legislature every where must be to make Laws, for the Security of natural Right and Property, that no one should violate them: *i. e.* These Laws must be negative; “*Ne quis fur esset, neu latro, neu quis adulter.*” And concerning these, it is plain, that without the Sanction of a *Penalty* on the Violators of them, they are nothing: And with it, as it is proportioned and adapted, they may have all the Force of Laws, or all the Force necessary to secure Obedience. But as for particular, *positive Rewards*, (which, according to Mr. *Warburton*, are the Power which Society has *not*, and yet cannot subsist without,) these are not necessary; as well because the *Penalty* annexed is sufficient to secure Obedience in general (if rightly adjusted, and steadily executed on the particular Offenders); as also because Protection and Security do immediately and universally follow the steady Observance of these Laws.

Such *negative* Laws are the most original and most fundamental Laws of all States. For  
suppose

suppose but Obedience to *these*, and any State may subsist; without it, it cannot. *Positive* Laws therefore are not immediately necessary, and should never be made, but with great Caution and upon very urgent Occasion. And as to *these*, it is plain, when they respect the *whole* Community, positive Rewards cannot be found for every one. Protection and a Participation of the Good, naturally arising from such Laws, must always attend Obedience to them, and be, ordinarily, a sufficient Recompence for it. But as the Consideration and Prospect of these may not always be effectual to secure Obedience, it is necessary that a *Penalty* be annexed to deter those who might otherwise be tempted, by some private sinister Views, to neglect them.

This, I think, is agreeable to the Practice of all States, the Notions of most, or all Writers in Politicks, and the Sentiments of the Generality of Mankind. And, though in a general and popular Way it is usual to say, "The  
" Sanctions of all Laws are Rewards and Punishments;" and, that these are the two  
" Hinges upon which civil Government turns;" if by *Rewards* be meant particular, positive Encouragements, as by *Punishments* are meant particular, positive Penalties, it is not strictly true. And I cannot but wonder Mr. *Warburton* should so far come into it, as to subjoin immediately;  
" And so far is certain and apparent to the common Sense of Mankind, that whatever Laws  
" are not enforced by both these Sanctions, will  
F 2 " never

“ never be observed in any Degree sufficient to  
 “ carry on the Ends of Society.” Ibid. I suspect a latent Meaning in those Words, *in a Degree sufficient to carry on the Ends of Society.* For he goes on in the very next Paragraph to deny, that however necessary the *Sanction of Rewards* may be to secure the Observance of human Laws, *This Sanction was or could be enforced by civil Government for the Observance of it's Laws:* And what is stranger still, he will shew this, “ from the true and original Constitution of civil Government, and from the  
 “ Nature of Society.” p. 15. By the Way; what Language is that, “ of *inforcing* a Sanction :” *Inforcing* Laws by *Sanctions* is common and intelligible. But what is, *inforcing* a *Sanction*? Can a *Sanction* want *Inforcement*? No otherwise than as a Thing can want itself. Such Language therefore is neither common nor intelligible: Yet it is used here many Times over.

Mr. Warburton is apprehensive, this will be  
 “ looked upon as a violent Paradox; nothing  
 “ being more common in the Mouths of Men,  
 “ than that the Sanctions of Rewards and Punishments are the two Pillars of civil Government.”—Ibid. The Thing in itself considered, *viz.* that the Sanction of positive and particular *Rewards* is not necessary to human Laws, is no Paradox; and I think, there is no Body of a different Sentiment. But there may be something strange enough in the Author's *Manner* of expressing and treating of it. He pursues



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pursues what he has undertaken, and will prove, very particularly,

1. *That by the true and original Constitution of civil Government, the Sanction of Rewards was not enforced.* Ibid. I am afraid, the Meaning of this Proposition will not be understood, unless it be this, "That to add the Sanction of Rewards, along with that of Punishments, to civil Laws, is not agreeable to the true and original Constitution of civil Government : " And if this be it, let us see how it is made out. " In entering into Society, says he, it was stipulated between the Governor and Governed, that Protection and Obedience should be the reciprocal Conditions of each other. When therefore a Citizen obeys the Laws, that Debt on Society is discharged by the Protection it affords him. But in Respect to Disobedience the Proceeding is not analogous." — Ibid. Many Things may be observed here. Mr. Warburton is defective in his Account of what was stipulated. It was not merely Protection on one Side, and Obedience on the other : But, what was very desirable, it was agreed that good Laws should be made for the general Benefit of Society : And then, that those who obeyed them should have the Protection of the civil Power ; those who disobeyed them should have — What? Why, Treatment according to the Nature of their Disobedience.

Now, it is plain, that a Citizen in obeying good Laws, is rewarded, not only with Pro-

tection, but likewise every Moment with the good Effects of his own Obedience: For the Laws, by the Supposition, tend to his Good; and Good then must be the immediate Consequence of Obedience. And it must be (and should have been much earlier than the Author does it) observed, that it is hardly possible in the Nature of Things, that more than this should be a Sanction of *Reward* to the Laws of a State: Because no State has particular Rewards of Riches, Places, Honours, &c. for all it's good Members. Matter seems necessarily wanting. Otherwise, it ought to be, and would be, applied.—*But*, says he, *in respect to Disobedience the Proceeding is not analogous*.—Yes; it is *analogous*, supposing by *Disobedience* is meant, as is and must be meant before by *Obedience*; viz. what is general or universal. Such Disobedience is a formal renouncing the Society or Government. And where Obedience was never formally or virtually promised, a Man is at Liberty to disregard the Laws of such Society or Government: And the only Consequence is a Refusal of it's Protection: Then, he either enters into some other, or lives at large, as in a State of Nature. If it be not general or universal Disobedience, then Protection is continued or withdrawn according to the Nature of the particular Offence. It may be equivalent to a total Disobedience; and, if it be so intended by the Offender, Expulsion and withdrawing the Protection seems to be the proper and adequate Punishment, whether the Man will consider

sider it as such or not. The State that expels and withdraws it's Protection will, doubtless, consider it as a Punishment, and at the same Time secure itself. Yet, if this Offender has (as it must be supposed he has) consented to live in the Society, as subject to it's Laws; has lived in it and enjoyed it's Protection; he must not think to get out of it by a notorious Act of Disobedience. After he has been thus guilty, he may indeed be glad to get out: But this can be only to avoid the Penalty due to his Crime according to the Laws. And if he pretends, that Expulsion from the Society was his View in committing the Fact: This can be no more than a Pretence; because there was a plainer and more innocent Way of coming at it; *viz.* by a formal Renunciation: Which should, I think, be universally admitted.—In the other Way (which really is no Way of renouncing the Society) he is, and deservedly, liable to the Penalty provided for such Disobedience. If the Disobedience, (a particular Instance: So it must be understood) is of one who is a Member of the civil Society, and consequently one who is to be considered as desiring still to live in it, Expulsion and a total withdrawing of Protection can very rarely be the proper Punishment; but, generally speaking, it must be, (or the Laws will appoint it to be) some pecuniary Mulct or corporal Chastisement: *i. e.* Such a Penalty as may, with Respect to a continuing Member of Society, be justly and probably



bably thought sufficient to overbalance the Temptation to Disobedience.

It is rightly observed by Mr. Warburton, that Expulsion for every Offence, or withdrawing of Protection and exposing every offending Member to the License of the rest, would soon bring the State into a *Consumption*, or throw it into *Convulsions*. Therefore other Penalties were invented; such as *pecuniary Mulets*, *Mutilation of Members*, &c. Hence, says he, arose the *Sanction*, and only *Sanction of civil Laws*; meaning the Sanction of Punishment. And for this being the *only* Sanction he gives the following Reason: "For that Protection is no  
 " Reward, in the Sense that these are Punish-  
 " ments, is plain from hence, that the one is  
 " of the Essence of Society itself, the other an  
 " adventitious Adjunct." p. 16. This seems to be too much like playing with Words.— Surely, it will not be denied, that the Promise of Protection to obedient Subjects, is a *Sanction* of the Laws to be obeyed, (no Matter whether it is expressly mentioned in every Law); *i. e.* it is a *Motive* that may encourage Obedience; and especially, when it is added; that, Laws being made, as they ever ought to be, for the Good of the Society, the Members cannot obey those Laws, and not at the same Time feel and partake of the Benefit of them. And, though *Protection* is (as it is expressed) *of the Essence of Society*; he might have considered, that the *Protection of the Society* is a vastly different Thing from the Protection of a *particular*

cular Member of the Society; and though Society cannot subsist without Protection, it may subsist without the Protection of *A*, or any particular Member. For no particular Member is of the *Essence* of Society. And therefore, though Protection is of the *Essence* of Society, yet with Reference to any particular Member it is a mere *Adjunct*; or as merely adventitious as any *Penalty* can be. Consequently this Reason is not good.

“ But, he says, this will appear farther by  
“ considering the Opposite to Protection, Ex-  
“ pulsion from the Society, or Banishment.”  
—What will appear farther? Why, that *Penalties* are the only *Sanction* of civil Laws.  
“ For this (Expulsion) is no Punishment, but  
“ by Accident: And so the State understood  
“ the Matter, as we may collect from the  
“ Manner of employing it as a Punishment on  
“ Offenders. For Banishment is of universal  
“ Use, with other Punishments——” p. 16.  
Every State does and will, (and must, while it retains any Opinion of itself and it's own Advantages,) look upon the Expulsion of a Member from it as an *Evil* inflicted on that Member. And it is no Evidence to the contrary, the observing, that States generally still retain their Authority over the expelled Person: Since this is never done but in the Case of more than ordinary Guilt, and to heighten the Penalty of Banishment. For thus the Offender is effectually hindered from the Chance he would otherwise have of equalling his present Settlement,

or perhaps greatly mending it. And whenever this is the Case, the expelled Person is not totally and absolutely driven out of the Society; or, to express it more properly, out of the Demesnes of the State to which he belonged, and of which he was a Member; but is sent and confined to some remote, obscure Corner of them; and consequently, of Course still remains subject to, and has in many Respects the Protection of the State to which he belonged. But when Banishment is simple and absolute, the Criminal is merely turned out of the Society and obliged to seek a Retreat Abroad, where he can find it. In this Case the former Relation between him and the State intirely ceases, and they are to each other as in a State of Nature.—

Had Mr. *Warburton* attended to these Things, he had talked upon this Head much clearer than he does; and had escaped some, not merely Obscurities, but Errors, which he here runs into. When he speaks of *Banishment*, as a *withdrawing of Protection*, it is a Mistake; it never is so, absolutely, but in the Instance of Expulsion from the *whole* Demesnes of the State; and, consequently, when it is *least* a Punishment. When a Criminal is sent to a remote Part of the State's Dominions, to be confined there, as it still retains it's Authority over him, so he still has a Right to, and may and will claim the State's Protection, upon many Accounts, and in many Respects; and the State will afford it him.

Thus,



Thus, Banishment is not necessarily a *withdrawing of Protection*; and it is only then so, when it is, and is intended to be, the *lightest Punishment*. Which may shew perfectly Mr. Warburton's Error, when he says immediately after; "Now where the thus withdrawing Protection is inflicted for Disobedience, all States have agreed, in Practice, to retain their Right to Obedience from the banished Member; though, according to the Nature of the Thing itself, that Right be really discharged."—What else but *Disobedience* can be a Reason for *withdrawing Protection*? And how can a State *withdraw Protection*, and yet retain a *Right to Obedience* from the banished Member? This is inconceivable and impossible. And, in Fact, we see it to be otherwise, wherever Protection is withdrawn absolutely. In this Case, the banished Person immediately puts himself under the Protection of some other State; and is thought by himself and others, and justly, to have no Relation, as before, to the State of which he was formerly a Member. This Mr. Warburton himself owns to be really the Truth of the Case, when he says, "that, according to the Nature of the Thing itself, the Right to Obedience is really discharged:" and gives a very good Reason for it: "Because Obedience and Protection are reciprocal Conditions of each other." If then what he says be true, that, notwithstanding this, "States have all agreed, in Practice, to retain their Right to Obedience from the banished Member;"

“ber ;” it will only follow, that they have all in Practice agreed to do a very foolish, and absurd, and impossible Thing. It must be plainly foolish and absurd, for *States, in Practice, to go contrary to the Nature of Things* ; and it is impossible they should retain a Thing, which, in the *Nature of Things*, is not.

Yet, notwithstanding, he proceeds to assert, “It was first necessary all States should act thus, when they inflicted Exile as a Punishment : It being no Punishment, but by Accident, when the Claim to Subjection was remitted with it.”—Yes ; the State, as was said before, will and must look upon it as a *Punishment* to expel a Member out of it’s Society, (for surely every State has a good Opinion of it’s own Privileges ;) and it may think mere Expulsion an *adequate* Punishment for some Instances of Disobedience. And the Subject must, in the first Instant, esteem it a Punishment, to be ignominiously thrust out from being a Member of the Civil Society to which he belonged, as no longer worthy the Privileges of it. And though such a one may chance to fare as well abroad, or better than he did at home ; this is no more a Proof, that his Expulsion was not a Punishment, intended to be such, inflicted as such, and adequate to his Guilt, than the Compassion and Relief, which a fined, or mutilated, or scourged Criminal may afterwards meet with from tender People, is a Proof, that Fining, Mutilation, or Scourging, is no Punishment, or a Punishment only by Accident.

In

In the second place, says he, "States had a Right to act thus;" i. e. to retain their Right of Obedience from the banished Person; "because, being inflicted (Banishment) on an Offender, all Claim of Advantage from that reciprocal Condition had been before forfeited." The reciprocal Condition is Protection and Obedience. Now if Protection is the Condition of Obedience, and, *vice versa*, Obedience the Condition of Protection, remove one, and you necessarily take away the other. This is according to the very *Nature of the Thing itself*; and is as plain, as any Proposition whatsoever. To talk therefore of *retaining a Right to Obedience*, when all *Right to Protection* is denied, is absurd and contradictory. And the *Practice* of all States might have shewn Mr. Warburton the contrary. For whenever a State banishes a Criminal only to some distant Corner of it's Dominions, it both affords Protection and claims Obedience: And this is what it does in the Case of a *greater* Degree of Guilt. But when it absolutely expels the Criminal out of it's Dominions, it never more concerns itself about him, except merely guarding against his Return: And this is inflicted in the Case of *lesser* Guilt. And whereas Mr. Warburton thinks he has here obviated an *embarrassed Question*, viz. "Whether a banished Man is a Subject of the State that expelled him?" p. 17. *marg. Note*; he certainly has more *embarrassed* it than it was before; and the true Answer is, by distinguishing between *Banishments*. One is absolute,



lute, and the Criminal is wholly separated from the State: The State then has nothing to do with him; but merely to guard against his Return. Another is not so; the expelled Member is not thrown out of the Dominions of the State, but only restrained to a particular Part of them; and, it is plain, he may be restrained here under what Conditions the State pleases: And, in this Case, both Protection is afforded, and Obedience claimed. All this sure may very easily be conceived; and there is really no more Difficulty in the Thing, than there is in considering, that when a State has two Criminals, for whose Guilt *Banishment* is thought the proper Punishment; it may, finding the Guilt (or even the natural Temper) of the Criminals to be different, make this Banishment more or less rigorous; wholly expel one, and detain the other in Durance in some obscure Corner. In the former Case, the Civil Government resigns him to a State of Nature; absolutely withdraws Protection, and gives up all Claim to Subjection and Obedience, (all which the State certainly may do;) in the other, it does nothing of this; and as certainly is at Liberty whether it will or not.

But, lastly; besides that what Mr. Warburton has said under this *first Proposition*, is so plainly wrong; what is the Tendency of it all to clear up in the least what he undertook to prove? Here he has left us quite at a Loss.

Let us see whether we have any Amends made us, under the *second Proposition*.

2. " Our

2. "Our second Proposition is, that the  
"Sanction of Rewards could not, from the  
"Nature of Society, be enforced by it." For  
which he gives a double Reason: "Because it  
"could neither distinguish the Objects of it's  
"Favour; nor reward them, if distinguished,"  
p. 17.

1. "It could not distinguish the Objects of  
"it's Favour." To prove which, a Distinction  
is made between *Punishing* and *Rewarding*,  
viz. that in the one Case, there is *no Necessity of*  
*knowing the Motives on which a Transgressor*  
*acts*; in the other Case *there is*.

Civil Judicatures, in order to *punish*, endeavour only to find out, whether the Transgression of the Laws was *voluntary*, and do not trouble themselves about the particular Principles or Motives that influenced to the Transgression; but *punish* (having found this) *without Scruple, in Confidence of the Offender's Demerit*: And this, with very good Reason, as Mr. Warburton says: *Because no one, in his Senses, can be ignorant of the principal Transgressions of Civil Laws, of their Malignity.*—By *Demerit* must be understood, what is really such, or *real Demerit*, in Opposition to false or merely appearing Demerit. This is plain from the Manner of the Expression, *in Confidence of the Offender's Demerit.*—Now, I say, on the contrary, that no Civil Judicature is capable of making a Judgment in this Case, any more than in the other, of *real Merit*: Which, it is afterwards owned, it can make no Judgment  
I of,

of, or a very imperfect and incompetent one; and this is given as a *Reason* why *Rewards* cannot be the *Sanction* of human Laws. Real Demerit requires just the same Faculties and Discernment to make a Judgment of it, as real Merit; and both equally depend upon the internal Principles and Motives of the Heart, which influenced to Action. But the Heart is inscrutable to Man in both Cases equally.

What Mr. *Warburton* says to support his Assertion, that the Magistrate in punishing Transgressions, in Confidence of Demerit, proceeds with *very good Reason*, does not, be it ever so true, come up to the whole of Civil Punishment. Where a Transgression proceeds from *Sottish Negligence*, or *Brutal Passion*, there the Magistrate punishes, and there is real Demerit. But where a Transgression proceeds from pressing Necessity (as when Property is violated, to prevent Starving); or from Enthusiasm, or Superstition; the Magistrate still punishes, though there is no Demerit; or, perhaps, on the contrary, great Merit; and great Demerit would have attended the Omission. This is so far from being any Reason, why the Magistrate should not punish (I mean, where Enthusiasm or Superstition influence to Transgression) that it is the strongest Reason in the World for his doing it.

*The Case is otherwise*, he says, in *Rewarding*.—*Here the Motive must be considered*.—For my own part, I no more see a Necessity of this here, than he himself sees it in the other Case,

*viz.*



viz. of *Punishing*. For as Society reaps the same ill Effects from Transgressions, whatever are the secret Motives or Principles from whence they proceed; it reaps the same good Effects from Obedience to it's Laws, whatever secret Motives it may proceed from. And if for the former Reason it *punishes* rightly; for the latter it may and should *reward*, if it *can*. Mr. Warburton's Reason for *considering the Motive to Obedience*, is what, I believe, no body can understand. "Because, as merely doing ill  
 "deserves Punishment, a Crime in the Case of  
 "wrong Judgment being ever necessarily in-  
 "ferred; so merely abstaining from ill cannot  
 "for that very Reason have any Merit," p. 18. What is *merely doing ill*? merely transgressing a Law? The Action materially considered, which the Law forbids? Is not this often done, both without Guilt and Punishment? It cannot therefore, with any Propriety, be said, to *deserve* Punishment. And in many other Cases, where there is no *Desert* of Punishment, the Magistrate, notwithstanding, shall punish, and rightly; purely from a due Regard to the Publick; which can never be sufficiently consulted, without allowing such a Power of punishing.

*Mere doing ill*, it is said, *deserves Punishment; a Crime in the Case of wrong Judgment being ever necessarily inferred*. This is very obscure. But however, suppose in all *wrong Judgments* there is something *criminal*, (which, perhaps, is the Meaning;) he must

needs allow, that this *Criminalness* admits of *Degrees*; and, in some Cases, is evanescent, approaching to nothing with infinite Nearness. Yet the State punishes without any Distinction, where the Crime is infinitely small, as where it is excessively great; and, in the same Manner, and to the same Degree; which often is extreme. This sufficiently shews, that *Punishment* is not determined and measured by real Demerit.—But suffer him to conclude his Reason.—*So merely abstaining from ill, cannot for that very Reason have any Merit.* An Oedipus might find Employment here. *For that very Reason*—What is *that very Reason*? It is hard enough to say what it is; and not worth while to inquire after it; as it can never come up to the Author's Purpose; which, I think, I have already shewn. 2. His second Reason against positive *Rewards* is, in some Sense, a good one, *viz.* “That no Society can find a Fund sufficient for that Purpose.” This is the *only* Reason against positive Rewards of Obedience. And it is for this Reason, and no other, that the general Method among all Civil Governments has been, and still is, to enforce their Laws (the most necessary and fundamental of which are negative, *i. e.* against Injury) with only positive Punishments; it being thought, and rightly, that these, along with the Consideration and Experience of the immediate good Effects of Obedience, in the peaceable and secure Possession of natural Rights, would be sufficient to procure a general Regard to them.

Yet

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Yet still, since this Regard is not so general and so steady as might be wished, *could* any thing farther be found out, that might *positively* encourage Obedience, no one sure should be against it. And a great many have been of Opinion, that something of this Kind might be done; more than the Generality of States have troubled themselves about; or even any. And this has been reckoned a Fault, and such a one as ought to be remedied, as far as possible. Surely Mr. *Warburton* cannot dissent from this: And yet, though *this*, and *only* this, was the View of all the *Utopian* Writers from *Plato* to *Gulliver*, he has thought fit to treat them as a Parcel of mere Projectors. But he is plainly *angry*, that these Writers ever thought of *positive Rewards*. For which, I can conceive no Reason but this; that if such *Rewards* should be applied, and found effectual, his own Plan would be intirely superseded. Nothing can better shew this, than his Manner of accounting for the Conduct of these *Utopian Visionaries*. He says, they were not contented with the *simple* End of Government; which was only the “Security of the temporal Liberty and Property of Man;” but would needs have it “serve all the good Purposes it was even accidentally capable of producing;” and so they fairly jumbled together, all Sorts of Societies into one; and confounded the Religious, the Literary, the Mercantile, the Convivial, with the Civil.” And having once “mistaken the End,” he says, it was not to be wondered they

G 2



they should err in the *Means*; and, particularly, should make *Rewards* a Sanction of human Laws.—Every Mistake here is not to be taken Notice of.—But give me Leave to ask; Should *Civil Policy*, as every Thing else, be made to answer all the Good it *can*? Are they then to be blamed, who would make Civil Government useful in as extensive a Manner as is possible? Or, ought any one to be against enlarging the Plan of Civil Government, if any Good can be produced by it?—However, we will at present suppose, that the only legitimate End (it certainly is the greatest) of Policy is, the *Security of the temporal Liberty and Property of Man*; and I would ask Mr. *Warburton*; Is this End so secured by merely *penal* Laws, that nothing farther needs be desired? This cannot be said: For we daily see how insecure these Blessings are, even to Life itself, through the headstrong Passions of foolish Men, these *Penal* Laws notwithstanding. Now, if positive Rewards (such as what some of the *Utopian* Writers have thought of) can be applied to bribe, or balance these Passions of Men; just in the same Way, as Penalties attack and work upon their *Fears*; would it not be right, perfectly so, to do it? The Answer must not be, that it *cannot* be done. These Authors are of a different Mind, and propose something of their Method. Would Mr. *Warburton* do any thing to Purpose, he should shew the Impracticableness of their Proposals. But this he does not attempt; and satisfies himself with only endeavouring

vouring to shew, how they came to be so *wild* in their Notions. In which Attempt too he as plainly falls short; because they might have fallen into the same Method, and proposed the same Means, though they had confined themselves to what he himself will have to be the only End of Civil Government, *viz. the Security of Liberty and Property.*

But his Design in all this, and the Inference he draws from such Reasoning, are now to be attended to; and, I believe, will appear surprising. "But it being evident, that the joint  
"Sanctions of Rewards and Punishments are  
"but just sufficient to secure the tolerable Ob-  
"servance of Right (the common false Opini-  
"on, that these are the two Hinges of Go-  
"vernment arising from that Evidence) it fol-  
"lows, that, as Religion only can supply the  
"Sanction of Rewards, which Society wants  
"and has not, Religion is absolutely necessary  
"to Civil Government," p. 20. By *Sanctions of Rewards and Punishments*, at the Beginning of the Sentence, I thought a good while, must be meant the civil or ordinary Sanctions of Laws; and, it must be owned, this is the natural Construction. But recollecting, that he has been directly arguing a great while against there being any such Sanction to human Laws as that of *Rewards*; and that, in Fact, the Force and Success of such a Sanction has never been fairly tried; and that therefore he could not say how evident it was from Experience, that such a Sanction of Rewards, along with

that

that of Punishments, *was but just sufficient to secure a tolerable Observance of Right*—I concluded at last, that by the *joint Sanctions of Rewards and Punishments*, must be meant, of *Religious Rewards, and Temporal Punishments*. And since *Religious Rewards* Religion only can supply, hence he concludes, that *Religion is absolutely necessary to the State*.

That Religion only can supply religious *Rewards*, must be plain enough. But if he should say, that by *Rewards* he means only *positive Rewards*, and assert that Religion only can supply these, he plainly takes that for granted, which the *Utopian* Authors will by no means grant him: And then, his Conclusion stands upon Premises incapable of supporting it. They will say, and say truly, their Method has never yet been fairly tried; and therefore it cannot be said, what may be the Effect of it. Nay, they will say, and say truly, that even the Sanction of *Punishments* has never yet been so well adjusted, and so steadily executed, as it might and ought to have been. And that upon this Account too, he is too hasty in his Conclusion.

He proceeds, p. 21.

“ Having thus proved the Service of Religion in general to Society, and shewn by what Influence it is that this Service is performed, we are enabled to proceed to the Proof of the particular Proposition in Question.” This *particular Proposition* must be that which stands at the Head of this *Section*:  
 “ That the inculcating the Doctrine of a future  
 “ State



“ State of Rewards and Punishments, is necessary to the Well-being of Civil Society.” But then I am at a Loss to find the Meaning of that Expression of *proceeding to the Proof of it*. For what has been done hitherto? He has already shewn that Civil Society cannot (as he is fond of expressing it) *enforce the Sanction of Rewards*, upon several Accounts, and particularly upon this, that it has not a *Fund* sufficient for this Purpose; and therefore, that it is *Religion* only, that can *enforce the Sanction of Rewards*; which Sanction is absolutely necessary to procure Obedience to Civil Laws. Now, would not one think, this farther Consequence was immediately strong and good, that therefore “ the Sanction of future Rewards and Punishments was necessary to the Well-being of Society, *i. e.* that the inculcating the Doctrine of future Rewards was necessary to the Well-being of Society?” For it seems not to be conceivable, that the *Rewards and Punishments of Religion* are absolutely necessary to secure Obedience to Civil Laws; and yet that these Rewards and Punishments should not be *future*. If it be asked, why may not they be *present*? The Answer is: If these Rewards and Punishments are constant, steady, and uniform, they will seem to be only the *natural* Effects and Consequences of Virtue and Vice. If they are otherwise, variable, inconstant, uncertain, they will seem to be, and really be, defective; incapable of answering their End; and *future Rewards and Punishments* must

necessarily come in in Aid of them. The Consequence is, that upon all Accounts, the Doctrine of *religious Rewards and Punishments*, must necessarily mean *future Rewards and Punishments*, and refer to another State of Things.

Well; but having proved, as he says, the *Service of Religion in general to Society, and shewn by what Influence it is that this Service is performed*, (*viz.* particularly and especially by Religion's enforcing the Sanction of *Rewards* to Obedience to Civil Laws, which Civil Constitutions cannot do,) he is *inabled to proceed to the Proof of the Proposition in question*. And he does it thus.

“ By what has been said, it appears, that  
 “ this Service is performed by Religion, solely  
 “ as it teaches a Providence, the Rewarder of  
 “ good Men, and the Punisher of ill.—What-  
 “ soever therefore is necessary for the Support  
 “ of this Doctrine of a Providence, is mediate-  
 “ ly necessary for the Well-being of Society,”  
 p. 21, 22. And then, “ that the Doctrine of  
 “ a future State of *Rewards and Punishments* is  
 “ absolutely necessary, for the Support of the  
 “ general Doctrine of Providence,” he proves  
 from the uncertain and unequal Distribution of  
 Good and Evil in the present Life. And hence  
 concludes: “ Now this Doctrine of a future  
 “ State being the only Support of Religion,  
 “ we conclude, which is what we had to prove,  
 “ that the inculcating it is necessary to the  
 “ Well-being of Society.” I think I have  
 rightly represented the Author's Sense, and his  
 Man-

Manner of arguing here. And if so, it may be left to the Reader to make his Judgment of it.

II.

But what I think myself more immediately concerned with here is, the *Medium* by which a future State of Rewards and Punishments is proved, in order to support the general Doctrine of a Providence, the Rewarder of good Men and Punisher of ill; *viz.* "The unequal Distribution of Good and Ill in the present Life." This is the Argument, and the only one here made Use of for this Purpose.

Now concerning this Argument it is to be observed, that though it is much used and almost in every Body's Mouth now-a-Days, it was hardly ever mentioned in Antiquity, and overlooked by the Philosophers, even when they were, *exoterically*, preaching up the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments, with all the Arguments they could devise. Of which, I think, no other Reason can be assigned, than that they had no Notion of such an unequal and partial Distribution of Good and Evil at present, as we are now perpetually making the Subject of Complaint. Or, if they thought of it at any Time, struck as it were by some, appearingly, gross Inequalities, they never seem to have laid any great or lasting Strefs thereon.

This Difference between them and others may seem unaccountable: Yet may perhaps in a good Measure be resolved into the very wide  
Notions



Notions they and others have entertained concerning *real* Good and Evil; and partly, into the different Judgments they and others have usually passed upon personal Merit and Demerit, whether absolutely considered, or relatively and comparatively. The Ancients seem to have been much more cautious than the Moderns, in pronouncing upon this Man's real Merit, that Man's real Demerit. For they were well aware of the Impossibility of doing this rightly, without being able to do, what no Man upon Earth is capable of, *viz.* the searching into Men's Hearts, and there seeing all the secret Springs and Motives of their Actions. And without this they could not but see an utter Incapacity of judging of the Ways of Providence; which, for ought they *knew* to the contrary, might be, even at present, perfectly and exactly equal.

Nothing is cited here, except some Lines from *Claudian* (who cannot well, in this Case, be reckoned an *Ancient*) and a Passage from *Herbert's Relig. Gent.* As to the latter; why *Lord Herbert* should be esteemed and called an *unexceptionable Evidence* in this Case, is not to be conceived: When it is so quite certain, that what he says is directly contrary to Mr. *Warburton's* own Account, afterwards, of the Conduct and Opinion of those very Philosophers *Lord Herbert* is here speaking of. *Herbert* says, "It was the Doctrine of the best Schools or  
"Sects of the *Gentile* Philosophers and Di-  
"vines, that nothing was more agreeable to the  
"Nature

“ Nature of God, than that good Men should  
 “ be rewarded, evil Men punished. And since  
 “ they saw plainly, that no such Distinction  
 “ was made in the present Life ; but, on the  
 “ contrary, that good Men were often oppressed,  
 “ with Miseries, while the worst of Men lived  
 “ in Ease and Affluence ; therefore they firmly  
 “ believed a future State of Retribution ; be-  
 “ ing convinced by the clearest and strongest  
 “ Arguments drawn from the Justice and  
 “ Goodness of God.” “ CERTISSIMIS ex  
 “ *Justitia Bonitateque Divina argumentis de-*  
 “ *ductis, bonis post hanc vitam præmium condig-*  
 “ *num, malis pœnam dari credebant.*”

It must be owned, *Lord Herbert* does not support these Assertions of his with any express Authorities from the Ancients, and only, in the Margin, refers us at large to *Plato's Phædon* ; an Evidence *Mr. Warburton* will by no Means acquiesce in ; and much less can he agree with *Lord Herbert* in these Assertions, without overturning in a Manner his whole Book : And it would be expressly contrary to what he afterwards says of *Plato* in particular, and the *Theistic Philosophers* in general ; that as to any *moral Arguments* by which alone a future State of Rewards and Punishments can be proved, “ they  
 “ resolved them all into Tradition and the Religion of their Country.” How ill does this agree with *Herbert's CERTISSIMIS EX JUSTITIA BONITATEQUE DIVINÂ ARGUMENTIS DUCTIS.*

How-

However, I cannot but think *Lord Herbert* was much mistaken, when he makes the Rise of these Arguments to be from the Fact and Observation of the unequal Distribution of Good and Evil *at present*. For, unless I am much mistaken, no one Sect of the *Theistic* Philosophers ever drew an Argument from hence to prove a future State. Neither *Socrates*, nor *Pythagoras*, nor *Plato*, nor *Aristotle*, nor *Zeno*, nor even *Tully*. The Reason of which may perhaps presently appear in some Measure. Indeed, this was even too vulgar an Argument to be taken Notice of by the Philosophers; and the Observation of the Fact itself, was left by them to the *Poets*, who are full enough of it, especially the *Tragic* Writers; and knew, best of any, the proper Use that was to be made of it. Which Use was not however that, which *Lord Herbert* makes, (and *Mr. Warburton* too *here*) and is now so common. Among all *these* Writers it would be hard perhaps to find one, that infers a future Retribution from the present appearing Inequality of Providence. But we may do, what will seem strange to the Generality, find it sometimes made Use of in Favour of Irreligion. And this is the Purport of the Lines here quoted from *Claudian*: And more plainly of the following Distich:

Τολμῶ καλεῖπειν, μήποτ' ἔκ εἰσιν θεοί,  
Κακοί γὰρ εὐτυχῆς ἐπιπλήττισί με.

*Simplicius*, in his Comment upon *Epidictus*, producing



ducing these Lines of the *Tragedian*, immediately tells us, how easily *Epicletus's* Principles will obviate such an Objection: viz. by judging rightly of human Happiness; and placing it where only it can lye, and where only it can be met with: Not in the τὰ ἐκ ἑφ' ἡμῖν, but in the τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. When this was done, he thought it would be impossible not to see, that a good Man cannot be miserable, and a bad one cannot be happy, whatever external Appearances are. Καλῶς ἔν ἔχει τέρας καὶ τῷ Ἐπικλήτῳ πειδομένως, μὴ ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ἐφ' ἡμῖν τίθεσθαι τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἡμῶν καὶ τὰ κακά. ἕτως γὰρ ἔτε ἀγαθὸς δυσπραγείσει ποτὲ, ἔτε κακὸς εὐροήσει, c. 38.

And this gives me an Opportunity of observing, that the Philosophers, the best and wisest of them, could not by any Means use the Argument above for a future Retribution; because of the wide Notions they had of *Good* and *Evil* from the rest of the World. And particularly: Whereas *Pain* is commonly reckoned the greatest, and almost the only *Evil*, they generally denied it to be any *Evil* at all. So *Tully* expressly assures us in several Places of his Works; and particularly in his *Offices*, Lib. 3. c. 29. in Answer to an Objection against *Regulus's* Conduct. "What could *Jove* himself have done more to punish his Breach of Oath, than the *Carthaginians* did upon his keeping it?" Or, "How could angry *Jove* have hurt *Regulus* more than *Regulus* hurt himself?" "Nothing," *Tully* ingenuously confesses,

fesses, " if Pain be the only Evil. But, says  
 " he, the Philosophers of greatest Weight  
 " and Authority are so far from allowing it to  
 " be the greatest Evil, that they will not grant  
 " it to be any Evil at all. This is the Opinion  
 " of those, who argue with the greatest Exact-  
 " nefs: And even those who are less strict in  
 " their Reasoning, will allow it to be only a  
 " secondary Evil." "*At enim ne iratus quidem*  
 "*Jupiter plus Regulo nocuisset, quam sibi nocuit*  
 "*ipse Regulus.*" "*Certe ; si nihil malum esset,*  
 "*nisi dolere. Id autem non modo non summum*  
 "*malum, sed nec malum quidem esse, maxima*  
 "*autoritate Philosophi affirmant. — Nervosius*  
 "*qui ista differunt, solum audent malum dicere*  
 "*id, quod turpe est : qui autem remissius, hi ta-*  
 "*men non dubitant summum malum dicere.*"

I know not whether it was not a Strain far-  
 ther that *Epicætetus* went, when he seemed to  
*infer the Affection* of the Gods for him, from  
 those Circumstances of Poverty, Servitude, Pain  
 and Lameness, which would be generally rec-  
 koned the very sharpest Ingredients of human  
 Wretchedness: He wrote these Lines upon  
 himself.

Δῆλος Ἐπίκλητος γενόμεν, καὶ σώματι πηρὸς,  
 Καὶ πένιῳ ἴρος, καὶ φίλος ἀθανάτοις.

And it must not be imagined, he had the least se-  
 cret Thought of better Things in another Life:  
 Since from several Passages in his Writings it  
 plainly enough appears, he had no Notion of

any proper Futurity. But he seems, apparently, to have looked upon these external Circumstances, however distressful and wretched they may seem to common Eyes, as the VERY BEST FOR HIM \*.

III.

What has been said hitherto concerns only Mr. Warburton's Reasoning under his *first Proposition*. The *second* is this: "That all Mankind, especially the most wise and learned Nations of Antiquity, have concurred in believing and teaching, that the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments was necessary to the Well-being of civil Society." p. 87.

And he endeavours to prove the Truth of it,  
1. "From the Conduct of Legislators and In-stitutors of civil Society: 2. From the Opinions of all the wise and learned among the ancient Literati."

He begins with the former, and undertakes,  
1. "To shew in general the civil Magistrate's Care in this Matter." And having done this, he proceeds, p. 102.

2. In the next Place, "To enumerate the several Arts" employed by him for this Purpose.

1. The first of which was, "To proclaim an extraordinary Revelation from some God."

\* If the Sense of, *καὶ φίλον ἀθανάτοις*, be brought lower, and these Words be supposed to mean no more than—"and yet notwithstanding dear to the Gods," it will abundantly shew that Epictetus did not esteem these external Circumstances of Distress any real Evils, nor any Impeachment of the Goodness of God.



—2. The second, “ By making the Doctrine  
“ of a Providence, in it's full Extent, the  
“ grand Sanction of their Laws.” — The  
third, “ The Invention of the Mysteries.”

I have given this short Detail, only to make  
what will now be said with Relation to the  
*first of these Arts* (the only one to be considered  
at present) more easily understood. And I be-  
lieve, after all, the Reader will be sensible of a  
great Perplexity and Inconclusiveness in Mr.  
*Warburton's* Enlargement upon this Particular.  
The Assertion is this:

“ The first Step the Legislator took, was to  
“ proclaim an extraordinary Revelation from  
“ some God ; by whose Command and Di-  
“ rection he pretended to have instituted the  
“ Policy he would recommend to the People.”

No Body, at all acquainted with Antiquity,  
will call in Question this Practice of the ancient  
Legislators, or the Commonness of it. But it  
is very hard to see for what Purpose it is men-  
tioned upon this Occasion. It *should* prove the  
Legislator's Concern and Endeavour “ to incul-  
“ cate a future State of Rewards and Punish-  
“ ments:” For this is the only Point to be  
proved. But is it a plain Consequence of such  
a Fiction? or any Consequence at all? A Ve-  
neration for their Persons and a Reverence for  
their Laws are visible enough in it: Whoever  
says there is more ought to prove it. Whe-  
ther Mr. *Warburton* has done so, we shall now  
see.

When

When he comes afterwards directly and particularly to the Design of the Legislators in this Practice, he says; "Hence we have enough to conclude of their Sentiments concerning the Use of RELIGION to a State." And it is very true; they could, and they always did, make a Handle of *Religion* to serve their political Purposes. Thus, if the People had not previously believed in the Gods and their Concern in human Affairs, the Legislators could have gained no Advantage to their Institutions by a pretended Intercourse with them. But Mr. *Warburton* is so far from being satisfied with this, that he will needs extract *more* out of this Fiction of the legislative Inspiration, than was ever thought of before, I think, by any Body.

As was just said, a Veneration for the Persons of these Legislators, and a greater Respect for their Laws are plainly visible in it. But, it seems, there was more. "For, says he, we must always have in Mind what *Diodorus Siculus* so truly observes, that they did this, not only to beget a Veneration for their Laws, but likewise to establish the Opinion of the Superintendency of the Gods over human Affairs." This does not seem very consistent, in any other Sense than that of *confirming, strengthening, fixing* the Opinion of the Superintendency of the Gods. Because there must have been among the People, yet unpolicied, a Notion of this Kind, or the legislative Pretence could have had no Effect. Mr. *Warburton* however will by no Means be satisfied

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with

with this: For “ he will venture to go farther  
 “ and endeavour to shew, that this latter was  
 “ their principal Aim in all their Pretensions to  
 “ Inspiration.” p. 105.

And, after a long and no Ways necessary Parenthesis, he comes to what he undertook ; and, I think, changes the Question. For now he makes it to be ; “ Whether these Pretensions of  
 “ the Legislators were made for the Sake of the  
 “ State immediately, or for the Sake of Religion,  
 “ on, and so mediately only for the State.” But if it was *mediately* for the State, it was *ultimately, i. e. principally*, for the State ; and Religion was no otherwise concerned, than as it might subserve the Purposes of the State. And so it is frankly acknowledged in the next Words: “ For, says he, it is carefully to be observed,  
 “ that all that is in this Discourse represented as  
 “ contrived and done by the Magistrate in Behalf of Religion, was not done ultimately for  
 “ it’s own Sake, but for the Sake of the State.” But is not this plainly contrary to what is here undertaken to be shewn ; viz. “ That Religion, or to establish the Opinion of the Superintendency of the Gods over human Affairs, was the principal Aim of all their Pretensions to Inspiration ?” And this in Opposition to that political View, of *gaining a Veneration for their Laws*. Now, he says, that not only this Pretension, but every Thing else that the Magistrate did in Behalf of Religion, was, not *ultimately* for it’s own Sake, but for the Sake of the State. Is not this, saying, that



the State was the *principal Aim* of the Magistrate in every Thing he did? And therefore flatly contrary to what he undertook to shew, by Way of Improvement upon *Diodorus Siculus*.

Yet even still the Question is not so fixed, that we can immediately come at the Answer. But we have another State of it; or another Manner of stating it. For thus he goes on: "The Question, I say, then is; whether this Pretence to Inspiration was made to *introduce* "a civil, or a religious Society." And is this really the Question? What, thus absolutely expressed? *Religious*, or *Civil*, Society? *i. e.* the one exclusive of, if not in Opposition to, the other? Certainly, this is not what was undertaken at first: Nor, at all agreeable with what he had just before said was the Point in Question; and seconded with an Observation, concerning the whole of what he himself says throughout his whole Book, about the Care of the Magistrate with Relation to Religion; that it must all be understood to have an ultimate Reference to the State. Yet here is an Action of the Magistrate's, a Fiction, a Contrivance of his, which has ever been understood to be merely making a Tool of Religion for the Service of the State, and indeed, in a Manner, to throw a religious Colour and Complexion upon the State itself; and yet Mr. *Warburton* will needs have it to respect Religion *only*; or, Religion by Way of Distinction from and in Opposition to the State, and designed (as it is expressed) *to introduce a religious, not a civil, Society*.

Here, this is made the Question: The Determination follows.

And yet, as it should seem, we have not still the Question in the *exactest* Manner; since what is immediately said by Way of Answer, plainly supposes a somewhat different Manner of expressing it. For thus he proceeds: "If for the civil Society," *i. e.* for the Good, the Benefit, of civil Society.—Does not this plainly pre-suppose the civil Society as already in Being? Therefore whatever it is, it cannot be done to *introduce* civil Society. — But indeed to pursue such Uncertainties, or Mistakes, would be tedious and endless.—To go on therefore with the Answer; "If for the civil Society, the Effects he would aim at *must be*, to gain Reception for his Policy and Laws; or, 2dly, To secure their immutable Duration." But as no Reason is assigned for this Necessity, every one will think himself at Liberty to be of another Opinion, who can assign any other *Effects* which might be in the Legislator's View, equally with, or more than these. An high Esteem and Veneration for their Persons, was the first and most immediate *Effect* intended by this Fiction of a divine Intercourse. The Consequence of which would be a ready Admission of their Laws and Subjection to them: Which is the *first* of his *Effects*. And as for the *second*; it might, probably, be intended thus far, and no farther; "that these Laws should continue in Force, till the same, or a like, much more a superior, Hand should alter or remove them."

*Divine Legation of Moses.* 101

But the great and principal *Effect*, in Comparison of which every other is nothing, is not yet mentioned ; and that was, the *effectual securing Obedience to their Laws*. For it is conceivable, Laws may be received, continued, and yet withal neglected in Practice.

And it may be observed ; this *Effect* was not hid from Mr. *Warburton* ; no : Though he does not take it into his Division, he was well aware of it, and purposely omitted it ; and for this *very good Reason* : viz. “ Because this is the very “ Thing he contends for ; such Veneration and “ Observance of the Laws, being only to be “ procured by the Influence of Religion ; “ which the pretended Inspiration introduces.” Such an Exception surely has not been often made, nor such a Reason often given. Let it be asked ; might not the Legislator pretend to Inspiration for the Sake of civil Society ? It will not be denied. And how was this Fiction to serve civil Society ? By procuring a steady Observance of it's Laws ? No ; because nothing can procure this but *Religion* : Therefore, though he might and did, ultimately, intend the Observance of his Laws, the nearest Effect, and what was necessary in order to the other, was the *Introduction of Religion*. But was not Religion in being before these Pretences to Inspiration ? Did not the People believe, antecedently, in *that God*, that the Legislator pretended to be inspired by ? How then could this Pretension be to *introduce Religion* ? No ; Religion was in Being already ; and the Legislator only



made a Tool of it to secure the Observance of his Institutes ; and this Pretence to Inspiration was the most effectual Manner possible of applying People's *religious* Notions to his political Purposes.

Mr. *Warburton*, however, will needs have it, that if it be supposed, the Pretence to Inspiration was for the *civil Society*, it must be for one or both these two Purposes only ; " To gain Reception for " his Laws ; or, secure their immutable Duration." Then he endeavours, next of all, to shew, that it could not be intended for either of these Purposes ; and concludes therefore that it must be for the Sake of *Religion*.

It will hardly be worth while to make many Observations upon what he says to prove, that neither of these *two Things* could be in the Intention of the Legislator. What I shall say will be very brief.—" To the Introduction and " Reception of his Laws, there could, he says, " be small Occasion for this Expedient ; " Why ? 1. Because of the plain good Tendency and Usefulness of civil Laws. And if to this it be said (as it may very well be) that the ancient Legislators had to do with the most ignorant and savage Sorts of People ; he observes, 2dly, " That though this might be the Case of " some, it was not the Case of *most* of those " with whom these Legislators had to do." Every one will see, that this is a mere Assertion, without any just Authority to support it. We are now talking chiefly of the *first* Legislators, who began this Fiction of Inspiration ; and, according

according to all the Accounts we have any where of the People they had *to do with*, they were sufficiently wild and barbarous. What were they to whom *Romulus* and *Numa* gave Laws (though these were far from being the earliest Legislators)? Just wise enough to be wrought upon by such a Fiction; and too wilful, as it should seem, to be wrought upon without it.

But he will think it enough, if there were *any* of the ancient Legislators, who used this Fiction, and did not want it for the mere Introduction of their Laws; and concludes from thence, “ that if we would assign a Cause of  
“ their Pretence to Revelation as extensive as the  
“ Fact, it must be—that which he contends  
“ for.” But this is being too hasty. There are other Reasons assignable, different from his; and which might be in the Legislator’s View, whatever People he had to do with; *viz.* “ The Continuance of the Laws:” And “ the steady Observance of them.” And to answer *both these* the Pretence to Inspiration might be *but just* sufficient.

But he goes on to another Consideration: “ Besides, says he, several of these Legislators gave Laws to a willing People, on the Strength of their personal Character of Virtue and Wisdom.”—But surely, where this was really the Case, it will be difficult enough to assign *any* Reason for the Pretence to Inspiration at all.—He observes farther; “ that where Religion was thoroughly settled, there

“no Inspiration was pretended to.” So, he says, it was with *Solon* and *Draco* at *Athens*. Whatever was the Reason of their omitting it, that which is here assigned could not be it. For neither was Religion so thoroughly settled there in their Times, nor ever afterwards, as not to need perpetual Alterations of one Kind or other. And even both these Legislators gave Laws relating to Religion.—But, lastly, says he, “had the Legislators had it *only in* “*View* to secure the Reception of their Laws, “the *bare temporary Persuasion* of their Inter- “course with the Gods, would have been suf- “ficient to have brought the People to embrace “the Policy offered to them; but we find “they perpetuated the Memory of the Divine “Assistance,”—p. 108. No body pretends this was the *only View*. This might be one; and might not others be joined with it? It is hard to find the Meaning; or, if not the Meaning, the Pertinency, of that Expression, *a bare temporary Persuasion*. An Institutor’s being *once* inspired, might be sufficient to procure an Institution’s Reception: But the *Memory* of the one, was necessary to *effect* the *Continuance* of the other: And for this Reason and Purpose, if any Means could be found out to perpetuate the Memory of such a Thing, it should be done, for the very same Reason that the Thing was begun. But the Author’s Manner of expressing the Reason of *their perpetuating the Memory of the Divine Assistance* afforded to them, will be reckoned somewhat singular. “It  
“could



“ could sure be for no other End, but to establish the Opinion of the Superintendency of the Gods,” p. 109. As if it could be supposed *they* should want this, who in their most savage State are always represented as ever ready to receive any Thing from the Hands of their Gods: For which Reason too it was, and no other, that this Fiction of Intercourse with, and Inspiration from the Gods, was so universally made use of by these ancient Politicians. It had been better, if he had stuck to his former Manner of Expression, and said, *To establish Religion.*—As to the Way of *perpetuating* the Fiction; we are told it was twofold. One was by “ prefacing their Institutions with it.” That is, they wrote their Institutions, and this Fiction at the Head of them; and there it is plain it would last as long as the written Institutions.—But the other Way seems to be much the best; and that was, “ to pretend, when the People “ to be subdued to Society were more than usually savage, that the extraordinary Intercourse with the Gods was continued and “ perpetuated.” Was not this *perpetuating it by perpetuating it*? And if it be said, they perpetuated the *Memory* of their own original Intercourse, by perpetuating the Intercourse itself; this could never enter into the old Legislators Heads; both because the perpetuating the Intercourse was not in their Power, and the perpetuating it would intirely render the *Memory* of their own original Intercourse needless.

But

But for fear this should be reckoned trifling and tedious, let us go on to something more material.

He proceeds to the other *Purpose* to be answered by this Fiction, *viz.* "The perpetuating their Institutions, and rendering them immutable." This is expressed, as was before observed, somewhat too violently. It should be, "Till the same or a greater Authority shall alter them." And what Absurdity in this? And as there is nothing in the Answer accommodated to this Sense of the Reason, I shall pass it over, and come to his Conclusion once more; which is this, p. 111. "Having shewn that there was no Need of the Pretence to Revelation for the Establishment of *Civil Policy*, it follows, that it was made for the Sake of *Religion*." — *Having shewn* — But how has this been shewn? Why, no otherwise than by omitting the Consideration of the most *material Purpose* of all relating to Civil Policy, *viz.* *The steady Observance of the Laws*: Which, from all the Experience of the World, every Motive and Reason, every Trick and Contrivance whatsoever, besides that of a *Divine Revelation*, were little enough, and too little, to procure in the Manner that was desirable. And let this *Conclusion* be compared with the Proposition he himself had laid down at the Head of this *Section*; where he asserts, that the Legislator ascribed his *Policy* to a Divine Original, in order the more effectually to recommend it to his People. The Words are these.

"The

“ The first Step the Legislator took, was to  
“ proclaim an extraordinary Revelation from  
“ some God, by whose Command and Direc-  
“ tion he pretended to have instituted the Po-  
“ LICY he would recommend to the People.”  
The Conclusion is:

“ Having shewn that there was no Need of  
“ the Pretence to Revelation for the Establish-  
“ ment of *Civil Policy*, it follows, that it was  
“ made for the Sake of *Religion*.”

But, lastly, in a Word; what is, after all,  
this whole Affair of the Inspiration of the old  
Legislators to a *future State of Rewards and Pu-  
nishments*; the Doctrine of which he was to  
shew, had been inculcated by all of them?  
The Connexion of these *two* Things is intirely  
dropt; whether through Forgetfulness, or a  
Consciousness that it was not to be made out,  
is hard to say. But certainly, the Consequence  
is, that for Want of it, all that has been done  
under this Head, must plainly pass for nothing.

IV.

We will now come to something far more  
agreeable and entertaining, and, at the same  
Time, of far the greatest Importance of any  
Thing in Mr. *Warburton's* Book, viz. The  
real Opinion of the *Philosophers* concerning a  
*future State of Rewards and Punishments*.

He owns, they all were of Opinion, that  
“ the inculcating this Doctrine was necessary  
“ to the Well-being of Civil Society ;” and not  
only this, but he likewise endeavours largely  
to shew, that they were perpetually in their  
Writings



Writings and Discourses asserting and preaching up this Doctrine. But then (which is the most extraordinary Part of Mr. Warburton's Undertaking) he endeavours, after all this, to shew, that though the *Philosophers*, the Theistical Part of them, really thought this Doctrine necessary to the well-governing of Mankind, and ever inculcated it in their popular Writings and publick Discourses, they never a one of them, excepting only *Socrates*, really believed a Tittle of it. And this, I think, is done with no other Design, than so much the more thoroughly to convince us, how absolutely necessary this Doctrine is to the Welfare of Civil Society; since those wise Men could so much insist upon, and so steadily and vigorously inculcate it, when at the same Time they did not themselves really believe the Truth of it at all.

As this is a most surprising Undertaking, it may be no mean Entertainment to see how it is executed. And here I purpose to go along with the Author through the whole Performance.

And as, before he proceeds to the direct Proof of what he asserts, viz. "That the *Philosophers* did not believe a *future State of Rewards and Punishments*," he thinks it necessary (to abate the *Prejudices against a new Opinion*) to assign the *general Reasons*, which induced him to think, that "the *Philosophers* did not always believe what they taught, and that they taught this Doctrine in particular, without believing it;" it will be proper here, in the first Place,

to

to observe with some Exactness, what these *Reasons* are, in order to judge of the Validity and Extensiveness of them.

1. The first general Reason is, "That the ancient Sages held it allowable for the publick Good, to say one Thing, when they thought another." This may very easily be allowed: Nay, the Observation might have been extended much farther; even to every Age and every Country of the World, when and where there was a Civil and Religious Policy established. But yet I cannot think, that in the Author's Enlargement upon this Reason, the true Ground upon which it stands is at all opened. Which I take to have been this; that it ever has been esteemed the very Essence of Religion, the believing there are invisible Powers, (or at least, one,) who superintend human Affairs, and will reward or punish according as Men behave themselves. Wherever this is believed, there is *Religion*; where it is not, there can be none. And wherever *so much* is believed, there is all the Religion that can be *necessary* to support a Civil Constitution. As to the Number, or Names of these invisible Powers, or the Distinctions that may be conceived (and accordingly denominated) in the invisible Power, it is plainly not of so great Importance (or so absolutely necessary to influence human Action) as the believing that there is a superintending, invisible Power, whether simple or compound. This Belief was universal among People, before Civil Society; so that no Legislator, even among  
the

the most savage Barbarians, even the wildest *Thracians* and *Americans*, going to institute a Civil Policy, ever found a single Person destitute of it ; as Mr. *Warburton* says.

And another Thing they universally found too, *viz.* that in Consequence of this Belief, People every where had some Manner of acknowledging, addressing to, supplicating the Favour, and deprecating the Anger of this invisible Power (whether simple or compound.)

Now, as the Tendency of Religion to the Good of Society is plainly evident, and universally acknowledged, the Legislator going to institute a Civil Policy, proceeded upon those Notions of an invisible Power, which he found already among his People, and interwove the Manner of Worship with his Civil Constitutions ; and this, whether he believed the popular Notions or not. If he did believe them, it was no Wonder: Well ; but what if he did not believe them ? Some or other invisible Power he himself believed (to suppose the contrary, would be to no Purpose in the present Case ; ) and he might think it signified nothing, as to the real Influence of Religion on Society, whether this invisible Power resided in the *Sun* (according, perhaps, to his own Opinion) or in the *Moon* (according, perhaps, to the common Opinion ; ) or what was the Name or Names given to this invisible Power. An *invisible Power* believed, was the Thing that was necessary : He found this was believed ; and though, perhaps, accompanied with a great many doubtful or false  
Cir-



## *Divine Legation of Moses.* IIII

Circumstantial, he winked at the one for the Sake of the other, and would not attempt the rectifying of the latter (which could be attended with no bad Effect) for Fear of unsettling the former; the Removal of which must be pernicious. This was the Reason, the *true* Reason, why Legislators universally fell in with the Religion in Being, when they instituted their *Civil Policies*.

And this was the true Reason too, why the wisest Men, who were not Legislators, every where conformed to the National Religion; and taught, that every one should do the same, though, at the same Time, they saw a great many Errors, and could think of Amendments in many Respects. By taking away the Fringe, they were afraid of rending the Coat; and, after all, as it was only the Fringe they found Fault with, though it might render the Coat a little heavy and cumberfom, it did not destroy the Nature of the Coat: That still remained what it was, and should be; and answered the good Purposes it was intended for. Therefore, though in their external Conformity, and in their Discourses, they might seem to assert what they knew to be false, they did it purely, and only, because they apprehended Things in the main to be right; and apprehended likewise, that more Hurt than Good would attend a Discovery of their freest Sentiments.

Mr. Warburton's Account of this Matter, as it seems to me, is far-fetcht, and equally obscure and uncertain.—“ The Legislators came  
“ to

“ to their People in the Name of a God : This  
 “ gave their Constitutions a religious Air: This  
 “ raised the Veneration of the People for these  
 “ civil Constitutions to the highest Degree:  
 “ And at the same Time with the civil Policy  
 “ was the national Religion established.” —

What all this is to the present Purpose is hard to see. Was not the *God*, whose Name the Legislator always came in, the God of the Country? And was not the Religion established, the Religion of the Country to be civilized? And what was added, and whenever any Thing was added, was it not perfectly agreeable, or consistent, with the Religion already in Being? And, it must be owned, this was plainly the Way to add Veneration to the State. But what did it do to Religion? And how will this account for that *Maxim*, which so much prevailed, “ that every one should conform to the Religion of his Country?” The true Ground of that *Maxim* was this: That the publick Religion was every where looked upon as in the main right, and capable of answering the End proposed by it. And though some Faults might be found in it by speculative, inquisitive Men, it was thought more Mischief would arise from endeavouring to correct, than from conniving at them. This, doubtless, was the Apprehension of considerate Men in all Ages: And upon this was grounded that *Maxim*, “ that every one should conform to the Religion of his Country.”

And

## *Divine Legation of Moses.* 113

And this, no Question, was the true Reason of *Socrates's* Conduct in particular. It may be allowed Mr. *Warburton*, that *Socrates*, though he always conformed to the established Religion, could not but see some Faults in it. This may reasonably be concluded from his Capacity and Diligence. But what were the particular Errors he saw, no one knows, as we are nowhere told them; except only in one Instance or two, not very extraordinary ones, or such as required any great Penetration. And it is not impossible we may, nay, it is very probable, we do, extend this Penetration of his much farther than it really went. And I think, indeed, as Mr. *Warburton* himself has represented him here, he makes less for his Purpose, than otherwise he would do.

He was accused of *Impiety*. Yet before his Judges he declares it was always his Opinion, "that every one should conform to the Religion of his Country." "And if it should be suspected, that this was only saying what made best for his Defence, let us pursue him," says Mr. *Warburton*, to his last Moments, "retired amidst his philosophic Friends and Followers; and there we shall find him still true to this great Principle,"—*viz.* of conforming to the Religion of his Country. What? whether he believed it, or not? Or, though he believed it to be false? This would be aspersing him in a worse Manner than his worst Enemies ever did.—He ordered, it seems, one of his Friends to sacrifice a Cock to *Æsculapius*, after



he was dead. This Action has indeed puzzled many; and, in the obvious Meaning of it, it would lead one to think, *Socrates* did not see so far into the Falshood of the established Religion as we, through Prejudice, perhaps, in Favour of him, are apt generally to think. For it is hard to suppose, that one of his Character should, in his latest Moments, comply with a religious Custom of his Country, which his Judgment was against; and do this too among all his philosophic Friends; with whom he might, and should, have been as open and sincere as possible. As to myself, I should conclude from this Action, either that he did not see the Errors of the publick Religion so far as we imagine he did; or else (which is by no Means improbable) that we do not at this Distance understand the true Meaning of this Action, and put a quite wrong Construction upon it.

Perhaps, there will be no great Improbability in it, if we give this Action of *Socrates* an *allegorical* Turn. It was common with People to sacrifice to *Æsculapius*, on the Recovery of their Health from any dangerous Illness; and the Sacrifice usually offered on such Occasions was a *Cock*. Now *Socrates* looking on the fatal Cup he had drank, and which had now at this Time almost wrought it's Effect, not as Poison, but as the most salutary Draught, which was to free him from the Wretchedness and Misery of the present Life, and put him into a State of Health, *i. e.* of Ease, Tranquillity and Happiness,

ness, beyond what he had hitherto known,—to signify these Apprehensions of his in the *allegorical* Way, so familiar to the Ancients, ordered this Sacrifice to be made to *Æsculapius*.

But here a Question is started; “Why should these ancient Sages not think it lawful and reasonable to forsake Error, and embrace Truth; especially when——?” p. 309. This Question sure is very oddly worded. They could not possibly think otherwise; but then they thought it likewise very lawful and reasonable, not to oppose Error, when they saw no Prospect of Success; and not to urge Truth, when Prejudices were violently against it, and there was no absolute Necessity for it’s being known. Mr. *Warburton*’s Answer to this Question is not easily intelligible, though he calls it a *plain Explanation of the Riddle*. “The Genius of their national Religion taught them, that Utility, and not Truth, was the End of Religion.” If it did do this, it did not fall much short of the Truth. To say, that the *Good* which Religion does, is it’s End, is surely not amiss: But who can conceive what is meant, when it is said, “that Truth is the End of Religion?” I believe, this is the first time of using that Expression.—He goes on; “And now not rightly distinguishing between particular and general Utility, between that which arises from the illegitimate Administration of Civil Policy, and the legitimate, they universally embraced this other false Conclusion, that Utility and Truth do not

“coincide.” What? meaning that *Utility* never coincides with *Truth*; nor *Truth* with *Utility*? i. e. that Falshood only can produce *Utility*, and *Truth* Mischief? This certainly never was the Notion of any Set of Men whatsoever. And, though he next of all says, “that from this Principle a third necessarily arose; that it was lawful and expedient to deceive for the publick Good;” it is certain, that a much less violent and less unreasonable Principle will account for it. When the Prejudices of People are so strong, that there is no Prospect of removing them, they must be humoured; and, if possible, managed so as to become the Occasion of Good. This is all that any of the wise Ancients seem to have meant. And I reckon it has been the Practice of all prudent Demagogues, in all Places and Ages of the World.

2. The second *general Reason* is; “That the ancient Sages did actually say one Thing, when they meant another,” p. 301. Supposing this (nor is there any Difficulty in allowing it) will it from hence follow, that they did it, when they taught the Doctrine of a *future State*? This Custom of theirs, of speaking one Thing, when they meant another, it is said, “appears from that general Practice in the *Greek Philosophy*, of a two-fold Doctrine, the external and the internal, a vulgar and a secret one.” The Practice of *lying* does by no Means necessarily follow from the Practice of the *double Doctrine*: I say, necessarily. For  
though



though the one might seem to come near the other, look very like it, and be in perpetual Danger of running into it; yet, originally they appear to have been very different, and the one was practised without the least Taint of the other. Some Truths were concealed from the Vulgar, which were discovered to others, that were more capable of receiving them: Which every one must see to be a very different Thing from telling the Vulgar what was known to be false. This, I take it, was the true Meaning of the *double Doctrine* in it's Original. And every one must be sensible, how absolutely necessary such a Method is in publick Instruction. One may venture to say, that without it, all such Instruction must fail of it's End.—It might be carried farther, and with perfect Innocence, *viz.* Where People's Prejudices were fixed and violent, (as they are commonly found to be in some Respect or other) there, to be so far from directly attacking them, as on the contrary to humour them, to suppose in their Instruction the Truth of them, and by this Means gain Admittance for some real and useful Truth, which otherwise would certainly have been excluded. This again is a Practice very different from *Lying*, and may be kept absolutely clear of it.—But, says Mr. *Warburton*, “ They  
“ were not different Points of Doctrine, but  
“ one and the same, that were thus handled  
“ differently, popularly, and philosophically.”  
If it was so; might not this be done in a very innocent Manner, without offending at all a-

gainst their own real Sentiments? On the contrary; is not this often absolutely necessary, in order to accommodate the Doctrine to the Capacity of the Vulgar? And is not this too the very Conduct observed upon many Occasions in the *Scriptures* themselves? Where (to instance in what comes nearest to the present Purpose) both the Rewards and the Punishments of a future State are represented in such a Manner, by Images taken from the present World, as was exactly accommodated to the Capacity and Apprehensions of the common People.

Yet Mr. *Warburton* goes on most laboriously to prove, what every Body else will think plain enough, *viz.* That this Method of philosophising, or of instructing, was “invented originally for the Service of Society,” *i. e.* for the Good of the People. What other End could it possibly have?—And yet more; he will shew, that the *Greeks*, who borrowed it of the *Egyptians*, the first Inventors, “actually employed it for that Purpose; however it might at length degenerate into Craft and Folly.” There is no Occasion to follow him here, as I have no great Difference with him upon either of these Heads; except only, that I cannot agree with him, that the *Egyptians* were peculiarly the *Inventors* of this double Method; or that the *Greeks* knew nothing of it till they travelled into *Egypt*: On the contrary, it necessarily arises every where from the different Capacities and Improvements of Mankind.

## Divine Legation of Moses. 119

The learned *Cudworth* \*, after observing concerning the *Egyptians*, “ that, besides their vulgar and fabulous Theology, they had another “ ἀπόρρητος Θεολογία, arcane and recondite “ Theology—which differed from one another, as *Aristotle’s* Exoterics and Acroamatics;” informs us, upon the Authority of *Origen*, that the same Distinction obtained among the *Persians*, the *Syrians*, the *Indians*; and all the other Nations, “ who have, besides their “ religious Fables, a Learning and Doctrine ||:” And he owns too, that *Origen* thought it was the same among *Christians* themselves, and that Christianity, “ besides the Outside and exterior Cortex of it, communicated to all, had a “ more arcane and recondite Doctrine—which “ all were not capable of.”

But what I differ most from *Mr. Warburton* in is, that the Practice of *Lying* necessarily arises from the Practice of the *double Doctrine*. This is a Mistake: And he no where endeavours to shew, (which yet ought principally to have been done,) how the one is a Consequence of the other.

I pass on therefore to his,

3. Third Reason, viz. “ That the ancient “ Sages seemed to practise the double Doctrine “ in the Point in Question,” p. 319. That is, that they preached a future State in publick, and denied it in private. This must be the

\* *Intell. System*, c. 4. sect. 18.

|| *Contra Celsum*, L. 1. p. 11.—καὶ τῶν ὅσοι καὶ μύθῳ καὶ γράμματι ἔχουσιν.



Meaning, or it is nothing to the Purpose. For as to the *Manner* of representing the Nature and Qualities of this future State, they might differ as much as they would in their publick and private Teaching, without affecting at all the Reality of it. But if they applied the double Doctrine to the *Being* of such a State, *i. e.* in publick taught it, but in private denied it, this would be to the present Purpose extremely; since it would be Evidence enough, that they did not really believe any such Thing.—How far Mr. *Warburton* has made out this, most material, Point, any one may judge. He is very sparing of his Authorities here where they are most wanted, and most wished for; and, indeed, quotes nothing but an obscure Passage from *Seneca*; and at the same Time calls him a *Mongrel*.—But a little to supply this Defect, I would take Notice, that there is under the *first Reason*, a Citation from *Macrobius*\*, which would, in my Opinion, have come in here much more to the Purpose. But, whether here or there, I am sorry Mr. *Warburton* has not thought fit to elucidate it at all; or so much as to give us the Occasion and Connexion of it: For Want of which, it can be of no Service to his Readers, unless to lead them into a very wrong Notion, perfectly different from what *Macrobius* intended. The Quotation is thus introduced: “*Macrobius* informing us on “ what Subjects the Philosophers used this License of *Lying* for the publick Good, says it

\* *Somn. Scip. L. 1. c. 2.*

“ was

“ was concerning the Soul, and the national  
 “ Gods.” “ *Sciendum est tamen, non in omnem*  
 “ *disputationem Philosophos admittere fabulosa vel*  
 “ *licita; sed his uti solent cum de ANIMA, vel de*  
 “ *aeriis ætheriisve potestatibus, vel de cæteris*  
 “ *Dis loquuntur.*” In the first Edition, Mr.  
 Warburton gave it us thus, and LICITA was  
 printed in Capitals, though the Meaning of it  
 could not be understood. In the second Edi-  
 tion, *vel* is changed into *velut*, and this indeed  
 makes the Sense of *Licita* very easy. But upon  
 what Authority this Alteration is made we are  
 not told. It may however be allowed; unless  
 we should rather choose to read (with Gronovius)  
 for *vel licita, vel ficta*; which is but a small  
 Alteration. Either of these Emendations will  
 make the Sense plain and good.—However,  
 this is only incidental.

Surely Mr. Warburton expresses it much too  
 strongly, when he says, that “ *Macrobius* here  
 “ informs us on what Subjects the Philosophers  
 “ used this License of LYING for the publick  
 “ Good.” This is not at all the Sentiment  
 that *Macrobius* expresses here; neither was there  
 any Ground for it in the Nature of the Thing;  
 a *Fable* being no more a *Lie*, than a Dialogue  
 between fictitious Persons, a Parable, an Alle-  
 gory, or even a Metaphor. But it is concerning  
*Fables* *Macrobius* is here speaking; and by Way  
 of Answer to *Colotes* the *Epicurean*, (who had  
 objected it to *Plato*, that he used *Fables*;  
 which by no Means can become a Philosopher,  
 treating upon any Subject): He gives us there-  
 fore

fore a Chapter upon this Head, to shew in what Cases the Philosophers used *Fables*, and to vindicate the Use of them.—However, it will be necessary before we go any farther, to take a little more particular Notice of the *Occasion* of *Macrobius's* mentioning this Matter *here*. It is in Vindication of *Plato* principally; and in the next Place of *Tully*. The one had raised a dead Man to relate what is done in the next World; the other makes *Scipio* to see it in a *Dream*. Now both these are *Fictions*, or *Fables*. And *Plato*, in particular, was found Fault with upon this Account, by the whole *Epicurean* Sect, his Performance ridiculed, and with it the most real and venerable Parts of Nature.

“ *Epicureorum tota factio, æquo semper errore*  
 “ *a vero devia, & illa existimans ridenda quæ*  
 “ *nesciat, sacrum volumen & augustissima irrisset*  
 “ *naturæ seriæ.*” *Colotes* wrote a Book upon this Subject, and maintained, “ that no *Fables*  
 “ ought to be composed by a Philosopher; be-  
 “ cause no Fiction can become a Professor of  
 “ Truth.”—“ *Ait a Philosopho fabulam non*  
 “ *oportuisse confingi; quoniam nullum figmenti*  
 “ *genus veri professoribus conveniret.*” And his Reason is farther urged in this Manner. “ If,  
 “ says he, we are to be informed in the celesti-  
 “ al System, and the State or Habit of the Soul  
 “ when it is gone from hence, why are we  
 “ not told this in plain and simple Language;  
 “ without the Interposition of imaginary Cases  
 “ and Persons, and, in a Sort, the whole Ap-  
 “ paratus of the *Scenes*: Whereby the very  
 “ Gate



“ Gate of Truth is polluted with a LIE?”  
 “ *Cur enim, inquit, si rerum cœlestium notionem,*  
 “ *si habitum nos animarum docere voluisti, non*  
 “ *simplici & absoluta hoc insinuatione curatum*  
 “ *est; sed quæsitâ persona, casusque excogitata no-*  
 “ *uitas, & composita (compositi) advocati (advo-*  
 “ *cata) scena figmenti ipsam quærendi veri jamu-*  
 “ *am mendacio polluerunt?*” In Answer to him  
 Macrobius gives us a short Discourse concerning  
 Fables in general; in order to shew, what Sort  
 the Philosophers did, and might reasonably, make  
 Use of, and likewise in what Cases they applied  
 them. For as there were many Sorts of Fables,  
 which Philosophy rejected, so there were some  
 Cases in which it never used them. Of the for-  
 mer he had given several Instances before; and  
 here, at the Place of Mr. Warburton’s Quota-  
 tion, he comes to give his Instances of the lat-  
 ter. And he mentions two: The *supreme God*,  
 or *πρῶτον αἰτίον*, and the *Mind*, called by the  
 Greeks, in the Way of Distinction, *Νῆς*. When  
 the Philosophers (meaning, I suppose, in a strict  
 Sense, the *Platonists*) treat of either of these,  
 they never use any Fable at all. But when they  
 come to treat of the *other Gods*, or the *Soul*,  
 they then allow themselves in the Use of Fables.  
 For which he gives the following Reason.  
 “ *Quia sciunt inimicam esse naturæ apertam nu-*  
 “ *damque expositionem sui: quæ sicut vulgaribus*  
 “ *hominum sensibus intellectum sui vario rerum*  
 “ *tegmine operimentoque subtrahit; ita a pru-*  
 “ *dentibus arcana sua voluit per fabulosa trac-*  
 “ *tari.*” That is; “ As Nature has wrapt  
 “ herself

“ herself up, as it were, in a double and tre-  
“ ble Covering, that she might not be open  
“ and exposed to vulgar Eyes, the Consequence  
“ of which would probably be Neglect and  
“ Contempt; so she would have those wiser  
“ Men, who can penetrate into her Recesses,  
“ to imitate her Manner: And, as it is neces-  
“ sary for the Good of Mankind, the less at-  
“ tentive and weaker Part of them, that they  
“ should be informed in some Measure of her  
“ Design and Works; not to lay this Know-  
“ ledge before them in a plain, simple, una-  
“ dorned Manner, (the readiest Way to have it  
“ despised and lost,) but in a more reserved,  
“ and yet at the same Time a more affecting  
“ one; by sensible Representations from such  
“ Images as are proper to strike vulgar Minds,  
“ ingage their Attention and influence their  
“ Conduct; though the inmost Meaning of them  
“ is little or not all attended to. This was to be  
“ done by *Fables*.” And this was done by *Plato*  
and his Followers in the *Fables* they invented  
concerning the State of the *Soul* in it's future Situa-  
tion. For *Colotes* to say that these were LIES,  
was great Misrepresentation; though agreeable  
enough with the Grossness of an *Epicurean* Ge-  
nius: Since there was Truth at the Bottom,  
the best and most useful Truth, however dis-  
guised and covered with Images taken from the  
present Scene of Things. This was the Sense  
of *Macrobius* concerning these *Fables* of the  
Ancients; and therefore he resembles them, in  
the next Place, to the *Mysteries*: Which being  
both

both exhibited by and at the same Time covered with Abundance of sensible Representations proper to strike the Eyes and Ears of the Initiated, reached no farther than the Imaginations of the greatest Part, and perhaps struck them with Awe and Reverence, while the better qualified and attentive only were capable of penetrating through the Appearances and reaching the true Secret. “ *Sic ipsa mysteria figurarum cuniculis operiuntur; ne vel hæc adeptis nuda rerum talium se natura præbeat: sed summatibus tantum viris, sapientia interprete, veri arcani consciis, contenti sint reliqui ad venerationem figuris defendentibus a vilitate secretum.*”

But it is Time to return.

What Mr. Warburton does farther under his *third Reason*, is making a general Observation concerning the Conduct of the Philosophers in their Writings: But what it will conclude in his Favour is hard to say. He has observed, it seems, that “ those Sects which joined Legislation with Philosophy, as the *Pythagoreans, Platonists, Peripatetics* and *Stoics*, always professed a Belief of a future State of Rewards and Punishments \*; while those “ who

\* Mr. Warburton can hardly stand by this Observation in the general Manner in which it is here expressed. For if we look forward to p. 357, 358. we shall find him citing *Aristotle* for the contrary Notion, and though not citing any Thing of *Zeno's*, yet declaring it as a Thing known and certain, “ that the philosophic Principle of his School was, that the Soul died with the Body.” And yet again, p. 389, 390. *Aristotle* in particular, and the *Stoics* in general, are mentioned as maintaining that



“ who simply philosophized, as the *Cyrenaic*, “ *Cynic* and *Democritic*,” (this last Sect is expressly afterwards, p. 325. said to be wholly atheistical; the same might have been said of the other two, with equal Reason) “ publicly professed the contrary.” It should seem, that the whole Meaning of this Observation is no more, than that some Sects were for a future State, and some against it. Nor is there any Thing strange in this: Nor in what is observed farther, that in those Sects that were generally on the Side of a future State, there were some that dissented; so did *Panaetius* from his Master *Plato*, and so did *Chrysippus* from *Zeno*: Nor, lastly; which is likewise taken Notice of, in one and the same Man’s talking differently about it at different Times; as *Chrysippus* did. As for the *Reason* here assigned, or insinuated, for these Variations, viz. that it was just as the *Philosophical* Sects, (or particular Philosophers at different Times,) gave or gave not themselves to *Legislation*;—this seems to be said merely in Pursuance of the favourite Notion. But in Opposition to it, I would only wish him to look back on that Part of his Performance, where he endeavours to shew, that the real *Legislators* did actually enforce their Laws with future Rewards and Punishments; and likewise

that the human Soul does not die with the Body. And, lastly; it would have been much more to the Purpose, if he could have shewn, that whereas *Aristotle* in his *Ethics* denies a future State of Rewards and Punishments, he has in his *Politics* asserted the contrary.

there,

there, where he has given us the Opinion of the *ancient Sages* in this Matter; and with Respect to both, reflect how little *real Evidence* he has produced. And this may sufficiently obviate what is said under the next *general Reason*: Which we are told is *gathered*,

4. "From the Opinion that Antiquity seems  
"to have had of it's Philosophers on this Point."

p. 321. Here we are referred to some preceding Quotations from *Timæus*, *Polybius*, and *Strabo*; p. 295. How *Pliny* comes to be here dropt, since he is before-mentioned with the other three, I know not. As for *Polybius*; what he says has been considered above.

These Writers observe how great a Difference there is among Mankind: Some are capable of being influenced by the natural Reason of Things; others are of a less reasonable and more unthinking Disposition: And that the latter must be influenced by the Rewards and Terrors of Religion; *i. e.* in other Words, by the Authority and Superintendency of invincible Powers; but none of them speak clearly and determinately of the Rewards and Punishments of another Life. Now Mr. *Warburton* dextrously calling the former Manner of acting the *Religion of the Philosophers*, (which these Authors do not,) opposes it to the other, which is the *Religion of the State*, and enforced with future Rewards and Punishments (which none of these Authors mention): from hence concludes, that in the Opinion of those Authors (and such as them) the *Philosophers* did not really believe this

*Doctrine.*

*Doctrine.* But this is such a Consequence as cannot be admitted.

5. The last general Argument is taken from *Cæsar's* Affair in the Senate. Which, well considered, will make more against, than for him ; and this in a much tenderer Point than that of the real Opinion of the old Philosophers. As to this latter it plainly determines nothing. — *Cæsar* discovered, manifestly enough, his own Sentiments concerning a future State. “ *De*  
“ *pœna, possum equidem dicere id quod res habet ;*  
“ *in luctu atque miseriis, mortem ærumnarum*  
“ *requiem, non cruciatum esse : eam cuncta mor-*  
“ *talium mala dissolvere ; ultra neque curæ neque*  
“ *gaudio locum esse.*” *Cato* and *Tully*, in Answer to him, only say, such a Notion had been derived by Tradition from their Ancestors, (as *Mr. Warburton* represents the Matter). — But had such a *State* been, (as the whole Design of his Book is to shew,) the grand Sanction of all civil Government, surely *Cæsar* must have met with a very different Treatment from what he did. — And whereas it is said farther ; “ Here  
“ then was a fair Challenge to a philosophic  
“ Examination ; and can we believe these two  
“ Patriots would be less favourably heard.” — It seems more than a sufficient Answer to observe, that this was by no Means a proper, either *Time*, or *Place*, to enter upon a philosophic Disputation.

With this Affair of *Cæsar* give me Leave to join a parallel Piece of Conduct even of *Tully* himself. Who in his Oration for *Cluentius*, in



Order to bring off his Client, or at least mitigate his Sentence, asks concerning that very wicked Fellow supposed to have been killed by him; "*Quid tandem illi mali mors attulit? Nisi forte ineptiis ac fabulis ducimur, ut existimemus illum apud inferos impiorum supplicia perferre* \*.—*Quæ si falsa sint, id quod omnes intelligunt, quid ei tandem aliud mors eripuit præter sensum doloris?*"

Mr. Warburton quoting this Passage, as an Evidence that Tully himself did not really believe any Thing of a future State, makes this Reflection upon it; "that it proves, *if no more*, at least that he has not concluded amiss, when from several Quotations interspersed throughout this Work, in which a Disbelief of the common Notion of a future State of Rewards and Punishments is implied, he has inferred the Writer's Disbelief of the Doctrine in general." But Mr. Warburton is to be reminded, that Tully only speaks here of a future State of Punishment; and therefore, though from this Passage, Tully's Opinion of such a State might be inferred, nothing can be concluded concerning the Doctrine in general of a future

\* Yet after this and before a much more august Assembly, he could confidently enough assert what he here appears to ridicule, and express his Assurance, "that Jupiter the Patron God of Rome would punish the Enemies of it, living and dead with everlasting Vengeance."—*æternis suppliciis vivos mortuosque mactabis.*" In Catal. 1. And again, before the same Audience, speaking of those Antonians who had been killed fighting against their Country in the Battle of Modena, he makes no Scruple to say, "*Impii illi—etiam ad inferos pœnas parricidii luent.*" Phil. 14.

K

State.

State. And as to the Justness of his Inference from like Passages from other Ancients, "that they did not believe a future State of Rewards AND Punishments, because they sometimes treated the common, vulgar Manner of representing such a State with Ridicule;" it is by no Means good, either as to a State of Rewards, or as to a State of Punishments; unless there be some such positive Declaration added, as here is by *Tully* in the Passage before us. Had *Tully* only ridiculed the vulgar Notion of Hell, nothing could have been inferred against the future Punishment of a bad Man †: Because though he is not punished in one Way, he may be in another. But, since with respect to such a one, *Tully* says, *Death has deprived him of nothing else but a Sense of Pain*, it may be pretty well concluded as his Sentiment, that there is no future State of Punishment. And whenever in Citations from other Ancients, where the common vulgar Notions of future Punishments are denied, there is the like Declaration added, the same Inference will hold

† And Mr. *Warburton* himself, in the 2d Edit, of his Book has told us, at the End of the 4th Sect of 3d Book, that we are not to doubt concerning the old professed Legislators (who either existed before the *Grecian* Philosophy or had not befottered themselves with it) but they "all believed, as well as taught," a future State of Rewards and Punishments: And that yet, on the other Hand, we are not "to think they credited all the idle Fables wherewith it had been clothed, in order to lay hold of the gross Imaginations of the People." Now from hence it follows, universally; that merely from a Person's denying or ridiculing the vulgar Notions of a future State, whether of Rewards or Punishments, no Inference can be drawn of his disbelieving the Thing itself.

good.

good. But have any Passages of this Kind been produced; especially from the ancient *Greeks*? I cannot remember any. But if they had, this would not have been sufficient Proof, that they disbelieved, as well future *Rewards*, as future Punishments. Even *Tully* himself, upon many Occasions, says, very consistently, “ hereafter “ we shall either be happy, or not be at all: “ There is no third.” \* From all which it may seem plain, Mr. *Warburton* is much too hasty in concluding from such a Passage in *Tully*, or like Passages in other Authors (of which, if I remember right, he has no where produced any) the Sentiment of *Tully*, or others, concerning a *future State in general*.

But I have not done with this Passage from *Tully*. This *Oration for Cluentius* was long before *Cæsar*’s Boldness in the Senate, when he declared so frankly against a future State. Mr. *Warburton* has oftener than once taken Notice of *Cæsar*’s Conduct in this Instance, and spoken of it with great Indignation, as a terrible Presage of the approaching Ruin of the *Roman State*. Now what *Tully* here says is very much in the Manner of *Cæsar*, as any one may see who compares the two Passages †. How comes  
Mr.

\* *Atqui tertium certe nihil inveniri potest. De Senect. c. 19. Post mortem quidem sensus aut optandus aut nullus est. Ibid. c. 20.*

† *Tully* says, concerning a very wicked Fellow, who had been killed: “ *Quid tandem illi mali mors attulit? Nisi forte “ ineptiis ac fabulis ducimur, ut existimemus illum apud inferos “ impiorum supplicia perferre.—Quæ si falsa sint, id quod omnes intelligunt, quid ei tandem aliud mors eripuit præter sensum “ doloris?*” *Cæsar*, concerning a Pack of as wicked Fellows,



Mr. *Warburton* then to reflect with so much Concern and Severity upon *Cæsar's* Conduct, and pass over *Tully's* without any Censure at all? *Cæsar's* was a "Licentiousness till then unknown in that august Assembly." *Tully's*, 'tis true, was not acted in the *Senate*; but it was in a *Court of Judicature*; and where, probably, such *Licentiousness*, if it was *Licentiousness*, would be less indured than in the *Senate*. For the *Senate* was a *legislative Court*; where, from the very Nature of Things, greater Freedom of Speech and Debate must be allowed, than would be tolerable in a *Court of Judicature*. In a *legislative Court* Men may talk freely for or against a Law in Being, in order to have it either continued or repealed: But a *judicial Court* must ever reverence and maintain the Laws in Being, and check all Attempts to lessen the Force and Authority of them.

And this reminds me of another Thing, viz. that if a *future State* was, as it is so much asserted to be, the great *Sanction* of civil Laws in all the ancient Governments, and particularly among the *Romans*, all Attempts to destroy or weaken the Belief of such a State must have been construed as striking at the very Foundations of the Government, and could not have been passed over without a most severe Ani-

who were to be punished with Death for Crimes against the State, says, that to such People *Death* would be the greatest Blessing.—"De pœna, possum equidem dicere id quod res habet; "in luctu atque miseriis mortem ærumnarum requiem, non cruciatum, esse: eam cuncta mortalium mala dissolvere."

madversion. Yet here are two of the greatest Men *Rome* ever had, publickly in the Faces of the most august and authoritative Assemblies declaring against such a State (at least a State of *Punishment*) without any, as plainly appears, the least Thought of a Reprehension, and, in Fact, without having any. And one of these (whatever may be said of the other, and he too who did it *first*) a Person who had the greatest Respect for his Country and the Laws of it, and made it his principal Business to preserve them in all their Vigour. Had he had any Notion, that a future State was the Sanction of those Laws, would he, so wantonly, without any real Occasion at all, but merely for the Sake of a *rhctorical* Flourish, have spoken against, and even ridiculed, that which was, as Mr. *Warburton* says, the grand Sanction and Support of them? And this in a Court of *Judicature*? Nay, he goes farther; and speaks of his own Sentiment upon this Head, as being so far from singular, that it was general, and even *Plebeian*: "*Id quod omnes intelligunt.*" There is, to me, many Times more Evidence in this Passage of *Tully's*, or rather, in this Piece of his Conduct, that the *Romans* never once thought of *sanctioning* their Laws with future Rewards and Punishments, than in all the Things Mr. *Warburton* has brought together upon this Head: Or, in other Words (to cut off all Occasion of Dispute about the Word, *Sanction*), that the *Romans* never imagined the Belief of a future State of Rewards and Punishments, the greatest,

greatest, or even a great Security for the Observance of their Laws: But, like other States, had their chief Dependence upon their *own* Rewards and their *own* Punishments.

## V.

After these *general Reasons*, which induced Mr. *Warburton* to “think that the Philosophers did not always believe what they taught, “and that they taught this Doctrine, viz. of “a future State, without believing it;” he comes to a “particular Examination of each “Sect.”—p. 325.

And after a Division of the old *Greek* Philosophy, he finds that there are only the *Pythagoric*, the *Platonic*, the *Peripatetic*, and the *Stoic*, to be inquired into upon the Point before us. For as to *Socrates*, whose Followers split into and founded the three latter of these *Sects*, he freely gives him up, and acknowledges that he believed a future State of Rewards and Punishments (though by the Way, as was observed before, this is very contrary to what *Tully* tells us; who always speaks of *Socrates*, *Pythagoras* and *Plato*, as being in the same Way of thinking with Respect to a future State.)

He begins with *Pythagoras*; and makes a great many Observations concerning him. Which Observations have but a very distant and obscure Relation to the Matter in Hand: So that here there is but little to be taken Notice of for a great Way.

That



That Observation which we meet with, p. 334. may appear not a little surprising. “ And that nothing might be wanting to his legislative Character, he likewise, in Conformity to the general Practice, instituted Mysteries : In which was taught, as usual, the Unity of the divine Nature.” — As if the instituting *Mysteries* was a necessary Part of the *legislative* Character ! No one ever heard of *Lycurgus*’s instituting *Mysteries* among the *Lacedæmonians*, or *Romulus*, or *Numa*, among the *Romans*. Yet these were great *Legislators* ; and all of them older than *Pythagoras*. And one of them, as has been seen above, rejected all *Mysteries*, as a foolish Invention, and a Blemish, not in the civil Policy, but in the Religion, of some of the *Greek States*. — Again ; speaking of what was taught in the *Mysteries* of *Pythagoras*, how comes he to confine it to the *Unity of the divine Nature* ; and say, that this was what was usually taught in the *Mysteries* ? When, every where else, speaking of what was taught in them, he so constantly says, “ The Doctrine of a *Providence* and of a *future State* of Rewards and Punishments” was inculcated there ; and farther says, that “ this Doctrine was of the *Essence* of mysterious Rites.” But to have mentioned this Doctrine *here* upon this *Occasion*, when he is about to shew, that *Pythagoras* believed no such Thing, might and would have looked, at least, oddly. Or, perhaps it was, (since he here refers to *Jamblicus*’s *Life of Pythagoras*), because his Author does not in this

Place mention any Thing else but the *Unity* of the divine Nature. And does *Jamblicus* say so much? He says, ἀκριβέστατην εἰδέναι αὐτῶν; i. e. the exactest Knowledge of them, viz. of the Gods. Is this the *Unity* of God? I believe, no Body that well considers the Quotations above from *Tully* and *Dionysius*, will easily come into this Construction.

At last Mr. *Warburton* returns to his proper Subject, p. 345. and says; “ From what has been said of *Pythagoras*’s Character it appears, that he taught several Doctrines which he did not believe, and cultivated Opinions merely on the Score of Utility.” Let a Man read with ever so much Care all that has been observed by Mr. *Warburton* concerning *Pythagoras*’s Character, he will find himself puzzled to shew, from whence any such Thing appears. But if he did cultivate and inculcate Opinions merely on the Score of *Utility*, will it from hence follow, that this of a *future State* was one of them? No; but *Timæus* the *Locrian*, who was himself a *Pythagorean*, says, “ that the popular Doctrine of the *Metempsychosis* was one.” This may be allowed: And yet it will by no Means come up to his Point. For, notwithstanding *Pythagoras*’s really disbelieving the *Metempsychosis* which he taught, he might still believe a future State of Rewards and Punishments. The *Metempsychosis* might be only a figurative Manner of representing a future Existence, accommodated to the low Apprehensions and gross Imaginations of People. And  
in

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in this Sense *Timæus* himself seems very capable of being understood \*. “ For as we sometimes cure the Body with unwholesom Remedies, when such as are most wholesom have no Effect” (which Similitude, by the Way, is a very improper and unmeaning one, as *Timæus* has expressed it: Had he said, dangerous, hazardous Remedies, when the safe, or commonly successful Remedies have no Effect, it had been more intelligible, though the *Likeness* might have been less.) “ So we restrain those Minds by false Relations, which will not be restrained by the true. There is therefore a Necessity of instilling the Dread of those foreign Torments.” Or, λέγειν ο δ’ ἀναγκάτως καὶ τιμωρίας ξέναι, may perhaps be better rendered thus; “ There is moreover a Necessity of inculcating those foreign Torments; as that the Soul shifts and changes it’s Habitation; that the Coward is ignominiously thrust into a Woman’s Form, &c.” ψευδέσι λόγοις, false Relations, false Accounts, or false Representations; a figurative or metaphorical Manner of speaking of and describing a Reality, in order to the bringing it down to the Capacity of People, and it’s making an Impression upon them. This may be the true Sense of ψευδέσι λόγοις. And τιμωρίας ξέναι may refer to *Egypt*, from whence very probably, the *Greeks* borrowed their Manner of

\* Ὡς γὰρ τὰ σώματα νοσῶντες πόκα ὑγιαζόμεν, εἴκα μὴ εἴκη τοῖς ὑγιεινοτάτοις ἔτω τὰς ψυχὰς ἀπείργοιεν ψευδέσι λόγοις, εἴκα μὴ ἀγῆσαι ἀλαθέσι λέγοντο δ’ ἀναγκάτως καὶ τιμωρίας ξέναι, ὡς μετενδομέαν τὰν ψυχάν, τῶν μὴν δειλῶν, &c. *De anima mundi.*

represent-



representing the Punishments of a future State ; and particularly *Pythagoras* ; who resided there some Time ; and, no Question, was initiated into the Arts of the *Egyptian* Priesthood \*.

The *Metempsychosis* might be a Fiction, and apprehended to be so by *Pythagoras* and *Timæus* ; but it will by no Means follow, that there was no Reality at the Bottom ; of which this was an highly figurative Representation. I cannot therefore think this Testimony *so precise* as *Mr. Warburton* would seem to reckon it ; nor the Consequence he draws from it just. The *Metempsychosis* might be the ordinary Manner among the *Pythagoreans* and others, of speaking of and representing a future State of Rewards and Punishments ; but it will by no Means follow, that if they disbelieved this, they did not believe a future State at all.

But, it seems, after all there was a *Metempsychosis* really believed by *Pythagoras*, notwithstanding what *Timæus* says above. For where-as the *Metempsychosis* of the *Egyptians* (and believed by all Mankind), from whom *Pythagoras* received this Notion, was “ a moral Designation of Providence †,” *Pythagoras* gave it “ a different Modification, and made the old the Foundation of a new Notion of it ; viz. that the successive Transition of the Soul in-

\* We have seen above what *Herodotus* says of certain *Greeks*, whose Names he knows but does not mention, borrowing the Notion of the *Metempsychosis* from the *Egyptians*, and using it as if it was their own. In all Probability *Pythagoras* was one of them.

† See above, p. 5.

“ to other Bodies was physical and necessary,  
 “ and exclusive of all moral Considerations,  
 “ whatsoever:” then it is added; “ This was  
 “ indeed peculiarly his,” p. 346. But it is ob-  
 servable, not one single Authority is produced  
 to support this *Distinction*: Which yet certainly  
 ought not to have been omitted, if there had  
 been any; especially for the *excluding all moral*  
*Considerations whatsoever.*

And it seems to be at the Expence of Truth,  
 at least it is with perfect Uncertainty, that *Ovid*  
 is here complimented with being well aware of  
 this *Distinction*, and seeing the Perniciousness of  
*Pythagoras's* Notion. For nothing of this ap-  
 pears in *Ovid*. *Pythagoras* is introduced, as  
 delivering his Doctrine of the *Metempsychosis* in  
 general to the People of *Crotona*; and what he  
 says, has not the least Manner of a private or  
 esoteric Doctrine; nor could Mr. *Warburton*  
 himself have had the least Suspicion upon this  
 Head, had it not been for the following Lines;  
 which he quotes indeed, but which are merely  
 levelled against the Fear of Death, grounded  
 upon the *Poetical* or *Mythological* Account of  
 what was to follow.

*Quid Styga, quid Tenebras & Nomina vana  
 timetis?*

Whereas, says *Pythagoras*,

*Morte carent animæ, semperque priore relicta,  
 Sede novis domibus vivunt, habitantque re-  
 ceptæ \*.*

\* *Metamorph. L. 15. Fab. 3.*

But

But *Ovid* himself, by no means, appears either from hence, or any thing else, to have had the least Sense of the Perniciouſness of this Instruction: Nor was there any in it. *Pythagoras* might say, that the Stories of *Styx* and *Charon* and *Cerberus*, &c. were all a Fiction; and that the Souls of Men pass from one Body to another, without excluding a *moral Designation*, or supposing that there may not be different Dwellings appointed for the Souls of Men, according as they have behaved themselves upon going out of one Body into another.

Yet though, as far as appears, there is *no Manner* of Foundation for this *Distinction*, we are told, in the next Place, that the “ not attending to it has much perplexed the best “ modern Writers on the Subject of *Pythagoras*. Mr. *Dacier* advances crudely, that all “ Antiquity have been deceived in thinking “ *Pythagoras* really believed it; and for his “ Warrant quotes the Passage from *Timæus*, “ given above.—Mr. *Le Clerc*—affirms, as “ crudely, that he did believe it.—In which “ Dispute neither of them being aware of the “ two different Sorts of the *Metempsychosis*, “ have with much Confusion divided the right “ and the wrong of the Question between “ them.”—Mr. *Warburton* is to be reminded again, that though he makes a Distinction of the *Metempsychosis*, calling one *natural*, and the other *moral*, the former of which was believed by *Pythagoras*, the latter not; and lays so mighty a Stress upon this Distinction, as to charge both



both *Dacier* and *Le Clerc* with *Crudities* and *Confusion*, merely for Want of attending to it; he has not himself brought the least Evidence in the World for the Support of it. And whereas he may think, that without such a Distinction, it is impossible to reconcile the different Accounts that are given by ancient Authors concerning *Pythagoras's* Opinion of the *Metempsychosis*, I suspect he may in that too be mistaken; and, possibly, the true Way of reconciling all Differences, may be by understanding his *Metempsychosis*, either *literally*, or *figuratively*. In the *figurative* Sense, as a metaphorical Representation of what shall be hereafter, he believed it: In the *literal* Sense he did not. And in this Manner may his Belief of a future State be made consistent with what *Timæus* has said, in the Passage above, concerning it. The Account of a future State stript of all Figure and Allusion to the agreeable and disagreeable Images of the present World, would, probably, very little affect the Generality of People. And surely *Pythagoras* might prefer one Manner of Representation to another, without coming under the Suspicion of believing nothing at all about it.

Here ends *Mr. Warburton's* Account of *Pythagoras*, and his Notion of a future State of Rewards and Punishments; and, it is probable, he may reckon he has made it appear, that *Pythagoras* did not believe any such State, how much soever he might inculcate it in his *Legislatorial* Capacity. But though there is a very long

long Account under this Article, swelled up to so many Pages, yet, when a Man has set aside all the Digressions, and removed every Thing but what is really to the Purpose, it must be surprising to see how little remains; and, excepting that single Quotation from *Timæus*, (the Meaning and Force of which has been sufficiently considered,) he will not find any Thing that amounts to the least Proof of Mr. *Warburton's* Assertion.

2. He next proceeds to *Plato*, p. 349, and tells us, he had “ for his *Greek* Masters, *Pythagoras* and *Socrates*; which was a monstrous Misalliance; but that it was the abstruse Philosophy of *Pythagoras* he was most attached to; for the Sake of which he travelled to *Egypt*.”—From hence, and some Observations more concerning the *double Doctrine*, *Plato's* Fondness for it, and the Opinion of the Ancients of the Necessity of this Key for the understanding his Writings; he is ready to come to this Conclusion: “ The Platonic Philosophy then being intirely Pythagorean in the Point in question, and this latter rejecting the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments, we might fairly conclude them both under the same Predicament,” p. 353. But this is going much too fast. It has not, I think, been *proved* at all, that *Pythagoras* rejected really a future State; and if this had been proved, it has not been *shewn*, that *Plato* followed his Example in preaching up a future State at the same Time that

that he did not believe it. And, being sensible that he had not sufficiently proved this latter Point, he proceeds to a more particular and distinct Consideration of it.

I. First then; he argued much for the Immortality of the Soul; but his Arguments were "Natural and Metaphysical," drawn from the *Essence* and *Qualities* of the Soul; and so only proved the *Permanency* of it: And "this he certainly believed." Hence it follows, that these Arguments were not of the *Exoterical* Sort, but what *Plato* himself looked upon as really good and conclusive; since upon the Strength of them he really believed the *Permanency* of the Soul.

One of these Arguments, and the most remarkable one (for it is rendered by *Tully* in his *first Tusculan* \*, and displayed at large by *Macrobius* †, with *Aristotle's* Answer to it, and the Defence of it by *Plato's* Followers) is taken from it's being *αὐτοκίνητος*, or having the Principle of Motion in itself: From whence he argued it must be *ἀθάνατος*, i. e. immortal. An Argument, so far from being merely *exoterical*, that it is an exceeding good one; never yet answered, and much less by *Aristotle*; who thought it the best Way to deny the Soul's having such a Principle of Motion in itself.—If then such Arguments as this are found in *Plato's exoterical* Performances, which are themselves not at all *exoterical*, we shall plainly want some Cri-

\* Ch. 23.

† *Somn. Scip.* c. 13, 14, 15.



terion to assist us in judging, while we read those Books, what Parts of them are true in the Author's Judgment, and which are only popular. And in *no* Case whatsoever will it be good arguing, that because such or such an Assertion is met with in this or the other Book, *e. g.* the *Laws*, *Criton*, &c.—therefore it must be *exoterical*. The utmost that can be concluded from hence is, that it *may* be so; but to prove it *is*, some other Argument is necessarily required.

Well; *Plato* did really prove and believe the *Permanency* of the Soul: “ But, says Mr. *Warburton*, for any moral Arguments, from “ which only a future State of Rewards and “ Punishments can be deduced, he resolves “ them all into Tradition, and the Religion of “ his Country.” *Plato*, doubtless, thought, and so does every one now, that in order to prove a future State of Rewards and Punishments, it was very necessary to shew, that the Nature of the Soul was such as proved a *Capacity* in it of existing after the Body is parted from it \*. This being

\* Here it may be observed, that this is the very Account *Macrobius* gives us of *Plato's* Conduct and Design in the *Phædo*. “ *Rerum omnium Plato & actuum naturam penitus inspiciens* “ *advertit in omni sermone suo de reipublicæ institutione proposito* “ *infundendum animis justitiæ amorem; sine qua non solum res-* “ *publica, sed nec exiguus hominum cætus, nec domus quidem par-* “ *va constabit. Ad hunc porro justitiæ affectum pectoribus inocu-* “ *landum nihil æque patrocinaturum vidit, quam si fructus ejus* “ *non videretur cum vita hominis terminari. Hunc vero supersti-* “ *tem durare post hominem qui poterat ostendi, NISI prius de ani-* “ *mæ immortalitate constaret? Fide autem facta perpetuitatis a-* “ *nimarum, consequens esse animadvertit, ut certa illis loca nexu*  
cor-

being once established, it would be easy to say, and not very difficult to believe, what it was that should determine the Manner of it's Existence hereafter. It is acknowledged, *Plato* got over the former Difficulty; and from what is said under the next Head, it appears he found no Difficulty in the latter Case. For thus Mr. *Warburton* goes on.

2. "As the inventing Reasons for the Immortality of the Soul was one Cause of his being esteemed the grand Patron of this Belief; so another was his famous Refinement (for it was indeed his) of the natural Metempsychosis, viz. That the Changes and Transitions, from one Body to another, were the Purgations of impure Minds—and, consequently, that pure and immaculate Souls were exempt from this Transmigration." Then it is added; "This Platonic Metempsychosis, (which was as peculiarly his, as the other was *Pythagoras's*) seemed to have something of a moral Designation in it."—*Pythagoras's* Metempsychosis has been considered. He learned it from the *Egyptians*; but from a moral one (which it was in *Egypt*, and believed by all Mankind, says Mr. *Warburton* himself, p. 346.) he made it a natural one. *Plato* comes after, and receiving this natural Me-

"corporis absolutis, pro contemplatu probi improbiue meriti deputata sint. SIC in Phædone, INEXPUGNABILIMUM LUCE RATIONUM anima in VERAM dignitatem PROPRIÆ immortalitatis asserta, sequitur distinctio locorum, quæ hanc vitam relinquentibus ea lege debentur, quam sibi quisque vivendo sanxerit." *Somn. Scip. c. 1.*

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temp-

tempsychofis from his Master *Pythagoras*, refined upon it, and from a *natural* made it again a *moral* one. *Plato* travelled into *Egypt*, as well as his Master, and was instructed there in the *moral* Metempsychofis, *i. e.* that the Metempsychofis had a *moral* Designation. The *moral* Designation therefore was not a Refinement peculiar to *Plato*, but was an *Egyptian* Notion long before him and his Master, and believed too, says *Mr. Warburton*, by all the World. Possibly (not certainly by any Means) this Notion might be his, *viz.* That perfect Souls were exempted from Transmigration. Perhaps, neither the *Egyptians*, nor *Pythagoras*, ever dreamt of there being any such; and then they could not think of making the Exception. However, for a certain Reason, I am very glad that *Plato* did—But how much they both

“ agreed (*Plato* and his Master) in excluding a  
 “ future State of Rewards and Punishments, will  
 “ be seen, when he comes to shew what a  
 “ Kind of Existence it was, that they afforded  
 “ to the Soul, when it had rejoined that uni-  
 “ versal Substance from which it was discerped.”

How much soever the Reader may be here baulked in his Expectation, he must be content to wait some Time for *Mr. Warburton's* Solution of this Difficulty; “ how *Plato's* Metempsychofis could be a *moral* one, quite different  
 “ from his Master's, which was merely a *natural* one, and likewise intended for the Pur-  
 “ gation of impure Minds; and yet after all  
 “ have no *moral* Designation in it:” And like-  
 wise



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wife of this; "How *Pythagoras* and his Disciple could so perfectly agree in the End, the Termination of the Metempsychosis, and yet differ so widely as they did, about both the Nature and the Design of it."—All I shall say farther here (and which I would desire may be remembered, since there will be presently Occasion for it) is; that, whatever *Pythagoras* might do, *Plato* only supposed, that *purged, purified, perfect* Souls could at any Time re-ascend to, and unite with, the original Substance, from whence they were taken.

3. But in the next Place; it is acknowledged to be very "true, that *Plato* in his Writings much inculcates—the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments. But how? why, always in the grossest Sense of the Populace: That the Souls of ill Men descended into Asses and Swine—talks of three Judges in Hell, and of Styx, Cocytus, &c." Thus he talked of, it seems, and represented the future State of *Punishment*. But we are not told, how he used to paint the future State of *Rewards*. No doubt, he chose a cleaner Conveyance for good, though imperfect, Men; till they were effectually purged, and made meet to re-ascend to, and rejoin the universal Substance. And as to that Way of painting a future State of Punishment, by disagreeable, filthy, or painful Images, it plainly all along has been, and still is, the constant Manner. And though Mr. *Warburton* may like one Manner of describing better than another, he

must own it all to be but *Description* still. Little else but Metaphor and Allegory is ever made use of, in talking of future Rewards and Punishments. And, without question, it is in a great Degree *necessary* it should be so. But to argue from hence, that a future State is not believed, because it is thus described, is a Consequence that will not by any Means be admitted: Any more than Mr. *Warburton* will himself admit it, in the Case of the ancient *Legislators* \*.

4. The last Observation, which is made in Confirmation of all the rest, seems to be, if possible, still less to the Purpose than any Thing yet said, *viz.* "That the most intelligent of  
" the Ancients regarded what *Plato* said of a  
" future State of Rewards and Punishments, as  
" said in the *exoteric* Way, and not believed  
" by himself," p. 355. There is no doubt but *Plato* himself knew very well, that his Descriptions of the future Punishments of ill Men were intirely figurative, and therefore did not believe them in the *literal* Sense. But he might think such a *Manner* of representing them was likely (so the old *Legislators* thought before him) to lay bold of the gross Imaginations of Men, make an Impression upon their Minds, and induce them to act well for Fear of what was to follow; when, perhaps, any other, more rational, Manner of Representation would not be regarded. And if *Plato's* Manner of Description was found Fault with by *Ckrysippus*, or any other

\* See above, p. 136. marg. Note.

Ancient, it no Ways appears, that it was any Thing else, but the *Representation*; and nothing can be at all safely concluded concerning *Plato's* Opinion of the Thing itself. It is well known, the same Fault has been found with the Representations of Revelation itself upon this Head: But no Body yet has been hardy enough to conclude from thence, that our Saviour and his Apostles did not believe a future State of Punishment. What has been said, will serve equally for an Answer to what is next cited from *Strabo* \*. The Word, *μύθος*, is only made use of to express the figurative Manner of Representation; and, notwithstanding that, both the *Brachmans* and *Plato* might equally believe a future State: Nor was it ever suspected, that the *Brachmans* did not, or at this Day do not. Neither is the Quotation from *Celsus* more to the Purpose. *Celsus* might well think *Plato's* Representations *allegorical*; but, it no ways appears he thought those Allegories meant nothing, or that therefore *Plato* did not believe a future State of Rewards and Punishments. On the contrary, it is plain *Celsus* had no Suspicion or Doubt upon this Head: Nay, he tells us there is a Meaning, and how we may find it out, though not without some Difficulty. The Way to find it out, is, by comprehending what *Plato* intends, when speaking of Souls, whether extremely corrupt, or only imperfect, and not yet sufficiently purged, he

\* Παραπλίκουσι δὲ καὶ μύθος, ὥσπερ καὶ Πλάτων περὶ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ψυχῆς καὶ τῶν κατ' ἄρθε κρίσεων, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. *Geogr.*



says (so Mr. *Warburton* gives his Sense) “ They  
 “ cannot, by reason of their Imbecillity and  
 “ Sluggishness, penetrate into the highest Re-  
 “ gion. But was their Nature vigorous enough  
 “ to raise itself to so sublime a Contemplation,  
 “ then would they come to understand, this  
 “ was the true Heaven, and the true Irradiati-  
 “ on.” This Passage is so very sublime, that I  
 am afraid very few will be able to understand a  
 Tittle of it. Which makes it so much the more  
 regretted by many, that whereas Mr. *Warburton*  
 has given us a Note upon the ἀλήθειον φῶς,  
 we have not another on the ὁ ἀληθὺς ἑρμῆς.  
 But the most important Thing of all had been  
 to have told us, what that *Contemplation* is,  
 which is so necessary, in order to understand  
 the *true Heaven, and the true Light*. But this  
 is omitted, and we are only told, “ that these  
 “ remarkable Words, besides the general Con-  
 “ clusion to be drawn from them, confirm  
 “ what has been said of the peculiar Platonic  
 “ Metempsychosis.” This *general Conclusion*,  
 I suppose to be, that *Plato believed nothing of*  
*a future State of Rewards and Punishments*. But  
 did *Celsus* think so? or intend that we should  
 think so?—As for the other Thing, *viz.*  
 This Passage’s confirming what has been assert-  
 ed of the *peculiar Platonic Metempsychosis*, (if  
 this be a Matter of any Moment) it may be al-  
 lowed to do that; *i. e.* so far as the *Platonic*  
*Metempsychosis* was a moral one, or had a *mo-*  
*ral Designation*. But, as was before observed,  
 a *moral Metempsychosis* was not a merely *Pla-*  
*tonic*

*tonic* Notion ; was not invented by *Plato* ; nor, so far as appears, at all improved by him.—Mr. *Warburton* goes on ; “ For here *Celsus* resolves “ all *Plato*’s Meaning, in his Representations of “ a future State into that ;” viz. the *moral* Metempsychosis, in Opposition to a merely *natural* one ; which was the *Pythagoric* Notion.— “ And we shall hereafter see, that that was re- “ solved into the Re-union of the Soul with the “ divine Nature, when it became vigorous e- “ nough to penetrate into the highest Region.” All that I shall observe here, is, that this, and an hundred such Remarks, will, by no Means, affect *Plato*’s Belief of a future State of Rewards and Punishments. The utmost Stretch of *Plato*’s free-thinking in the Case before us, seems to have been this, viz. “ That he thought “ the Souls of all Men would, sooner or later, “ re-ascend to the supreme Substance : The “ bad would be punished by passing from one “ disagreeable State to another, till at last, “ Thought and Reflection being awakened, “ they gradually recovered to a State of Purity “ and Perfection ; and then they would ascend “ to the original Substance. The Good would, “ by various Changes, likewise purge off the “ Remains of Impurity and Imperfection, and “ then return and be re-united to the same Sub- “ stance.”

Here ends the Account of *Plato*, and it must be referred to the Reader, whether the Author has not left this Article in as uncertain and inconclusive a Manner, as he did that of *Pythagoras*.

Hence he proceeds to the *Aristotelians* and the *Stoics*, and makes short Work with them, as he might very well do. The Passage cited out of *Aristotle's Ethicks*, is decisive enough. Nothing is cited concerning *Zeno's* Opinion; except a Passage from *Lactantius*. But then, with Respect to this Citation, he says; "Not  
 " to mention that his (*Zeno's*) Follower *Chrysippus* laugh'd at these Things as childish, we  
 " know that the philosophic Principle of his  
 " School was, that the Soul died with the Bo-  
 " dy,"—p. 358. If he asserts this to be the Notion of *Zeno's* School in *Zeno's* Time, I apprehend he says more than is any way to be proved; and directly, at the same Time, contradicts *Tully*; who tells us, that the *Stoics* held that the Soul would live after it's Separation from the Body, but denied that it would always do so \*. As for *Chrysippus*, it has been before observed, that he was very inconstant and inconsistent upon this Head; and therefore is to be given up here, as well as elsewhere, for a *repugnant* Stoic. Afterwards, the *Stoics* differed; and many of them were doubtful upon this Head, and some denied such a State. *Epictetus* did so; and he certainly was more Stoic than any Thing else. But what did *Cato*, who was older than he, and professedly a Stoic? Or, the other *Cato*, who was before him? If *Tully's* Book, *De Senectute*, where *Cato* is personated, was wrote in Character, we know suf-

\* *Tusc. Disp. i. c. 31. Stoici autem usuram nobis largiuntur tanquam Cornicibus; diu mansuros aiunt animas, semper negant.*

ficiently



ficiently what was his Opinion \*. As for *Seneca*, who is cited again upon this Occasion, he was much younger than both of them; and was as inconstant and inconsistent as *Chrysippus*; therefore not to be much regarded.

VI.

Mr. *Warburton* now thinking he has given sufficient Evidence, that the *Philosophers* did not believe a future State of either Rewards or Punishments, though they were perpetually inculcating this Doctrine in their Writings, proceeds to explain the very Causes, which kept the Philosophers from believing such a Thing. And he says, p. 368,

\* The following Argument, or rather, the following Arguments (for there are several of them crowded together) taken from *Plato*, seem to have given him the greatest Conviction upon this Head; and they are such as may have their Weight with every one, and no one can possibly consider them as merely of a popular, exoterical Nature. “*Quid multa? sic mihi persuasi, sic sentio: cum tanta celeritas animorum sit, tanta memoria præteritorum, futurorumque prudentia, tot artes, tantæ scientiæ, tot inventa, non posse eam naturam, quæ res eas continet, esse mortalem: cumque semper agitetur animus, nec principium motus habeat, quia se ipse moveat, ne finem quidem habentem esse motus, quia nunquam se ipse sit relicturus: et, cum simplex animi natura esset, neque haberet in se quidquam admissum dispar sui atque dissimile, non posse eum dividi; quod si non possit, non posse interire.*” — These Arguments, so strong and convincing in their own Nature, and to himself in particular, he tells us, are taken from *Plato*. “*Hæc Plato noster.*” And here again, *Tully* assures us, that in this Opinion of the proper Immortality of the Soul, *Plato*’s Sentiment was the same with that of *Pythagoras*, and his Sect, and likewise that of *Socrates*. For thus the preceding Quotation is introduced. “*Audiebam Pythagoram, Pythagoreosque — demonstrabantur mihi præterea quæ Soerates supremo vitæ die de immortalitate animorum differuisset.*” — Then follows, “*Quid multa? sic mihi persuasi, sic sentio.*” — Nothing can be plainer, than that *Tully* puts the *Pythagoreans*, *Socrates* and *Plato*, upon the same Footing exactly with Respect to the Immortality of the Soul.

1. That

1. That the *first Principle* which hindered them was this; "That God could neither be angry nor hurt any one." For which he cites *Tully*, *Offic.* l. 3. c. 28.

Whether *Tully* speaks at all to his Purpose, or how far he does so, shall be now considered.

*Tully* does indeed mention such a Notion of the Philosophers (in what Manner will be presently seen) upon Occasion of, and with Relation to, the particular Case of *Regulus*. Who, rather than persuade, or even consent to, an Exchange of the *Carthaginian* Prisoners, kept his Oath by returning to *Carthage* and yielding himself up to a cruel Death. This Action of *Regulus* is mentioned here by *Tully*, as an Example of that *Greatness* and *Fortitude* of Mind, which will help a Man to surmount any Difficulties, slight and despise the Appearances of Gain or Pleasure; and, on the other Hand, encounter any Degrees of Pain and Suffering, rather than be diverted or affrighted by either from doing his Duty; *i. e.* from doing what upon the whole, all Things considered and duly balanced one against another, appears rightest and fittest for him to do. This is *Tully's* Way of accounting for *Regulus's* Conduct.

"He was sent, says *Tully*, to the *Roman Senate*, to propose an Exchange of Prisoners, under a solemn Oath to return to *Carthage*, if the Senate rejected the Proposition." —  
*"Furatus missus est ad Senatum, ut, nisi redditi essent Pœnis captivi nobiles quidam, rediret ipse Carthaginem."* As soon as he entered *Rome*, he

he must, as *Tully* observes, be immediately struck with a great many desirable Objects; Country—Wife—Children—the Degree of a Consular, which the late unlucky Chance of War could not deprive him of. A common Mind would have been immediately so affected with these Things, as to reckon them superior to every Thing else, and for the Sake of them would have overlooked and slighted all other Considerations. But not so *Regulus*. The true Greatness and Fortitude of his Mind enabled him to see, that in his Case these Things were really upon the whole *not* good, *not* desirable. "*Utilitatis speciem videbat, sed eam, ut res declarat, falsam judicavit,*" That is, he used his Reason, and saw plainly that there were Circumstances in his Case, which quite overbalanced all the *Utility* of these Things. Therefore when he came into the Senate, he was so far from seconding the Proposition he had made from the *Carthaginians*, that he dissuaded a Compliance with it, and accordingly it was rejected. And what did *Regulus* do then? Why, he returned to *Carthage*; and though he knew he was going to a cruel Enemy and exquisite Torments, neither that, nor the Tenderness he had for his Country and Family could detain him. And as this was all his own Choice, and the Result of the most deliberate Consideration, we may pronounce him to have been much happier in the midst of even all his Tortures, than he could have been, had he staid at *Rome* an old—captive—perjured—Consular. "*Itaque*"



*“que tum cum vigilando necabatur, erat in meliore causa, quam si domi senex, captivus, perjurus, Consularis remansisset.”*

As to the particular Action of his returning to *Carthage*, it was his Oath that influenced him to do that. “*Jusjurandum*, says *Tully*, *conferendum putabat.*”——Now the mentioning *Regulus’s Oath* and his *Regard* to it upon this Occasion, gives *Tully* the Opportunity of introducing several *Objections* to *Regulus’s keeping* his Oath. Concerning all which *Objections* and *Tully’s Answers* to them, it may and should be remarked, they would have found no Place at all, had it been at first observed, (as it is a great Way afterwards) that as to this particular Action of *Regulus’s keeping* his Oath and returning to *Carthage*, whatever Fate he should there meet with, there was really nothing wonderful, or difficult, or even Matter of Choice in it. For, as the Manners of that Time were in which *Regulus* lived, he could not, in this Respect, have done otherwise than he did. Since had he not returned of his own Accord, he would have been compelled to it. That is; the Senate and People of *Rome* would themselves have sent him back in Chains, and with every other Mark of Infamy and Disgrace. In this Manner it is, that *Tully* at last recollects, and, I may add, as it were corrects, himself, and returns from a long Digression ||. “*Sed ex tota hac laude Reguli unum illud est admiratione dignum, quod captivos retinendos censuerit: nam quod re-*

|| Ibid. c. 31.

“ diit,

“ diit, nobis nunc mirabile videtur, illis quidem  
 “ temporibus aliter facere non potuit. Itaque  
 “ illa laus non est hominis, sed temporum.” Here  
 we have the real Truth of the Case; and from  
 hence it is plain, that *Regulus's* keeping his  
 Oath and going back to *Carthage*, made no  
 Part at all of his real Merit.

*Tully* however had his End in mentioning  
 this Oath, and gained by it an Opportunity of  
 making and answering several *Objections* to *Regulus's*  
 keeping it.

One, and the first, is that which *Mr. War-*  
*burton* here mentions. “ *Quid est igitur, dixerit*  
 “ *quis, in jurejurando? Num iratum timemus*  
 “ *Jovem? At hoc quidem commune est omnium*  
 “ *Philosophorum, non eorum modo qui deum nihil*  
 “ *habere ipsum negotii dicunt, & nihil exhibere*  
 “ *alteri, sed eorum etiam, qui deum semper age-*  
 “ *re aliquid & moliri volunt, nunquam nec irasci*  
 “ *deum nec nocere.*” Immediately after this come  
 the other *Objections*; and as *Tully's* Answers fol-  
 low afterwards in the same Order, he first of all  
 speaks to this, and says; “ That such a Reason  
 “ would hold good not only against *Regulus*,  
 “ or his keeping his Oath, but equally against  
 “ every Oath, or the keeping any Oath at all.  
 “ But in taking an Oath, the proper and pri-  
 “ mary Consideration is, not what *Fear* there  
 “ is in it, but what is the *Force* of it. An Oath  
 “ is a religious Affirmation: And what is thus,  
 “ affirmatively (positively, certainly) promised,  
 “ as in the Presence of God, *quasi Deo teste*  
 “ (*Tully* does not add, & ultore) must be held  
 “ to

“ to and performed. For this does not relate  
 “ to the Anger of the Gods, which is nothing  
 “ here, but to Justice and good Faith; which  
 “ are Considerations of principal Moment, and  
 “ to be preferred to all private Views whatso-  
 “ ever. This was plainly the Sentiment of our  
 “ Ancestors; who therefore placed and wor-  
 “ shipped the Image of good Faith in the Ca-  
 “ pitol the very next to that of *Jupiter* him-  
 “ self.”

This, I take it, is the true Sense of *Tully's* Answer to the first Objection; and in particular of that Expression, “ *jam enim non ad iram deorum, quæ nulla est, sed ad justitiam & ad fidem pertinet.* ” — *Quæ nulla est*, seems to be the same as, *quæ nihil est*, i. e. *nihil ad hanc rem*. That is; *it is nothing to the present Purpose*; it does not properly come into any Consideration here. As the Words seem not quite incapable of this Construction, it may not a little incline us to think it is the true one, to consider, that *Tully's* denying absolutely the *Anger* of the Gods, in this Place, is utterly needless and foreign to the Purpose: As any one will presently see, who strictly attends to and considers the Force of his Argument. Those indeed who make the Objection, do deny the *Anger* of the Gods, and say, it is the Sentiment of all the Philosophers, “ that God can neither be angry nor hurt any one; ” and upon this they ask; “ what should *Regulus* or any one else be afraid of in violating an Oath? *Tully* in his Answer apparently waves the Consideration



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sideration of this philosophical Opinion; and satisfies himself with observing, that it is nothing to the Purpose; since in swearing a Man is to consider, not what *Fear* there is, but what is the proper, positive *Force* of his Oath. “*Non qui metus, sed quæ vis sit, debet intelligi.*” And this will lead him, not to the *Anger* of the Gods, but to *Justice* and good *Faith*: Which are, and ought to be, Considerations of principal Moment; and particularly were so in the Judgment of our Ancestors.

This is *Tully's* Answer.

Let us now return to Mr. *Warburton*, who has neither quoted *Tully*, nor represented his Sense, in such a Manner as might be wished. Where the Omissions seem to make against him, he has given us no Notice of them; but where they are of no Moment, he has by Breaks been very careful to give us Warning. After those Words—“*Sed jusjurandum conservandum putabat;*” he has omitted this emphatical Conclusion. “*Itaque tum cum vigiliando necabatur, erat in MELIORE CAUSA, quam si domi senex, captivus, perjurus consularis remansisset;*” and a great deal more, without giving the least Hint of any Omission: But on the contrary, goes on to the first Objection, as if in *Tully* it was immediately connected with “*jusjurandum conservandum putabat:*” Which it is not.

And again; *Tully*, he says, assures us, that “the Principle of God’s not being angry nor hurting any one,” was held universally by the  
*Philoso-*

*Philosophers, as well by those who believed a Providence, as by those who did not.*——And for this quotes these Words, as if they expressed *Tully's* own Sentiment; “*At hoc quidem commune est omnium Philosophorum, non eorum modo qui deum nihil habere ipsum negotii dicunt, & nihil exhibere alteri; sed eorum etiam qui deum semper agere aliquid & moliri volunt, nunquam nec irasci deum nec nocere.*” Whereas these Words are not *Tully's* in any proper Sense, but an *Objector's*, and contain an *Objection*, the first of five or six, to *Regulus's* Conduct: Which *Tully* himself answers afterwards; in the Manner above.——

But let us go on to his Manner of representing *Tully's Sense*. “What Conclusions, says he, follow from this Principle, against a future State of Rewards and Punishments, in the OPINION of *Tully* himself, we shall now see.”——

In the first Place; *Tully* draws no *Conclusions* at all from that Principle, either one Way or another: But only observes concerning it, that it is here, upon this Occasion and with Relation to *Regulus*, mentioned and objected to no Manner of Purpose, and that it is quite beside the Question: Since, whatever is determined concerning the *Anger of the Gods*, *Regulus's* Conduct would, and might reasonably, have been the same. And in the second Place; it is to be observed, that Mr. *Warburton* no more tells us what those *Conclusions* are, than *Tully* himself has drawn them. One indeed, and  
only

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only one, is afterwards mentioned ; and it shall be presently considered.

Thus he goes on : “ *Tully* is here commending *Regulus* for preferring the publick Good to his own, and the honest to the profitable, in dissuading the Release of the *Carthaginian* Prisoners and returning back to certain *Misery*, when he might have spent his Age at Home in *Peace and Pleasure* \*.” Now let us see what there is of this in *Tully*.

Does

What Truth there is in this Observation, or what *Peace and Pleasure* *Regulus* would have lived in had he staid at *Rome*, may appear, not only from what *Tully* himself tells us, but likewise from a parallel Instance in the next *Punic War* (when it cannot be pretended the Manners of the *Romans* were at all improved) related by *Corn. Nepos*, and preserved to us by *A. Gellius*. *Noct. Attic.* l. 7. c. 18. Some of the ten *Romans* who had been sent by *Hannibal* to *Rome* after the Battle of *Cannæ* to propose an Exchange of Prisoners, under the Obligation of an Oath to return, if they did not succeed, thought it best, it seems, though the Senate rejected the Motion, to stay at Home and enjoy the Freedom and Delights of *Rome*. But whatever they might propose to themselves, they found every Thing turn out contrary to Expectation ; and, instead of *Peace and Pleasure*, met with so much Contempt and perpetual ill Usage from every Body as soon rendered even Life itself a Burthen. “ *Cornelius* autem *Nepos*, in libro *Exemplorum* quinto, id quoque literis mandavit, multis in *Senatu* placuisse, ut ii, qui redire nollent, datis custodibus ad *Hannibalem* deducerentur ; sed eam sententiam numero plurium, quibus id non videretur, superatam ; eos tamen qui ad *Hannibalem* non redissent, usque adeo intestabiles invisosque fuisse, ut tedium vitæ ceperint necemque sibi consciverint.” It is observable in this Story, that, though the Senate had it in Deliberation, and many of the Members were of Opinion that these perjured Captives should be sent in safe Custody to the *Carthaginian* Camp, yet the Majority refused to come into it. Which is a remarkable Instance of what is above observed, that the Manners of the *Romans* were by no Means improved between the first and second *Punic Wars* ; since *Tully* expressly tells us, that at the Time of the former, the Senate and People

M

of



Does Tully oppose private *real Good* to that of the Publick, or the really profitable to the honest? So much the contrary, that he shews, the private Good or Profit, which could have hindered *Regulus* from keeping his Oath, was a *false Species*, a Delusion. "*Utilitatis speciem videbat, sed eam, ut res declarat, FALSAM judicavit: Quæ erat talis; manere in patria —esse domi suæ cum uxore—cum liberis—quam calamitatem accepisset in bello communem fortunæ bellicæ judicantem tenere consularis dignitatis gradum. Quis hæc neget esse Utilia? quem censes? magnitudo animi & fortitudo negat.*" And it is so far from being true, or agreeable to Tully's Sentiment, that *Regulus* returned back to certain Misery, that, on the contrary, he says, when *Regulus* was actually in his Torments, he was in more eligible Circumstances, than he could have been, had he staid at Rome. "*Cum vigilando necabatur, erat in MELIORE CAUSA, quam si domi Senex—captivus—perjurus—consularis remansisset:*" Where every Word is so very expressive of the extreme Wretchedness of that State he must have been in had he staid at Home.

Mr. Warburton goes on; "All this Tully observes was done out of Regard to his Oath, of Rome would have made no Scruple of sending away such faithless People in Chains, and with every other Mark of Infamy and Disgrace. But yet at the same Time it is evident likewise, that though the Senate let these perjured Captives alone, yet every Body in their private Conduct behaved in such a Manner towards them, as quite rendered Life an insupportable Burden, and quickly reduced them to the Necessity of putting a violent End to it.

“ But it may perhaps, says he, be objected—  
 “ What is there in an Oath? The Violator need  
 “ not fear the Wrath of Heaven. For all  
 “ Philosophers hold, that *God cannot be angry*  
 “ *nor hurt any one.*” And what is *Tully* made  
 to reply to this? Why, “ that it was a Con-  
 “ sequence of the Principle of God’s not being  
 “ angry, that the perjured Man had nothing to  
 “ fear from divine Vengeance: But that it was  
 “ not THIS Fear, which was really nothing,  
 “ but Justice and good Faith, that made the  
 “ Sanction of an Oath.” If this is *Tully’s* Re-  
 ply, here is then, first, a Concession made;  
*viz. that it was a Consequence of the Principle of*  
*God’s not being angry, that the perjured Man*  
*had nothing to fear from divine Vengeance.*—  
 But where shall we find any Thing of this in  
*Tully*? If this be a *Conclusion* or a Consequence  
 from that Principle, it is absolutely of Mr.  
*Warburton’s* drawing, not *Tully’s*. He has not  
 the least Tittle of it. What *Tully* himself says  
 is this: “ Such a Reason is quite impertinently  
 “ mentioned, with Relation to the particular  
 “ Case of *Regulus*: Since it will equally con-  
 “ clude against every Oath whatsoever. But  
 “ in swearing a Man is not to consider, what  
 “ Fear there is in his Oath, *i. e.* what he has  
 “ to fear from breaking his Oath, but what is  
 “ the proper FORCE of it.”—“ *Non qui metus,*  
 “ *sed quæ vis sit, debet intelligi.*”—And to this  
 Sense the Reason that follows is exactly accom-  
 modated. “ *Est enim jusjurandum affirmatio*  
 “ *religiosa: quod autem affirmate, quasi deo*  
 M 2 *teste,*

“*teste, promiseris, id tenendum est; jam enim*  
 “*non ad iram decorum, quæ nulla est, sed ad*  
 “*justitiam & ad fidem pertinet.*” That is;  
 “For an Oath is a religious Affirmation; but  
 “what is thus promised, as in the Presence of  
 “God, must be performed: For now Justice  
 “and good Faith are concerned, and not at all  
 “the Anger of the Gods.”

But then, in the next Place: What does Mr. Warburton mean by those Words; *It was not THIS Fear—but Justice and good Faith?—THIS Fear?* What, the Fear of divine Vengeance? This must be the Meaning, if there is any. But Tully's *Metus* is general, and will include every Occasion of Fear, whether from the Gods, or the Magistrate, or any other Cause whatsoever: And I apprehend, that with Respect to all of them equally he would say, “They do not any of them properly enter into the Consideration of the Obligation of an Oath.” And therefore those, who think the Gods never are angry, and cannot hurt any one, cannot with any Propriety object this to *Regulus*, as a Reason why he might not have kept his Oath. “*Non qui metus,*” is general: Not any particular Fear, but inclusive of all Fear, of every Kind, whatever is the Cause, Object, Occasion.—And Tully's Sentiment is; that no Fear whatever is properly concerned in the Obligation or Sanction of an Oath. And in this Manner he answers, or (as some would choose to express it rather) eludes, the *first Objection*; without at all entering into, or concerning him-  
 self



self with, this refined, philosophic Notion of the Anger of the Gods\*.

And

\* If the learned Reader cannot, after all, acquiesce in the relative Sense of those Words "*quæ nulla est*," and yet so far agree with me, as not to be able to see, with what Propriety, or to what Purpose Tully himself should here deny absolutely the Anger of the Gods, he may consider another Manner of interpreting the Passage before us; in which, I think, the Propriety of Tully's Language and Sentiments is equally consulted. It supposes an Ellipsis in the Words, "*quæ nulla est*," and they are thought to mean the same as, "*quæ dicitur nulla esse*," or, "*quàm dicunt nullam esse*." And though Ellipses are not by any Means to be imagined any where without Reason, it is thought that those who take the whole Passage before them, and well attend to it, will see, that there is no Improbability in supposing one here. The Objector would have the Force of an Oath, to relate to the Anger of the Gods; which Anger he denies. Tully says, the Force of an Oath has no Relation at all to the Anger here denied: But to Justice and good Faith. For what is an Oath but a religious Affirmation? And is not a Man obliged by Justice and good Faith to perform what is so promised? This Construction, I confess, is not my own: But I mention it as a very plausible one, and perfectly agreeable to Tully's Manner; who seldom dogmatizes upon any Occasion, and cannot by any Means be supposed to do it in so material a Point, without any the least Motive or Propriety whatsoever. "The Obligation of an Oath is derived from Justice and good Faith: The Anger of the Gods has nothing to do with it," — is not this saying enough? To what Purpose could it be added; "But this Anger is in itself nothing?" Would not this be quite superfluous and impertinent, and equally different from Tully's Manner both of writing and philosophizing? But, on the other Hand; if it be supposed, these Words, "*quæ nulla est*," express, not Tully's, but the Objector's Sense, there will be no Shadow at all of Impropriety or Impertinence. "The Obligation of an Oath does not relate to the Anger of the Gods, denied by the Objector, but to Justice and good Faith; which must be acknowledged by every one as capable of obliging."

Yet here is another Difficulty, it must be owned, still behind, not relating to Tully's Language indeed, but the Strength of his Reasoning upon this Occasion, and in this Answer to the first Objection: Which is, that this Answer seems not to have

And from hence, I think, may appear, how intirely wrong Mr. Warburton is in his Conclusion: "Here we see Tully owns the Consequence of this universal Principle, that it quite overthrew the Notion of *Divine Punishments*."

Tully certainly acknowledges no such Thing. No, not even (*ex abundanti*) upon Mr. Warburton's own Construction of those Words, "*quæ nulla est*." He will have them taken in the Sense of an absolute Negative. But what is it then that is here denied? It is the *ira deorum*;

left any effectual Difference between an Oath and a bare Promise. An Oath is a Promise, says Tully, made as in the Presence of God; "*quasi deo teste*." This is plainly mentioned by Tully as adding something to the Obligation of a Promise. And yet really and effectually there is nothing added; upon the Supposition, that though God be a Witness of an Oath, he is unconcerned whether it be kept or broken, and will neither reward Faithfulness nor punish Perjury.

But, lastly; with Relation to this whole Discourse concerning Regulus and his Oath, it is to be observed; that, notwithstanding Tully's "*Hæc fere contra Regulum*," it must not be supposed that any such Objection as the first could possibly be made in Regulus's Time. These Notions concerning the *avosencia* of the Gods had no Place among the Romans till long after. No, nor among the Greeks, out of the philosophic Schools; but both Greeks and Romans at this Time thought Perjury offensive to the Gods, and what the Gods could be angry at and would punish. And Agesilaus's Way of thinking and reasoning in a parallel Case was not, as yet, uncommon to both People. "*Juravit uterque* (Agesilaus & Tissaphernes) says Corn. Nepos in Agefil. "*se sine dolo inducias conservaturum. In qua pactione summa fide mansit Agesilaus; contra ea Tissaphernes nihil aliud quam belum comparavit. Id etsi sentiebat Laco, tamen jusjurandum servabat, multumque in eo consequi se dicebat, quod Tissaphernes perjurio suo & homines suis rebus abalienaret, & Deos sibi iratos redderet. Se autem servata religione confirmare exercitum, quum animadverteret deorum numen facere secum, hominesque sibi conciliari amiciores, quod ijs studere consuescent, quos conservare fidem viderent.*"

and

and the Negation cannot be extended farther, without including more than *Tully* has done—*“jam enim non ad iram deorum, quæ nulla est”*—that plainly is, *“quæ Ira nulla est.”* Granting then, that here is a Denial of the *Anger* of God, it will not follow, that *Tully* denied likewise divine *Punishments*. As it is evident he has not *actually* denied these *Punishments*, he can possibly be charged with the Denial of them no otherwise than only as a *Consequence* of his denying the other, *viz.* the *Anger*. But to this it may reasonably be objected; that a Man is not to be charged with the *Consequences* of an Opinion; no, nor with any *Consequence* whatsoever, though ever so plain and direct, till he himself sees and owns it. Now *Tully* does not in the least mention such a *Consequence*, “No *Punishments*, because no *Anger*,” and it cannot any other Way be known whether he saw the *Consequence* or not. But, on the other Hand, much the greatest Probability is, that he was so far from seeing the *Justness* of such a *Consequence*, that either had it been mentioned to him, or, in the least *Respect* to his Purpose to have taken any Notice of it upon the present Occasion, he would have denied it.

My Reason is this: He could, we find, very easily separate *all Anger* from the Execution of *Justice*, in the Case of the civil Magistrate: Nay, he reckoned, that *Justice* could never well be executed, where that *Passion* had any Place. Therefore he gives it as his Opinion, and a necessary Direction to the civil Powers,



that they should resemble the *Laws* in this Respect, and execute Judgment with the same Coolness as the *Laws* themselves determine it. This he has done in the very Beginning of this *Treatise of Offices* \*; and his Words are well worth reciting. “*Prohibenda autem MAXIME*  
 “*EST IRA in puniendo: nunquam enim iratus,*  
 “*qui accedet ad pœnam, mediocritatem illam te-*  
 “*nebit, quæ est inter nimium & parum; quæ*  
 “*placet peripateticis: & recte placet, modo non*  
 “*laudarent iracundiam, & dicerent utiliter a*  
 “*natura datam. Illa vero OMNIBUS in rebus*  
 “*repudianda est; optandumque ut ii, qui præ-*  
 “*sunt reipublicæ legum similes sint, quæ ad pu-*  
 “*niendum non iracundia, sed æquitate ducuntur.*”

Now if *Tully* could so easily separate *Anger* from Justice in an inferior rational Being, he must much more easily do it with respect to the higher Orders, and most of all with respect to the supreme. He reckoned *Anger*, we see, the very worst Attendant of human Justice (and would therefore have it absolutely excluded in every Case); could he think it necessary in the Execution of *divine* Justice? Nay, and so necessary, that the one could not be executed without the other? So necessary, that the Denial of the one, the *Anger* of the Gods, must be immediately the Denial of the other, the Execution of their Justice? This could not be: It may be concluded therefore, that though *Tully* in those Words, “*quæ nulla est,*” should be supposed absolutely to deny the *Anger* of

† Lib. i. c. 25.

the Gods, he has still left full Room for the Execution of their Justice in the Punishment of evil Men.

Lastly: It may not be improper to observe, that this is not the only Place in the *Offices*, where *Tully* mentions that Notion of the Philosophers, "that the Gods do no Hurt to any one." He had taken Notice of it as far back, as the Beginning of the *second Book*, c. 3. And it may be of some Service to see upon what Occasion and in what Manner he does it. He is there enumerating the several Things that are useful to Men. And first he divides them into *Animata* and *Inanimata*: The former he subdivides into *irrational* and *rational*; and the last of these, into *Men* and *Gods*. "*Ratione autem utentium duo genera ponuntur, unum deorum, alterum hominum.*" Concerning the Gods he says, "that Piety and Holiness will conciliate their Favour and Beneficence." "*Deos placatos Pietas efficiet & sanctitas.*" The Sense of the Passage requires this large Construction of the Word, *placatos*.—Concerning *Men* he says, "that in the second Place and next to the Gods, they can be most useful to one another." "*Proxime autem, & secundum deos, homines hominibus maxime utiles esse possunt.*" Then he proceeds to observe, that of the Things hurtful to Men the Division is the same. "*Earumque rerum quæ noceant & obsint, eadem divisio est.*" And then adds: "But because they think that the Gods do no Hurt to Men, they reckon that *Men* are chiefly hurtful to one

“one another.” “*Sed quia deos nocere non putant, his exceptis, homines hominibus obesse plurimum arbitrantur.*”——The Nominative Case to *putant* and *arbitrantur* will be in vain sought for by those who do not know or consider, that *Tully* in this Tract of *Offices* professes chiefly to follow the *Stoics*, as he declares at the Beginning of it. “*Sequemur igitur hoc quidem tempore & hac in quaestione potissimum Stoicos.*”——These therefore are the Persons he is here speaking of.

And this gives an Occasion of observing; that *Tully* seems, as it were industriously, to hide his own real Sentiments concerning this Notion of the Gods, “their doing no Hurt to any one.” Neither here, nor upon Occasion of *Regulus* does he say any Thing in his own Person, or let us know, what he himself really thought. But then, in the next Place; he himself informs us, that even in the Opinion of his *Philosophers*, the Ratio is not the same with Regard to both *Good* and *Evil*. They never dreamed, that because the Gods do no *Hurt* to any one, they neither therefore did any *Good*: But, on the contrary, from this Passage of *Tully* it is plain, they thought just the Reverse. The Gods did Good, and in so great a Measure, that, though in doing *Mischief* to one another Men have the first or only Place, “*homines hominibus obesse plurimum,*” in doing of *Good* they can pretend to no more than the second Place: “*Proxime & secundum deos homines hominibus esse utiles.*”

Therefore



Therefore farther, let it be observed, how infinitely wrong it must be to argue against a future State of *Rewards*, because it may, or must, follow from this Notion of the Philosophers, "that the Gods can hurt no Body," that there can be none of *Punishments*. God does *Good* here, though he does no *Hurt*; in the same Manner he may do Good, and no Hurt, hereafter.

And, lastly; whereas Tully elsewhere \* says, "*Hominem naturæ obediētem homini nocere non posse*," would any one argue from hence, that there can be no *Civil Punishments*? If the Gods always act according to Nature, it will certainly follow, that they cannot hurt any one: But will this farther Consequence be good, that then they cannot punish? Try it in the other Case, of the Civil Magistrate; a good Magistrate will act according to Nature, or the Reason of Things; and the Consequence is good, that such a one cannot hurt any Body: Will it from hence follow, that such a one cannot inflict Civil Punishments? Such a Consequence is seen to be plainly bad, whether we speak of Fact or Right. Malefactors are punished by every good Magistrate; and they ought to be so agreeably to the Directions of Nature; just in the same Manner as a rotten Branch is separated from the Tree, or a mortified Member from the animal Body.

Mr. Warburton however was himself aware of several *Objections* against what he has advan-

\* *Offic. L. 3. c. 5.*

ced upon this Head, viz. " of the Anger of  
" the Gods;" and he produces and endeavours  
to answer them.

I. The first is; That this Opinion of the  
Philosophers, " of God's not being angry, on-  
" ly concludes against a future State of Punish-  
" ments, and not of Rewards," p. 373.

To this, says he, we reply;

I. " That when the Sanction of Punishment  
" is taken off, the greatest Influence of a future  
" State is destroyed." But surely this is no-  
thing to the Purpose. The Position he under-  
took to make good was, " That the Philoso-  
" phers did not believe a future State of Re-  
" wards and Punishments." And he proves it,  
by observing a Thing in which they all agreed,  
viz. " That God cannot be angry." It is ob-  
jected to this Argument, that it only proves a-  
gainst a State of *Punishment*; and that therefore  
the Philosophers, notwithstanding this Tenet,  
might hold a *State of Rewards*. This is al-  
lowed; but then it is said, that by taking away  
a State of *Punishment*, you destroy the *greatest*  
*Influence* \* of a future State. Surely, this is too  
shrewdly

\* Whatever Influence of a future State is taken away by de-  
nying *future Punishments*, Mr. Warburton should be the last to  
take Notice of, or lay any Stress upon it. Because under his  
*first Proposition*, the Necessity of Religion to Society is made  
chiefly to arise from this Defect in Civil Government, " that it  
" cannot *inforce* the Sanction of Rewards." It can *inforce* the  
Sanction of *Punishments* in the Manner, and to the Degree, it  
pleases: But not having the *Sanction of Rewards* in it's Power  
at all, and Religion only being able to *inforce* that; therefore  
it is necessary, upon this Account, to Society. See p. 20.  
" On the whole then it appears, that Civil Society has not,

shrewdly observed; and as shrewd a Reason is given for it: "For while the Ancients made the Rewards of *Elysium* only temporary, they made the Punishments of *Tartarus* eternal." But if so, these Ancients were strange Men, and had rare Notions of Things; or rather, had most stupid Creatures to deal withal, who were capable of being managed at such a Rate.—However, I shall venture to say, he does not prove his Assertion. The Citations from *Virgil* fall short. The former; "*Hos omnes ubi mille,*"—includes only the People of *Elysium*; consequently (as Mr. *Warburton* himself will tell us presently) not all that are rewarded in a future State: The latter, "*sedet æternumque sedebit,*" depends upon a single Word intirely; which is often used with so much Latitude, that nothing can easily any where be concluded from it, as to a proper Eternity.

And as to *Plato*, who is next cited, he speaks only of great and most inexcusable Sinners as being thrown into *Tartarus*, from whence there is no Redemption. Ἱεροσουλίας πολλάς και μεγάλας, ἢ φόνες ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλὰς ἐξηργασμένοι, ἢ ἀλλὰ—τοιαῦτα.—And as to *Celsus*, who is next produced; he is equally to be understood as speaking of the Eternity of fu-

"in itself, the Sanction of Rewards, to secure the Obedience of it's Laws.—But it being evident, that the joint Sanctions of Rewards and Punishments are but just sufficient to secure the tolerable Observance of Right—it follows, that as Religion only can supply the Sanction of Rewards, which Society wants, and has not, Religion is absolutely necessary to Civil Government."

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ture Rewards, as of future Punishments.—*οἱ μὲν εὖ βιώσαντες εὐδαιμονήσουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι πάντων αἰώνις κακοῖς συνέχονται.*—He says, “the Good will be happy, the Bad will be always miserable.” Does *Celsus*, by this Manner of Expression, determine, the Good will not be happy as long as the Wicked will be miserable? Surely, not; Nor does *Origen* so understand it.

But then, in the next Place; he is well aware, that, as to the Eternity of future Rewards, several Passages might be brought to prove, that the Ancients believed it: As this of *Tully*, “*Omnibus qui patriam conservarint—ubi beati ævo sempiterno fruuntur;*” and comes off by distinguishing the Souls of Men, according, he says, to the Opinion of the Ancients, into *Human, Heroic and Demonic*; the two last of which were indeed believed to enjoy eternal Happiness in Heaven. Believed? and, indeed believed? By whom? By the *Philosophers*? If so, then the Dispute is at an End; and in more Respects than one. If it is to be understood of others, neither the Objection, nor the Quotation, are to any Purpose. But,

2. Mr. *Warburton* was sensible, and could not be otherwise, that this first Answer was very insufficient; and therefore endeavours, in the next Place, to mend it; and tells us, “that in every Sense of a future State, as a moral Designation, Rewards and Punishments necessarily imply each other; so that where one is wanting, the other cannot possibly subsist:” adding, “This is too evident to need

“ need a Proof.” But however *evident* it may be to him, I believe it is otherwise to almost every Body else. And was it many times more evident than it is, that future Rewards and Punishments necessarily *imply* each other, this would be nothing to the Philosophers, unless it can be any ways made appear, that *they* had the same Notion. And here let it be observed, that, whatever *Lactantius* might think, *Tully*, whose Opinion in these Cases is upon all Accounts infinitely preferable, was certainly of another Mind; and, as was said above, always spoke of the future State (in his philosophical Works) as either a State of Happiness, or of no Sense at all; and could never conceive how a *third* could be. Nor is there any Thing wonderful in this: For the Ancients might be, much too easily, led to think, that a State of *No-Sense*, i. e. something tantamount to Annihilation, was a Punishment sufficient for the Transgressions of a short Life. And especially, when they appear to have had a much higher Apprehension of the *present* Punishment of great Crimes; and, on the other hand, of the Inefficacy of Vice to produce Happiness; than the Generality seem now to entertain.

3. There is however another Thing to be offered upon this Head, *viz.* “ That the Philosophers, who held the Attribute of Grace “ or Favour in the Deity, meant it not as a “ Passion or Affection; in which Sense they “ understood the Anger that was denied by “ them.” This he will “ shew under the “ next

“ next head,” p. 375. He may shew it when he pleases; but what can it be to the Purpose? If there be a future State of *Rewards* (in the Opinion of the Philosophers) it must directly clash with what he has been endeavouring to prove, viz. “ that there is (in their Opinion) “ no future State either of Rewards or of Punishments.” It signifies nothing from what Principle in the Deity the future Rewards proceed: Much less, what *Name* they, or any one else, will give to that Principle: Whether it shall be called a *Passion*, or an *Affection*, or *Reason*; or, yet more particularly, *Love*, or *Goodness*; or, lastly, *Justice*. Though all this plainly appears, and really is, nothing to the Purpose; yet I cannot forbear observing a little farther upon what Mr. *Warburton* says here; That the *Philosophers* might to the full as easily have separated all *Passion* from that Principle in the Deity, which was necessary for the punishing of Sinners, as they could from that *Grace* or *Favour* which must necessarily be supposed in order to the rewarding the righteous. And they might have been put in Mind of this every Day, by only observing the Conduct of every prudent Magistrate; who executed the Laws in the Punishment of Offenders, and rewarded the good Citizen, equally, without any Transport or *Passion*, one way or other. But,

2. He starts another *Objection* against his own Reasoning from that Opinion of the Philosophers, that *God can neither be angry, nor hurt any one*, viz. “ That it proves too much. For,  
“ 2dly,



"2dly, says he, this destroys God's Providence  
"HERE, as well as hereafter: Which Providence several of the Theistical Philosophers,  
"we know, did believe." And surely it must be plain enough (as was before observed) that if, because God has no Passion (either of Love or Anger) he cannot do either Good or Hurt to another; this will equally conclude against his doing either of these in the *present* Life, as in the future. And if, notwithstanding his having no such Affections, (as Love or Hatred) he can in the present Life, according to certain Circumstances of Men, do either Good or Hurt to them, he may equally do the same hereafter.

Mr. Warburton himself was certainly sensible of a Pinch upon this Head: For he *labours* at an Answer; and, I think, in vain. The *Peripatetics* and the *Stoics* he will have to deny a *particular Providence*. What is said concerning the Providence they allowed, is by no Means clear and connected, (which indeed is not to be wondered at.) But the Observation made upon the whole, is surprising to a Degree. "Here then is a Providence very consistent  
"with a Disbelief of a future State of Rewards  
"and Punishments."—For what is this to the Purpose of the Objection? Did they believe a *present Providence* or not? A Providence taking Care of good Men, and punishing the bad? If they did; notwithstanding that they held God could not *love* or *hate*; then, in Spite of that Tenet of their's, they might equally believe such

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Regards would extend to Men in a future State of Being. But if they did not believe such Providence, then they are not of the Number of the *Theistical* Philosophers here meant, nor should they have been mentioned at all. And Mr. Warburton knows there were other *Theistical* Philosophers besides them, viz. the *Pythagoreans* and *Platonists*: And he owns, that they acknowledged a *particular* Providence,—  
 “ which could not possibly be administred  
 “ without the Affections of Love and Anger:”  
 And says; “ Here then lies the Difficulty:  
 “ These Sects removed all Passions from the  
 “ Godhead; especially Anger: And on that  
 “ Account rejected a future State of Rewards  
 “ and Punishments, while yet they believed a  
 “ Providence; which was administred by the  
 “ Exercise of those very Passions.” Here is  
*Nodus vindice dignus*; and Mr. Warburton will endeavour to solve it. In order to which, he has Recourse to an ancient Notion of Paganism, and thoroughly espoused by *Pythagoras*, and *Plato* in particular, viz. That of *Tutelary Deities*. And, in short, these are the superintending Beings, who exercise a *particular Providence* here below, influenced by the Affections of Love, Hatred, &c. “ But when now, adds  
 “ he, the Soul is disengaged from the Body, it  
 “ is no longer, in their Opinion, under the  
 “ Government of Dæmons, nor, consequently,  
 “ subject to the Effects of the Dæmonic Passions: And what becomes of it then, we  
 “ shall see hereafter,” p. 378. Several Things

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are here asserted upon very slender Grounds.— However, at present, let it be only observed, that that Phrase, *Disengaged from the Body*, is quite ambiguous, as used here. It may mean, disengaged from the *present* Body; as happens at Death; or, disengaged from all Body, or organised Matter. In the *latter* Sense, methinks, it is to be taken here. Because *Pythagoras* and *Plato* made the Soul after Death, to pass through many Stages and Revolutions, before it arrived at the Place here hinted at. And in all these intermediate States it must be supposed to be still under *Dæmonic* Influence; and was treated better or worse, according to it's Merit. Here then was (to observe it by the way) what might be called a future State of Rewards and Punishments; though not properly eternal.

But what wonderful Subtilty must this be; by these Dæmonic Agents to reward and punish with *Love* and *Hatred*; and yet *without Love* and *Hatred* in the supreme Being; who yet made these *Tutelary Beings* for this very Purpose? I will not say, this was doing by another, what might as well have been done by himself: But, most certainly, whatever Dispositions were necessary for this Office of Rewarding and Punishing, there must be originally in the supreme Mind (which appointed these Deities and their Office) Dispositions analogous and correspondent to them.

But we have had more than enough concerning this *first Principle*.



## VII.

2. "The other Cause, which kept the Philosophers from believing a future State of Rewards and Punishments," was the wrong Notion they had concerning the *Nature* of the Soul: Which they all held to be "a discerped Part of a whole; and that this whole was God; into whom it was again to be resolved," p. 380.

As this is the most singular Assertion in Mr. Warburton's whole Book; has a peculiar Stress laid upon it; and is, in itself, or in it's Consequences, more or less the Subject of the remaining Part of this Performance; it may reasonably be expected it should be supported with very good and clear Evidence; and the Evidence he offers ought for the same Reason to be strictly attended to.

To prove his Assertion, two Passages are brought from *Tully*. The first is from the Book, *De Divinatione*, L. 1. c. 49. "*A quâ, scil. Natura Deorum, ut doctissimis sapientissimisque placuit, haustos animos & libatos habemus.*" The other from the *Tusculan. Disputat.* L. 5. c. 13. "*Humanus autem animus decerptus ex mente divina, cum alio nullo nisi cum ipso Deo comparari potest.*" And because these Passages, and others of a like Nature, which one is perpetually meeting with among the Ancients, might be suspected as being only *highly figurative Expressions*, we are desired to take Notice of a "Consequence, drawn from this Principle, and universally held," viz. that

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that the Soul was eternal à parte ante, as well as à parte post. This Consequence will be considered presently.—But,

As to the Quotations from Tully: It were greatly to be wished, he had given us them more fairly. Had he added to the first of them what immediately follows; “*cumque omnia completa & referta sint æterno sensu & mente divina, necesse est cognatione divinatorum animorum animos humanos commoveri* ;” a Strain of Rhetoric and of Enthusiasm would surely have appeared to every one. And as to the second; Mr. Warburton, in producing it, has left out such qualifying Words, as would immediately have discovered a Violence in the Expression; and he has left them out without giving us the least Hint of any Omission. Tully’s Words are these: “*Humanus autem animus, descriptus ex mente divina cum alio nullo nisi cum ipso deo, si hoc fas est dictu, comparari potest.*” It must be left to the Reader’s Opinion, whether any other Account can be given of Mr. Warburton’s leaving out those Words, “*si hoc fas est dictu,*” but only that he was apprehensive they would be apt to lead every one to understand Tully’s Expression with a Latitude. And to me it is farther evident from hence, that had Tully, notwithstanding his “*descriptus ex mente divina,*” really thought, the human Soul was a Part of a whole, which whole was God; he would never have boggled at comparing the one with the other, with a “*si hoc fas est dictu* ;” but, on the contrary,

ry, must have seen the exact *Propriety* of it; since every *Part* is *naturally* compared with it's *whole*. And upon this is grounded the Maxim, which immediately precedes this Passage; "*Præstantia debent ea dici, quæ habent aliquam comparationem.*"

Mr. *Warburton* however will have it, that *Tully's* Expressions are to be understood *literally*: Because the Ancients drew a *Consequence* from hence; which *Consequence* would not have been good in any other but the *literal* Sense, *viz.* "The strictly proper Eternity of the Soul." And for this he brings us an indisputable Authority, the *great Cudworth*. But what does *Cudworth* say? Why, no more than this; That whoever among the Ancients held the Post-Existence of the Soul, held likewise it's *Præ-Existence*: And gives a Reason for it (a pretty good one) *viz.* "That what is generated may be corrupted." But this Reason, Mr. *Warburton* says, is *Visionary*; and that he quotes *Cudworth* only for the *Fact*; "For which we may safely take his Word. But the true Reason was, it's being a natural Consequence of the Opinion, that the Soul was Part of God."

But, as *Cudworth* says nothing of this, is any other Authority produced for it, "that the Ancients held the *Præ-Existence* of the Soul in Consequence of their Notion, that the Soul was a Part of God?" Nothing at all; in the first Edition of Mr. *Warburton's* Book. But, imagining, I suppose, upon farther Thought,  
that



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that here was a Defect, he has, in the second Edition, endeavoured, in some Measure, to supply it. For after those Words; "The true Reason was, it's being a natural Consequence of the Opinion, that the Soul was Part of God;" he there adds; "And this Tully plainly intimates in these Words; *Animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest.*—*His enim in naturis nihil inest, quod vim memoriæ, mentis, cogitationis habeat; quod & præterita teneat, & futura prævideat, & complecti possit præsentia: quæ sola divina sunt, nec invenietur unquam, unde ad hominem venire possint, nisi in Deo*—*Ita quicquid est illud, quod sapit, quod vult, quod viget, cœleste & divinum est; OB EAMQUE REM ÆTERNUM SIT NECESSE EST.*" *Frag. De Consol.* But whoever reads the whole Passage without the Breaks, will see; that Tully's Thought was only this: "That since upon comparing the evident Faculties of the Soul with the several Parts and Elements of the terrestrial System, we can find nothing here that corresponds to, or will any ways account for them; we must look elsewhere, and higher, for the Original of them. And as these Faculties, these *Vires memoriæ, mentis, cogitationis*—are plainly correspondent to our Conceptions of the divine Nature, we necessarily conclude, the Origin of them is from God. Whence we conclude likewise, that the Soul being *thus* cœlestial and divine, it must for that Reason be eternal; *i. e.* will never cease to be."

That this is the Sense of *Eternal*, will plainly appear upon reading a little farther. “*Nec vero Deus ipse, qui intelligitur à nobis, alio modo intelligi potest, nisi mens soluta quædam & libera, segregata ab omni concretionem mortali, omnia sentiens et movens, ipsaque prædita motu sempiterno : itaque eandem æternitatem animis quoque nostris ex seipsa ortis, IMPARTIVIT.*” It may, perhaps, seem too minute, to ask how Mr. Warburton came to write “*In deo,*” for “*A deo :*” The Construction of the Sentence should have directed otherwise.—“*Unde ad hominem—nisi A deo.*”

But what Mr. Warburton wants here in *Authorities*, he seems to think, may be made up by a *Metaphysical* Argument; to shew, what few People will reckon any Thing to the Purpose, *viz.* “That the Eternity of the Soul must be a Consequence of it’s being a Part of God.” For should this arguing prove ever so good, it must fall short of his End; since it can never prove the *Fact*, “that the Ancients held the *Præ-Existence* of the Soul in Consequence of their Notion, that it was a *Part* of God :” Unless we are (what we are not) certain, that the Ancients saw and held *all* the Consequences of every Notion they had. This before us might be a Consequence, a most necessary one, of their Notion; but they might not see it, and, consequently, never hold it. But for the Argument.

“If eternal, it must be either independent on God, or a Part of his Substance.” This

is

is not necessary : The Division is incomplete. It may be, neither *independent on God*, nor a *Part* of his Substance ; *i. e.* it may be, though *eternal, dependent*, and *no Part* of his Substance. This may be, till it can be shewn, “ that an “ eternal Effect of an eternal Cause is impossible.” Which to do, will strain any Man’s Metaphysics to the utmost.—Again ; The Division is faulty in another Respect, a most essential one indeed, *viz.* as it is no Division at all. Since the Soul may be *both* ; *i. e.* it may be *independent*, and yet a *Part* of the divine Substance. Nay, it must be *independent*, for that very Reason, because it is a *Part* of the divine Substance. Since the divine Substance is certainly independent ; the Whole ; and then every *Part* of it must be so too.—He goes on,

“ Independent it could not be ; for there can “ be but one Independent of the same Kind of “ Substance.”—This is too positive. It had been better, if he had added his *Reason* for this Assertion ; which now, for Want of it, must go for nothing. And, on the other hand, it may be said ; that it is far more reasonable to think, that there can be but *one* independent Substance of any Kind.

“ The Ancients, he says, indeed thought it “ no Absurdity to say, that God and Matter “ were both self-existent \*.” And so, they thought there were “ two independent Sub- “ stances” of different Kinds. “ But then,

\* Mr. Warburton cannot mean *all* the Ancients. Dr. Cudworth, from several very good Authorities, shews the contrary.

“ they



“ they allowed no third : Therefore they must  
 “ needs conclude, that the Soul was a Part of  
 “ God.” Here again, for *no Third*, we have  
 only Mr. Warburton’s mere Word ; which can-  
 not, upon this Occasion, stand for any thing.  
 But, it is more than possible, they looked upon  
 human Souls, and the Souls of their inferior  
 Gods, as Beings separate both from *Matter* and  
 the *divine Substance*. Which they might do,  
 and yet hold the *Eternity* of them, as well as  
 they held the *Eternity* of *Matter*. — “ But, as  
 “ is next observed, though they held the *Præ-*  
 “ and *Post-Existence*” of the Soul, and, conse-  
 quently, “ attributed a proper *Eternity* to it,”  
 they did not think it was “ eternal in it’s di-  
 “ stinct and peculiar Existence, but that it was  
 “ discerped from the Substance of God in Time,  
 “ and would in Time be resolved into it again,”  
 p. 384. There is no great Propriety in talking  
 of the *Eternity of the Soul*, if it is not meant  
 of it’s own proper Existence. — However (which  
 is much more to the present *Purpose*) it is  
 certain, they did not assign any definite Time  
 for it’s Discerption from the divine Substance,  
 before it’s Entrance into the present State of  
 Being ; nor for it’s Re-union after it leaves the  
 present Body ; and the *Præ-* and *Post-Existence*  
 they talked of was equally a separate and pecu-  
 liar Existence. Therefore, notwithstanding that  
 they held a Re-union, some time or other, with  
 the whole, from which it was discerped, they  
 might, very consistently, believe a future State  
 of Rewards and Punishments ; i. e. “ that the  
 “ Souls

“ Souls of Men, when separated from the present Body, fare better or worse, according as their Behaviour has been : And that in this Method of intermediate Rewards and Punishments, all Souls are fitted at last for a Reunion with the original Substance.”

If some People should think, as they very likely will, that if this be all, these Souls might as well have been kept where they originally were ; it is however to be considered, this is not the proper Place to attempt the Reasonableness of the Notion. All we are concerned in at present is the *Fact* : And I say, allowing the *Fact* to be as Mr. Warburton says it was, it does not by any Means follow, “ that the *Pythagoreans* and *Platonists* did not believe a future State of Rewards and Punishments.” On the contrary ; the *Metempsychosis* of both of them might have, and, most probably, had a moral View and Design. This indeed could not be an eternal State of Rewards and Punishments : But the *Eternity* of a State is not necessary to make it a State of Rewards and Punishments. Mr. Warburton will not say it : And yet, if he does not, all his Reasoning here comes to nothing.

But the *Platonists*, as he says, and it is true, thought that some Souls were, upon leaving their present Bodies, immediately united with the original Substance : And what future State of either Rewards or Punishments could these be in ? Now, when one considers what Sort of Souls these were, *viz.* thoroughly purified and perfect

perfect ones, that were thus distinguished, one cannot (it is impossible) avoid the Thought, "That this Re-union or Re-infusion (call it as you please) was looked upon as the *most happy* State; and a State attained to only in *Consequence* of the utmost Purity and moral Perfection: Therefore, a State of *Reward*." —

And therefore again; if there be any Consistency in the Notion, any View or Design in supposing this Re-union of *perfect* Souls with the original Substance, it must be such a Union as leaves the *Personality* intire, or a Consciousness of it's own distinct Being. Otherwise, it is plain, this Re-union is to such Souls exactly the same Thing as an utter Annihilation would be. But would, or did *Plato*, or any other Ancient, mention this Re-union of morally perfect Souls, in any other Way or with any other Design, than as a most encouraging Motive with every one to aim at and labour after such Perfection? Therefore I conclude, that, in the Opinion of the Ancients, the State of Souls after Re-union was not exactly the same as before the Discerption. Antecedent to this there might be, and was, no Consciousness of a distinct Existence; but, after the Separation, as there was one, it might possibly continue notwithstanding any Re-union. As for the Similitude of a *Bottle of Sea-Water*, (which has been by some made Use of upon this Occasion), it is an imperfect Representation of the Thing, and ought not to be strained too far; as it may easily be. There is only a general and confused Resemblance;



Resemblance ; which is the common Case of Similitudes. That there is not an *exact* Likeness here, may be plain from hence ; that whereas the Water in the Bottle has no real Quality or Property different or distinct from the Water in the Ocean ; the Soul, when discerped from the divine Substance, has one, and the most real one in the World, *viz. Self-consciousness* : Which, as it did not arise merely from it's Discription, and cannot be accounted for by it ; so a Re-union will not immediately destroy it.

I have launched a little more into Reflection on this Head, observing what mighty Use Mr. *Warburton* makes of those antique Notions of *Discription* and *Re-union*. For so he concludes : " Thus we see that this very Opinion of the " Soul's Eternity, which hath made modern " Writers conclude the Philosophers believed a " future State of Rewards and Punishments, " was, in Truth, the very Reason why they " believed it not." I think, I have shewn he is mistaken every Way : However, it must be left to the Judgment of others.

Notwithstanding ; " Though he has shewn, " he says, that the Philosophers in general held " the Soul's being Part of God, and resolvable " into him ; yet, that no Kind of Doubt may " remain, he will prove, in the next Place, " that it was believed in particular by the famous philosophic Quaternion." *Thales, Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle* and the *Stoics*, p. 387.

He

He begins with *Thales*; and quotes *Tully*, as telling us, in his *Book of Consolation*, "that he  
 " always maintained, that the Soul was Part  
 " or Parcel of the divine Substance, and that  
 " it returns to it, as soon as it is disengaged  
 " from the Body." Mr. *Warburton* not giving us here, as he usually does, the Original, I was curious enough to look into *Sigonius's Book, De Consolatione* (not being able to meet with this Passage any where else) to see, if there I might find the Words, which are here translated. And I think the Passage is this: "*Cujus*  
 " (*Thaletis*) *testimonium tale fuit, ut divinos esse*  
 " *hominum animos, & eos corpore solutos in cælum*  
 " *remigrare, unde prius venissent, in omni ser-*  
 " *mone asseveraret.*" And then the Writer adds: "*In quo cum Philosophis illis consensit, quos*  
 " *quondam Italicos nominavit Antiquitas.*"—  
 Had Mr. *Warburton* but translated this latter Part of the Sentence, he would not have wanted any farther Authority for *Pythagoras's* Opinion. But now, supposing this is the Passage he here translates, what can be thought of such a Translation? In the *Latin* we find no mention of *Part*, or *Parcel of the divine Substance*, nor the Notion of *returning to it*. This is by no Means a literal Translation of, *divinos animos*, and, *in cælum remigrare*; and much less is it proved, this is the Meaning of those Expressions. Indeed, it is not attempted.

And it is quite superfluous to shew the contrary; because Mr. *Warburton* in the 2d Edit. of his Book, has thought fit to drop this Reference

ference to the Book *de consolatione*, and along with it the Instance of *Thales*. But as no Notice is taken of his doing this, we are in the Dark for the particular Reasons; and all that can be said is, and must be, mere guess Work.

—It will be proper to observe however, that in Consequence of his omitting now the Instance of *Thales*, he has been obliged to change his Stile under the next Article; which is that of *Pythagoras*. For whereas before he had said, that *Tully bore the same Testimony against Pythagoras*, as against *Thales*, he now intirely omitting *Thales*, only says, that *Tully accuses Pythagoras*.—Yet still, as the Word, *accuses*, imports the finding some Fault, Care should have been taken, that it was *Tully* himself, and not a feigned Person, much less an *Epicurean*, that accused him. The Citation brought here is from the *Natura Deor.* l. I. c. II. “*Nam Pythagoras, qui censuit animum esse per naturam rerum omnem intentum & commeantem, ex quo nostri animi carperentur, non vidit distractione humanorum animorum discerpi & lacerari Deum.*” Is not this extremely in the *Epicurean* Manner, *i. e.* exceeding gross? And can such a Testimony as this deserve any Regard?—Most certainly it expresses nothing of *Tully's* own Sentiments.

But, it seems, *Sextus Empiricus* likewise bears his Testimony against *Pythagoras* and *Empedocles*, and all the *Italic* Sect: “That they held that our Souls were not only of the same Nature with one another and with the Gods, but  
“ like-



“ likewise with the irrational Souls of Brutes.  
 “ For that there is one Spirit that pervades the  
 “ Universe, and serves it for a Soul, which unites  
 “ us all together into one.” \* That Expressi-  
 on, of the same Nature with one another, is a  
 very unusual and improper one; and *Sextus*  
*Empiricus* gave no Occasion for making Use of  
 it. Indeed, the exact, determinate Meaning of  
 the Original is not very clear. Yet I think, it  
 may be rendered better thus: “ There is a  
 “ Communication between us and the Gods,  
 “ and even the Brutes too. For there is one Spirit  
 “ which pervades the Universe like a Soul, and  
 “ thus unites us with them.” This seems to  
 be the true Reading, and gives some Force to  
 the Reason; which, in Mr. *Warburton*’s Tran-  
 slation, has none at all; or a most obscure one.  
 ———However, it cannot be worth while to en-  
 quire farther into *Empiricus*’s Meaning; be-  
 cause, take his Words in what Sense you will,  
 they cannot be to the present Purpose. For  
 what he says relates to Men in their present Ex-  
 istence, as well as in their future. And if the  
 Union of Souls with the *Anima Mundi*, does  
 not destroy the Distinction of their Existence  
 at present, there can be no Reason to suppose  
 it should do it hereafter. And, if notwith-  
 standing their Union with the *Anima Mundi*  
 hereafter, they may have a Consciousness of a

\* Οἱ μὲν ἔν — φασὶ μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς τὰς  
 θεὰς εἶναι τινὰ κοινωνίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἅλλα τῶν ζώων· ἐν γὰρ  
 ὑπάρχειν πνεῦμα, τὸ διὰ πάντος τοῦ κόσμου διήκον ψυχῆς τρέπον, τὸ  
 καὶ ἐν ἡμῶς πρὸς ἐκείνα. *Adv. Phys.*

distinct

distinct Existence, as they have in the present World, the future State may be a State both of Rewards and Punishments.

The same may be said to *Laertius's* Testimony, which comes next. He says, "*Pythagoras* held that the Soul was different from the Life, and was immortal; for that the Substance from which it was taken was immortal †." This is nothing to the Purpose (though there is Obscurity enough in the real Sense); because if the Soul is taken from an immortal something, yet, as it has a separate, distinct Existence in the present State, so it may have for any Quantity of Time hereafter; *i. e.* for ever.

Next comes *Plato*: And concerning him it is observed, that he frequently calls the Soul *God*, and *Part of God*, p. 388. But then, on the other Hand, it is well known how full of Figure and bold Metaphors *Plato's* Style is. And every one knows too, that both *Greeks* and *Romans* were extremely free in the Use and Application of their Words, Θεός, Θεῖον, *Deus*, *Divinus*.——But yet, that the Words, Θεός and *Deus*, were not applied to the Soul by the *Greek* and *Roman* Philosophers merely in a figurative Sense, but, as they thought, with some Propriety, may appear, among many other Authorities, from *Tully's Somnium Scip.* where the *Elder Africanus* thus assures the younger, (agreeably to *Plato's* Sentiments,) "*Deum te—scito*

\* —ἀθάνατον τε εἶναι αὐτὴν (ψυχὴν) ἐπιδημῆς καὶ τὸ ἀφ' ἧς ἀπίσπασται ἀθάνατον εἶναι. *Vit. Phil.*

“ *esse : Siquidem Deus est, qui viget, qui sentit,*  
 “ *qui meminit, qui providet, qui tam regit &*  
 “ *moderatur & movet id corpus cui præpositus est,*  
 “ *quam hunc mundum ille princeps Deus : Et, ut*  
 “ *mundum ex quadam parte mortalem ipse Deus*  
 “ *æternus, sic fragile corpus animus sempiternus*  
 “ *movet.*” Upon which Passage Macrobius thus  
 comments : “ *Anima, qui verus homo est, ab*  
 “ *omni conditione mortalitatis aliena est, adeo ut*  
 “ *ad imitationem Dei mundum regentis regat &*  
 “ *ipsa corpus dum a se animatur. Ideo Phisici*  
 “ *mundum magnum hominem, & hominem brevem*  
 “ *mundum esse dixerunt. Per similitudines igitur*  
 “ *cæterarum prærogativarum quibus Deum ani-*  
 “ *ma videtur imitari, animam Deum & præsci*  
 “ *Philosophorum & Tullius dixit.*”

I cannot but here, upon Occasion of men-  
 tioning this Piece of Tully's and Macrobius's  
 Comment upon it, observe ; that though it is  
 quite throughout *Platonical*, asserting the Dig-  
 nity and Immortality of the Soul in the plainest  
 Terms that Language affords, Macrobius was  
 so far from imagining this *Dream of Scipio's* to  
 be only a mere popular, *exoterical* Tract,  
 that when he has explained that Part of it  
 where the *present Life* is said to be *Death*, he  
 concludes with telling us, that Tully's Learning  
 and Wisdom had fetched this Sentiment from  
 the most retired Part of Philosophy. “ *Plene,*  
 “ *ut arbitror, de vita & morte animæ definitio*  
 “ *liquet : quam de adytis Philosophicæ doctrina &*  
 “ *sapientia Ciceronis elicuit.*” And towards the  
 End of his Comment he tells us farther, that in  
 that



that Part of the *Somn. Scipion.* which treats of the Self-motion and Immortality of the Soul, Tully had reached the very Summit of Philosophy. “*At cum de motu & immortalitate animæ disputat, cui nihil constat inesse corporeum, cujusque essentiam nullius sensus, sed sola ratio deprehendit; illic ad altitudinem philosophiæ adscendit.*” And concerning the whole Piece he thus concludes: “*Vere igitur pronunciandum est, nihil hoc opere perfectius, quo universæ philosophiæ continetur integritas.*” So far was Macrobius from imagining, that it was nothing else but a mere popular, *exoterical* Harangue. I would only just observe farther, that he had the same Sentiment of Plato’s *Phædon*, calling it, “*Librum illum divinum de immortalitate animæ.*”

Well; but *Plutarch* tells us \*, “that *Pythagoras* and *Plato* held the Soul to be immortal; for that launching out into the Soul of the Universe, it returns to it’s Parent and Original.” But this Sense does not seem capable of being fetched out of *Plutarch*’s Words, ἀναχωρεῖν πρὸς τὸ ὁμογενές is not, “to return to it’s Parent and Original;” because ὁμογενές signifies, neither *Parent* nor *Original*: But this; “being of like Nature or Kind,” or “of the same or like Original;” and had it been accordingly rendered here, this Passage from *Plutarch* could have signified nothing. Since the Soul might be said to return to the *Anima Mun-*

\* — ἀφθαρτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐξῆσαν γὰρ εἰς τὴν τῷ αὐτῆς ψυχὴν, ἀναχωρεῖν πρὸς τὸ ὁμογενές. *De placit. Philos.*

di, it's *Like*, or which was of the *same Nature with itself*, without supposing, that upon that Account it should lose it's distinct and personal Existence.

*Arnobius's* Testimony, which comes next, is not worth considering, upon any Account.— However, I have put it in the Margin \*; and the learned Reader knows very well, how difficult enough it is to answer such Questions, even upon the common Notion of the human Soul. And, even generally speaking, such Interrogatories are best passed over in Silence.

The third of the Quaternion is *Aristotle* †; and he says of the *Mind*, or *Intellect*, that it “alone (by Way of Distinction from the sensitive Soul) enters from without and is alone divine.” All the Stress here lies upon the Epithet, *Θεῖον*; which yet is a Word used by these ancient Writers with such a Latitude, that nothing can be determined merely from it. But then, it seems, *Aristotle* distinguishes again “concerning this Mind or Intellect, and makes it twofold; Agent and Patient. The former of which he concludes to be immortal, and the latter corruptible.” *Cudworth* thought this a very unintelligible Notion; but Mr. *Warburton* will explain it. “Had that great Man reflected on the general Doctrine of the τὸ ἐν, he would have seen the Passage was plain

\* *Ipse denique animus, qui immortalis à vobis, & Deus esse narratur, cur in ægris æger sit, in infantibus stolidus, in senectute defessus? — Adv. Gent.*

† *Αἰνῶσαι δὲ τὸν αὖ μόνον ἀεὶ αὖτις ὄντα, καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον.*

“ and easy ; and that *Aristotle* from the common Principle of the human Soul’s being Part of the divine Substance, here draws a Conclusion against a future State of separate Existence.”—p. 389, 390. We must have much better Proofs, before we can believe the *general Doctrine of the τὸ ἐν*, and that it was a *common Principle*, that the Soul was a *Part of the divine Substance*. As for what has been done already, it really amounts to nothing : And as he has not made it appear, that *Aristotle* knew any Thing of this Doctrine, he will excuse me if I do not think *Aristotle* intended to draw any Thing from it ; much less the *Conclusion* which he speaks of, viz. *against a future State of separate Existence*. For, whatever may follow from Mr. *Warburton’s* Doctrine of the τὸ ἐν, which he charges upon the Philosophers, it does by no means follow from the Notion, “ that the Soul is a Part of the divine Substance.” For, as it does not follow, because it is a Part of the divine Substance, that it has not now, at present, a separate Existence ; so, notwithstanding it’s being such a Part, it may have a separate Existence ; for any Time, and beyond, and for ever. And therefore I conclude, that *Aristotle*, who certainly knew, as well as any Man, the Nature of a *Consequence*, and the Manner of drawing it, never intended from such a *Principle* to draw such a *Conclusion*, against a *future State of separate Existence*. Neither is it easy to come into his Paraphrase of *Aristotle’s* Words. “ The particular Sensations of the Soul (the passive Intelligent) will  
O 3 “ cease



“ cease after Death; and the Substance of it  
 “ (the Agent Intelligent) will be resolved into  
 “ the Soul of the Universe.” It may be allowed, that *Aristotle* might and did call the particular Sensations of the Soul the *passive Intelligent*: (or the Intelligent, *quatenus* passive :) But it cannot by any Means be allowed, that he could abuse Language and Philosophy so much, as to call the Substance of the Soul, *i. e.* the Substance stript of all it's *intellectual* and active, *i. e.* of all it's proper Faculties, the *Agent Intelligent*. No; by the *Agent Intelligent*, he probably, meant the Soul of Man *quatenus rational*, or, in a Word, the *Mind*. Neither does Mr. *Warburton* so intirely confide in his own Paraphrase, as not to have Recourse to the *Commentators* for *Aristotle's* Meaning: “ Who interpret *Agent Intelligent* to signify the “ divine Intellect;” and says *Aristotle* himself “ fully justifies this Gloss, in calling it Θεῖον, “ vine.” To overlook the Slenderness of such arguing, I would only observe again, (as before with respect to the Mind's being *Part of the divine Substance*,) that the *Agent Intelligent* is as much *divine*, and *divine Intelligent*, now at present, as it can be at any Time hereafter: And if, notwithstanding that, it has a distinct separate Existence now, it may have the same for ever.

Lastly, come the *Stoics*; and *Seneca* is to speak the *first for them*. It is strange Mr. *Warburton* could go no higher than him; one, whom he has branded for a *Mongrel*, and has too cited him before for the *Mortality* of the Soul.

Soul.——However, what does he say now?

“ \* And why should you not believe something  
“ divine to be in him, who is indeed Part of  
“ the Godhead? That whole in which we are  
“ contained, is one, and that *one* is God; we  
“ being his Companions and Members.” p. 391.

It may be sufficient to observe upon this; that  
(to overlook the Appearance of a Rant in the  
Expression) it proves nothing at all to the pre-  
sent Purpose. Since, how much soever we  
may be *Parts of God and his Companions and  
Members*, (who would not reckon this to be all  
Flourish?) as we have a distinct Existence and  
Consciousness now, we may have the same for  
any Time hereafter: And as we suffer, or are  
easy and happy, as we behave now, so we may  
do and be for any Time hereafter, and for ever:  
And consequently, notwithstanding this, there  
may be a future State of Rewards and Punishments.

After *Seneca* comes *Epietetus* (who, by the  
Way, was cited too before for the *Mortality* of  
the Soul); and he says †, “ The Souls of Men  
“ have the nearest Relation to God, as being  
“ Parts or Fragments of him, discerped and  
“ torn from his Substance.” As Mr. *Warbur-*  
*ton*, in a marginal Note upon this Passage, can-  
not forbear smiling at Dr. *More* for his Reflecti-  
on upon it, I am afraid a great many will be apt  
to smile at him for endeavouring to make the

\* *Quid est autem, cur non existimes in eo divini aliquid existere  
qui Dei pars est? totum hoc, quo continemur, & unum est & Deus:  
& Socii ejus sumus & membra.*

† Συναφίς τῷ Θεῷ, ὥστε αὐτὲ μόρια ἔσται καὶ ἀποσπάσματα.

most of *Epicletus's* Words, and even paraphrasing, instead of translating them. The Original is not very correct and consistent. For *συνάφει* and *ἀποσπάσματος* express contrary Ideas: Which indeed he endeavours to hide in his Translation; rendering the former Word, by *having the nearest Relation to God*. Yet how *Parts*, by being *discerped and torn from God*, can have the *nearest Relation* to him, no one can understand. And whereas, in the rendering above it is said, *discerped and torn from the Substance of God*, there is not a Word in the Original that answers to it. And once more, whereas he *smiles at the good Doctor*, for looking upon these as *metaphorical Expressions*, surely he will not undertake to *prove* that they are any Thing more than that.

Lastly; *Antoninus* says \*, “ (To die) is not “ only according to the Course of Nature, but “ of great Use to it” (surely, *συνφέρον αὐτῇ* is a very obscure Thought, and is not elucidated by any Thing that follows). We should “ consider, how closely Man is united to the “ Godhead, and in what Part of him that Union “ resides; and what will be the Condition of “ that Part or Portion, when it is resolved (in- “ to the *Anima Mundi*).” Such a Manner of translating will make any Thing of any Thing. “ And in what Part of him that Union re- “ sides.”—Besides that it is an Absurdity; since

\* Τὸτο μὲν τοι ἐμόνον φύσει εἶναι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφέρον αὐτῇ πῶς ἀπίσται διὰ ἄνθρωπον, καὶ κατὰ τι αὐτὴ μίξθαι, καὶ πῶς ἔχει ὅταν διαχίται τὸ τὴν ἀνθρώπου τὸτο μέρος.



Union cannot reside in any Part; what is there in the Original that expresses even the least of this? *ἐκ τὰς τῆς αὐτοῦ μερῶν*, is, and in some Sense (or *secundum quid*) a Part of him.—Perhaps the Passage should be rendered thus; “How nearly Man is related to God, and, as it were, a Part of him: And how it will be with this Part of Man (by which he is related to God) upon a Dissolution.”—Mr. Warburton owns this Passage is *obscure*; but instead of endeavouring to clear it up, only observes the different Manners in which the Critics read it. And I think we may safely pass it over, as nothing to the present Purpose. Only let me be allowed to say; that taking it in his Sense, or supposing such a Resolution of the Soul at Death into the *Anima Mundi*, as he is here endeavouring to prove, it is a poor *Consolation* against Death; not at all better in any Respect than *Annihilation*.

And thus we are got through the famous philosophic Quaternion; whose Opinion concerning the Nature of the Soul, was such as made it impossible they should believe a future State of Rewards and Punishments. I have considered all that has been offered upon this Head; and, unless I am much mistaken, have made it appear, that all the Evidence here produced is just nothing. And for THIS Reason in particular, and more especially; “Because, however the Soul might (*i. e.* in the obscure Opinion and Talk of some of the old Philosophers) be originally a Part of God and resolvable into him

“ him again, yet, as it has, confessedly in this  
 “ World, a distinct separate Existence and a pro-  
 “ per Self-consciousness, it may, for any Thing  
 “ that has been produced from this *Quaternion*  
 “ to the contrary, have the same Existence and  
 “ the same Consciousness for and beyond any  
 “ given Time hereafter. And consequently,  
 “ that notwithstanding their Notion of the  
 “ Soul’s being *Part of God and resolvable* into  
 “ him again, they might hold a *future State of*  
 “ *Rewards and Punishments.*” Therefore Mr.  
*Warburton’s* Conclusion must be wrong: “ This  
 “ then being the general Notion of the Philo-  
 “ sophers concerning the Nature of the Soul,  
 “ there could not possibly be any Room for  
 “ their believing a future State of Rewards and  
 “ Punishments.” p. 393. Since it has been  
 shewn, that notwithstanding that Notion, there  
 was *Room* enough for them to believe the Rea-  
 lity of such a State.

But in the next Place, Mr. *Warburton* pro-  
 ceeds to give us such a Solution of a *Difficulty*  
 (which here comes in his Way) as must be e-  
 steemed very extraordinary and surprizing. “ How  
 “ much, says he, the Ancients understood the  
 “ Disbelief of this (a future State) to be the  
 “ Consequence of holding the other, (the Soul’s  
 “ being Part of God, and resolvable into him)  
 “ we have a very remarkable Instance in *Strabo*  
 “ *do*; who, speaking of the Religion of *Moses*,  
 “ thus expresses himself. He affirmed and  
 “ taught, that the *Egyptians* and *Libyans* con-  
 “ ceived amiss, in representing the Divinity un-  
 “ der

“ der the Form of Beasts and Cattle : Nor were  
 “ the *Greeks* less mistaken to picture him in  
 “ an human Shape. For God was only one,  
 “ which contains all Mankind, the Earth and  
 “ Sea, and which we call Heaven, the World,  
 “ and the Nature of all Things,” p. 394. This  
 Mr. *Warburton* thinks is the *rankest Spinozism*.  
 On the contrary, I cannot but reckon this Pas-  
 sage full of good Sense, and that in the latter  
 Part of it, (where the *Spinozism* is supposed to  
 lye,) there is an excellent Reason given against  
 the low and foolish Conceptions which all  
 Mankind entertained concerning the Godhead.  
 In Opposition to these, *Strabo* makes *Moses* to  
 give us this Account of God. “Εν τῷτο μόνον τὸ  
 περιέχον ἡμᾶς ἀπάντας καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλατταν, ὃ κα-  
 λῶμεν ἑρᾶνόν καὶ κόσμον καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν.  
 Which Words appear to me so far from ex-  
 pressing any unworthy Sentiment of God, that  
 on the contrary they are a noble Description of  
 the Immensity and Omnipresence of the Deity.  
 “ God is only one, and so far from being limit-  
 “ ed by any Thing, that he contains and en-  
 “ compasses all Things.” And though it may  
 be hazardous to guess at the particular Passage  
 or Passages of the *Law*, which might lead to  
 this Notion of the Deity ; yet it seems not im-  
 possible, nor perhaps unlikely, that he might  
 have his Eye upon *Deut. iv. 39. Know therefore*  
*this Day, and consider in thine Heart, that the*  
*Lord he is God in Heaven above and upon the*  
*Earth beneath : There is none else.* The latter  
 Part of which the 70 translate thus : καὶ ἐπεὶ ἔτι



ἔτι πλεον αὐτῶ : Which is full as much for Mr. Warburton's Purpose as what *Strabo* says. But, taking *Strabo's* Words in Mr. Warburton's Sense, I cannot but be of his Opinion, that a more perverse Construction could not be put upon the Doctrine of *Moses*.

But then, how came so candid a Writer as *Strabo* to fall into this Error? And here it is Mr. Warburton has quite surprized us. "The true Solution is this: *Strabo* well knew, that all who held the τὸ ἐν denied, and necessarily, a future State of Rewards and Punishments. And finding in the Law of *Moses*—the Omision of such future State—he concluded backwards, that the Reason could be nothing less than the Author's believing the τὸ ἐν." A BACKWARD Conclusion indeed, if ever there was one! And such a one too as nothing but the warmest Imagination could have suggested. And admit, that all who held the τὸ ἐν, denied a future State, did all who denied a future State, hold the Doctrine of the τὸ ἐν? Mr. Warburton himself will not say it. Therefore, though *Moses* said nothing of a future State, it will not follow, that he held the τὸ ἐν: And *Strabo's* backward Conclusion was a very silly one.

### VIII.

Mr. Warburton's last Attempt is, to consider the Original of this Notion of the τὸ ἐν. And whereas it might be suspected the *Greeks* borrowed it (as they did many Parts of their Learning) from the *Egyptians*, he, on the contrary, will shew, that it was intirely of *Grecian* Extract:

tract : And he will give the very beſt Evidence in the World for it; viz. “ The Diſcovery of “ the Inventors.” p. 399. And theſe were *Pherecydes Sirus*, and *Thales*. The Proof of which is as follows. “ *Tully* ſpeaking of *Pherecydes Sirus*, the Maſter of *Pythagoras*, tells “ us he was the firſt among the *Greeks* that affirmed the Souls of Men to be eternal.” “ *Pherecydes Syrius primum dixit animos hominum eſſe ſempiternos—hanc opinionem diſcipulus ejus Pythagoras maxime confirmavit.*” *Tuſc. Diſp. L. I. c. 16.* This is perhaps the moſt extraordinary Quotation in the whole Book, and will deſerve to be thoroughly conſidered.

The whole Paſſage, as it is in the Original, is thus : “ *Itaque credo equidem etiam alios tot ſeculis; ſed, quod literis extet, Pherecydes Syrius primus dixit animos hominum eſſe ſempiternos.*” The plain, obvious Meaning of which appears to be this: “ That *Tully* did not “ doubt but many had held the Immortality of “ the Soul before *Pherecydes Syrus*; but he is “ the firſt that is upon Record; he is the firſt “ whoſe Name is mentioned.” And then *Tully* goes on to tell us, that *Pythagoras* had it from *Pherecydes*, and *Plato* from *Pythagoras*; and that *Plato* ſupported the Opinion with *Reaſons*; which the others had not done. “ But however, ſays *Tully* to the young Man his Auditor, “ unleſs you are of another Mind, we will drop “ *Plato’s Reaſons*, and e’en give up this HOPE “ of Immortality.” “ *Hanc totam SPERM immortali-  
tatis*

“*mortalitatis relinquamus.*” In what Manner this was spoken by *Tully*, and how it is to be understood by us, appears from the *young Man's* Answer and *Tully's* own Reply. “*A. An tu, cum me in summam expectationem adduxeris, deseris? Errare, mehercule, malo cum Platone quam cum ISTIS vera sentire.*” *M. Maeste virtute; ego enim ipse cum eodem ipso non invitus erraverim.*” From hence it is plain, that whatever was meant by the *Immortality* here mentioned, it was something in it's own Nature pleasing, desirable, and the Object of *HOPE*; and this likewise to such a Degree, that the *young Man* could not endure the Thought of losing so delightful a Prospect; and he expresses himself with equal Displeasure and Contempt concerning those *Philosophers*, who were opposite to *Plato* in this Point, and imagined the Soul died with the Body. “He had rather think falsely with *Plato*, than be in the right with those worthless, minute Philosophers—*quam cum ISTIS vera sentire.*” And *Tully* commends his Resolution, and assures him it was his own Sentiment. That contemptuous Pronoun *ISTI* in *Tully's* Style often means the *Epicureans*: Who were, every one knows, the most famous Sect that stood up for the *Mortality* of the Soul. Here it will include all that agreed with them in this their favourite Tenet.—

Now apply all this to *Mr. Warburton's* Notion of the τὸ εἶν, and suppose that *Tully* meant it in this Sense, when he says “that *Pherecydes* was the first that asserted the Immortality of  
“ the



“ the Soul; which Notion *Pythagoras* had  
“ from him, and *Plato* supported with Rea-  
“ sons.” Suppose this, and what Sense will  
there be in representing such Immortality as the  
Object of HOPE, or, indeed, making it better  
in any Respect than the *Immortality* of the *Epi-  
cureans*, or the *Immortality* of the *Spinofists*?  
If it is not better than either of them, but in-  
deed the very same with one of them, how  
impossible had it been for *Tully* to represent it,  
as he does, here and in every other Part of this  
*Disputation*, as the great and even the highest  
Object of our Wishes and Expectations? There-  
fore it must be as plain as the Light at Noon-  
day, that *Tully* understood *Pherecydes* to mean  
the common Immortality of the Soul; and  
that this was what *Pythagoras* learnt from him;  
and *Plato* of *Pythagoras*: Which Notion *Plato*  
philosophised upon and supported with *Reasons*;  
and these *Reasons* *Tully* details out in the fol-  
lowing Part of this *Disputation*. And who-  
ever peruses these *Reasons* will see, not only  
that they have no imaginable Relation to the  
*τὸ ἐν* Doctrine, but that the whole Design and  
Force of them is to prove, that the Soul is so  
far from depending upon the Body, that it has  
a proper Life in itself, and such a one as it will  
be better capable of enjoying hereafter, when  
separated from the Body and not incumbered  
any longer with Flesh and Blood.

Now for Mr. *Warburton*'s Reflections upon  
this Passage. “ A very extraordinary one, says  
“ he, if it be taken in the common Sense of  
“ the

“ the Interpreters ; that *Phercydes* was the  
 “ first, or first of the *Greeks*, that taught the  
 “ Immortality of the Soul, nothing can be  
 “ more false or extravagant. *Tully* himself  
 “ knew the contrary—and *Plutarch* assures us,  
 “ the Author and Original is not known.”  
*Tully* does not say, nor does any Body that I  
 know of understand him as saying, that no one  
 before *Phercydes* asserted the Immortality of  
 the Soul. Both he and *Plutarch*, it is allowed,  
 knew the contrary very well. But then too  
 neither of them might be able to mention ex-  
 pressly the *Name* of any one Person, that had  
 asserted this Notion before him. And this is  
 what *Tully* says expressly ; but then at the same  
 Time that he tells us this, he tells us likewise,  
 that he did not at all doubt but many more had  
 done it ; though he could not say, who they  
 were. *Phercydes* is the *first that is upon Re-*  
*cord.*—

He goes on ; “ They therefore must mean  
 “ quite another Thing (from the common Im-  
 “ mortality of the Soul) which the exact Pro-  
 “ priety of the Word, *Sempiternus*, will lead  
 “ us to. *Donatus* the Grammarian tells us ;  
 “ *Sempiternum ad Deos, perpetuum ad Homines*  
 “ *proprie pertinet.* Here then a proper Eter-  
 “ nity is attributed to the Soul. A Consequence  
 “ that could only spring, and does necessarily  
 “ spring, from the Principle of the Soul’s be-  
 “ ing Part of God.” Then he concludes ;  
 “ Thus has *Tully* given us an illustrious Piece  
 “ of History ; that not only fixes the Doctrine  
 “ of

“ of the τὸ ἐν to Greece, but records the Inventor of it.”—It would be endless to be particular in remarking upon this Passage.

*Tully* could never intend to give us any Thing relating at all to the τὸ ἐν; since it does not appear from any of his Writings, that he was at all acquainted with it. And *here* in particular he could not intend it, because it has no possible Connexion with the Subject he is upon. So far from it, that it is directly contrary to his Design. The Doctrine of the τὸ ἐν, *Mr. Warburton* himself says, is utterly inconsistent with the Notion of a future State of separate Existence and Self-consciousness: But *such* a State is what *Tully* is here asserting and endeavouring to prove: *Such* a State as this *Tully* plainly meant *Phercydes* to be the first Person that History expressly gives an Account of as asserting and maintaining: He mentions him upon this Occasion with no Marks at all of Dislike or Disapprobation, but the contrary: He says, *Pythagoras* had the Notion from *Phercydes*, and greatly propagated it: And *Plato* took it from *Pythagoras*, and supported it with *Reasons*. This same Notion *Tully* endeavours in what follows to prove and establish in the Manner of *Plato*, and in his own. From whence it follows, as plain as can be, that *Tully* took *Phercydes*'s Notion to be the same with his own; and if his own was not grounded upon, nor any Ways connected with, the Doctrine of the τὸ ἐν, neither was *Phercydes*'s. And as for *Tully*'s using the Word *Sempiternus* upon this Occasion, no Argument can be drawn from  
P thence



thence any Way. For, even supposing the Word to be used here in what Mr. Warburton, following *Donatus*, says is the strictly proper Sense, for *æternitas a parte ante* as well as *post*, yet the Doctrine of the τὸ ἐν will not follow; since an eternal Effect of an eternal Cause might be, and probably has been, all along held by many, as no inconsistent or unlikely Notion. And supposing it to be used here with a Latitude, and to mean no more than a *future* indefinite or eternal Existence, as the Words, *immortalis, æternus*, are known to do very often, then there is no Ground at all for his Inference. And why may it not be understood in this Sense? Will *Donatus*, or Mr. Warburton say it is never used so by any Body? Or, will they deny, that *Tully* ever uses it thus? This cannot be: It is impossible to read *Tully's* Writings without meeting with it perpetually\*. And, lastly; *this* is the very Sense in which it is used here; as has been, I imagine, made evident from the

\* If any one can make a Doubt of it, he may cast his Eye upon the following Passages. *Tully* professes of himself, that he had "*mortales inimicitias, sempiternas amicitias.*" *Orat. pro Rabir.* In the 4th *Orat.* against *Catiline*, the Word is used to signify a continued Duration, though merely equal to the present Life: "*Vincula sempiterna certe ad singularem pœnam nefarii sceleris inventa sunt.*" Just in the same Manner as *æternum* is used, towards the End; "*æternum bellum.*" In the 14th *Philippic* it is used more properly; "*Memoria bene redditæ vitæ sempiterna.*" *Offic.* l. 3. c. 22. speaking of *Paulus Æmilius* he says, "*Nil domum suam præter memoriam nominis sempiternam detulit.*" And, once more, in the same Sense he plainly uses it in this present *Disputation*: "*Sin autem perimit (supremus ille dies) ac delet omnino, quid melius, quam in mediis vitæ laboribus obdormiscere, & ita conniventem somno consopiri Sempiterno?*" c. 49.

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Series, Connexion and Design of *Tully's* Discourse.

Thus then ; here is no *proper Eternity attributed to the Soul* ; but if there was, it would not follow, that the Soul was in any proper, or in Mr. *Warburton's* Sense, a *Part of God* : And *Tully* had no Intention *here* to give us a *Piece of History* relating to the τὸ εἶν at all ; (a Notion he does not appear either here or any where else to have had the least Knowledge of ; ) and much less to *fix* this Notion to *Greece*, or indeed any where else : Or, lastly, to determine any Thing at all about the *Inventor* of it.

It may be expected some Notice should be taken of the different Manner in which this Citation from *Tully* appears in the 2d Edit. of Mr. *Warburton's* Book : Where he has made this Addition to it : “ *Quod literis extet Pherecydes Syrius, &c.* ” But this is so far from mending the Matter, that it seems to make it much worse. Since, whereas before the Error might possibly be thought to have been involuntary, there is now hardly Room for so favourable a Construction. One would think, he must, upon a Review, have the whole Passage before him in the coolest and most deliberate Manner ; and therefore could not cite it wrong a second Time through mere Inattention. And indeed the Manner of citing it this second Time, appears to me rather worse than the first. Because now he makes the Sentence complete, and not only mentions *Tully's* Testimony, but refers to the Authorities upon which it is grounded ; the

latter of which was omitted before. And once more, if it was not thought proper to give us now this second Time any more than half the Sentence, yet surely we should have had this half fair and entire: And then the Particle *sed* had not been omitted. *SED quod literis existet, &c.* and the inserting this Particle would have discovered a plain Reference to something going before: And the Consequence upon viewing the whole Passage must immediately be, that every one would see it was in no respect for the Author's Purpose.

And surely, when he says, " he makes no Question but it was *Phercydes's* broaching this Impiety—that made him pass—for an Atheist," he has the poorest Ground for his Confidence; especially when *Elian* gives, so expressly, another Reason; and such a one as in all Ages and Places, has been ever made the Ground of such a Charge. Let a Man deny, or merely doubt concerning the Gods or Religion of his Country, and strait he will be reproached as believing in *no* God and having *no* Religion. *Socrates*, it is well known, did not go *so* far, yet he got the Imputation and Charge of *Impiety*: And died in Consequence of it. Certainly, Mr. *Warburton* must be *fond* of this Notion concerning *Phercydes*, when he can support it in such a Manner, by Arguments that have not the least Weight in them; no, nor so much as an Appearance of it. What an Argument is that, which follows here? *Suidas* tells us, *Phercydes* had *no* Master; *ἐκ ἐσχληναι καθ-*



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καθηγητήν : He had no Leader, no Instructor—what follows from thence? Therefore he had no Notions in common with any Body; but as they were all of his own forming, so they were all peculiar and singular.

Yet, in the next Place, we are told, there is “as positive Attestation for *Thales's*” being the Inventor of this impious Notion, as for *Pherecyæ's*. For *Laertius* tells us, “Some affirm him to be the first who held the Souls of Men to be immortal \*.” And here what Sort of *Immortality* is meant, appears from the Word used to exprefs it: Which is ἀθάνατος; “an Epithet appropriated to the Immortality of the Gods, as ἀφθαρτος is to that of Men.” A Piece of Criticism just as well founded, as that before upon *Sempiternus* and *Perpetuus*. And Mr. *Warburton* may himself compare it with a Citation of his own presently after, p. 408. *Marg. Note*: Where ἀφθαρτος is as plainly and emphatically applied to the Deity, as ἀθάνατος can possibly any where be. Πῶς δύναται μέρϕ φθαρῆναι τῷ ἀφθάρτε ἢ ἀπόλεσαι τῷ θεῷ; and again, with his own Quotation from *Herodotus*, p. 92. where the Historian says, “The Egyptians were the first who said that (or how) the Soul of Man was immortal.” ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος ἐστίν. Does the Word, ἀθάνατος, here signify a strictly proper Eternity; i. e. a *parte ante* as well as *post*? Look into the Historian, and it will plainly appear to be otherwise. And,

\* Ἐνίοι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν πρῶτον εἰπὴν φασὶν ἀθανάτους τὰς ψυχάς.]

lastly; the very Etymology of the Word should have hindered from putting such a Construction upon it; and any living Being may be, with the utmost Propriety, said to be *ἀθάνατος*, who, whatever was his Original, *never dies*. And, to keep to the same Writer, when *Herodotus* tells us, that *Megabyzus*, the *Persian* General, had left an *immortal Memory* *ἀθάνατον μνημὸν*, among the *Hellepontians* by a certain Saying of his, there mentioned, l. 4. c. 144. or when he mentions the *Γῆρας τὰς ἀθανατίζοντάς*, l. 4. c. 93, (the Meaning of which Epithet as applied to them is presently after explained) is or can be any other Duration intended than a *posterior Eternity*?

Mr. *Warburton* proceeds with his Observations upon this Testimony of *Laertius*.

“The same Objection holds here against understanding this Passage in the common Sense, as in the Case of *Phercydes*.”—But this Objection, I think, has been shewn to be nothing in the Case of *Phercydes*.—“And besides, we cannot doubt, he says, of the other Meaning; when we reflect on what the Ancients tell us of *Thales*’s holding the Soul to be *αὐτοκίνητον*, a Self-moving Nature.”—Why, what Impiety can there be in this Epithet? On the contrary, would it be a *rational* Soul, if it was not *αὐτοκίνητος*? And, if it be *αὐτοκίνητος*, must it for that Reason be eternal *a parte ante*? Well; but he held too “the World was animated.”—So did a great many others, without holding the *τὸ ἐν*.—And, lastly;

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lastly; *Tully* tells us, he held “ the Soul was “ Parcel of the divine Substance.”——But it has not appeared, that *Tully* says any such Thing.

At length *Mr. Warburton* comes, p. 401. to sum up the Argument relating to these two *Inventors* of the τὸ εἶν. Which he does thus:

“ *Thales* and *Phercydes* are said to be the first “ who taught the Immortality of the Soul.”——This is not setting out accurately. One or the other is said to be the first. No one mentions them both for this Opinion. *Tully* gives it for *Phercydes* against every Body: But how? Not that he was *absolutely* the first; but that no one else in particular is expressly mentioned by Name before *Phercydes*: He is the first upon Record. *Tully* plainly supposes, nay he tells us, he does not doubt, but many had held the Soul’s Immortality before *Phercydes*; but no Name is recorded more ancient than his. And in the same Sense may *Laertius* be understood.

He goes on; “ In the common Sense of this “ Assertion, they were not the first, and known “ not to be so by those who asserted it.”——Can *Mr. Warburton* then mention any one who asserted the *Immortality* of the Soul, in the common Notion of it, earlier than those two? If he can, it will be to the Purpose: But till he does (what was more than *Tully* could do;) we must look upon this only as a mere Assertion.

Indeed, in the 2d Edition, *Mr. Warburton* tells us, *Homer* had taught the common Doctrine of the Immortality long before *Phercydes*,



and that *Tully* knew it; and that *Herodotus* likewise had recorded it to have been taught by the *Egyptians* from the *earliest Times*.—What *Tully* would say, were he alive, to these two Instances, no Body can be positive. Whether he would allow of a *Lapsus Memoriae* (something of which seems to have happened to him in the Case of *Regulus* above) is doubtful. But what may be said is this: The latter Instance is not to the Purpose. For though the common Immortality was a well known Doctrine among the *Egyptians*, yet the *Author* of it among them is not known. But *Tully* is speaking of the *Author* of it. And if the *Author* of it among the *Egyptians* should be known, and known to be much earlier than *Pherecydes*, yet this again would be nothing to *Tully*; who, most probably, is here to be understood as speaking of the *Greeks* only. And as to the other Instance; some (whatever *Tully* would do) will deny that *Homer* ever does teach the Doctrine of the proper Immortality. But then, in the next Place, granting it, yet *Homer* was a *Poet*; and if he mentions this Notion, it is only in the *poetical* Way; but *Tully* considers it as a *philosophical* Opinion, and, perhaps, had only a Mind to say, who was the *first Philosopher*, that is recorded to have held and taught it.

He proceeds; “The same Antiquity informs us, they held the Doctrine of the τὸ εἶν, which commonly went by the Name of the Doctrine of the Immortality.”—Neither of these Assertions appears to have any Grounds; nor has

has been at all supported by Mr. Warburton: What little, extremely little, Evidence he has produced for the former, has been considered; and as to the latter, he has produced absolutely nothing.—“Nor is any earlier on Record than “they, for holding that Principle.”—This is very true; for neither they, nor any Body else, are *on Record* for holding the Principle of the τὸ ἐν; at least nothing has hitherto appeared. But, if by *that Principle* could be meant, the common Doctrine of the *Soul's Existence after Death*, no Names are earlier upon Record for asserting it, than *Pberocydes* and *Thales* (i. e. in the Opinion of *Tully*, and those whom *Laertius* speaks of)—“We conclude therefore, that “those who tell us *they* were the first who “taught the Immortality of the Soul, necessarily meant, that they were the first, who “held it to be Part of the divine Substance.” Which is such a *Conclusion*, as Mr. Warburton himself cannot *now* approve of. It must be left however to the Judgment of others.

Only, in Regard to Mr. Warburton, it should be observed farther; that at the End of summing up this Argument, he, in the 2d Edition, adds what follows; “This, I say, we must “conclude, though *Plutarch* \* had not expressly affirmed it of one of them; where he says, “that *Thales was the first who taught the Soul “to be an eternal-moving, or self-moving Nature*: But none but God is such a Nature;

\* Θαλῆς ἀπεφάνητο Πρῶτος τὴν ψυχὴν φύσει αἰκίνητον ἢ αὐτοκίνητον.

“there-

“ therefore the Soul, in his Opinion, was Part  
 “ of the divine Substance; and he was the first  
 “ of that Opinion.” The whole of this Argument lies in *Thales's* speaking of the Soul as an *eternal or self-moving Nature*; or rather, in *Plutarch's* Manner of representing his Notion. Which, most certainly, by the Way, is not the most correct. For αἰκίοντος expresses more than αὐτοκίοντος, as a Being may be the latter, without being the former; if αἰεὶ be supposed here to signify a proper Eternity; as Mr. *Warburton* would understand it. And if it signifies here, as most probably it does, only a *posterior* Eternity, the two Words are not immediately convertible, and do not express the same Thing. This is plain from *Plato's* Conduct, long before *Plutarch's* Time. *Plato* argued from the Soul's having a Principle of Motion in itself to it's Capacity of moving for ever; *i. e.* from it's being αὐτοκίοντος, to it's being αἰκίοντος. And this is the Argument that is given us at large by *Tully* in his *first Tusculan*: And more, this is the Argument which *Macrobius* tells us had been bandied about between the *Platonists* and the *Aristotelians*. And as the *Platonists* certainly had much the better Reason on their Side in this Instance, if it was commonly seen and acquiesced in, this would in Time make these two Words, αἰκίοντος and αὐτοκίοντος, become convertible Terms; such as might be used in many Cases indifferently for one another. And thus it might probably be in *Plutarch's* Time; and a Man would be justified in saying, αἰκίοντος



τὸ ἢ αὐτοκίνητο, and, *vice versa*, αὐτοκίνητο ἢ ἀεκίνητο. But then this Difference in these two Manners of speaking is to be taken Notice of: The Particle ἢ in the former is equivalent to this, *Or, which is much the same Thing*; in the latter it is, *Or, and therefore*. Mr. Warburton seems to think, grounding himself merely upon *Plutarch's* Expression, these two Words among the Ancients signified exactly the same Thing. But this is contrary to *Plato's*, to *Tully's*, to *Macrobius's* Sense of the Matter; and, if it was added, contrary to common Sense, it would not be straining the Thing too far. And as for the *Reasoning* built upon it, that appears to be as bad as any Thing. “But none but  
“God is such a Nature; therefore the Soul, in  
“*Thales's* Opinion, was Part of the divine Sub-  
“stance.” For can it be known, that *Thales* thought an eternal Effect of an eternal Cause an Impossibility?

We now go on to another Proof, “that the  
“Doctrine of the τὸ ἐν is purely *Grecian*,”—  
which will be thought a very extraordinary one,  
*viz.* p. 402.

The *Greeks* indeed were the Inventors of this Notion; “but as they had their first Learning  
“from *Egypt*, we may be assured, that some  
“*Egyptian* Principles led them into it.” And this is said in Opposition to those, (who they are is not so well known) that would have the Notion itself to be *Egyptian*, and not *Grecian*. Now, it will be no Venture to say, that if any *Egyptian* Tenets can be specified, which evidently

dently lead to this Notion, a great deal more will be done towards making the Notion purely *Egyptian*, than has been yet done to make it *Grecian*. But here we are much disappointed again.

The first Tenet was, it seems, the Doctrine of the *Metempsychosis*, or Præ-existence of the Soul. This was invented, we are told, to account for the *Origin of Evil*. How far it will answer that End, is not to the present Purpose. What is here wanted is, to see the Connexion between the Doctrine of Præ-existence, and that of the *τὸ ἐν*; which may shew us, how easy it was for the *Greeks* to slide from the one into the other. And surely nothing can be more surprising than the Manner in which it is endeavoured to shew this.—“The necessary  
“Consequence of the Doctrine, (of the *Metempsychosis*, *i. e.* in a præ-existent State) was  
“that the Soul is older than the Body.”—If this is considered as a *Consequence*, it is a very odd one; however, the Thing is clear enough.  
“So having taught before, (*viz.* in their Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments) that the Soul was eternal *à parte*  
“*post*, and now (*viz.* by the Doctrine of the *Metempsychosis*) that it had an Existence before it came into the Body; the *Greeks*, to  
“give a *Roundness* to their System, taught on the Foundation of that Præ-existence, that it  
“was eternal too *à parte ante*.” But, surely, the *Greeks*, especially the *Philosophers*, and *Phercydes* and *Tkales* in particular, were not such  
defultory

desultory Reasoners, as to infer the Soul's existing, properly, from Eternity; because the *Egyptians* said, *it did not begin to exist when the Body did*: And this merely to give a *Roundness* to their System. Certainly, had they always reasoned at this Rate, neither they nor their Systems had deserved or met with any Regard.

Yet there immediately follows another Instance of the Volatility of their Genius and Roundity of their System, still more remarkable than the former. For, in the next Place, we are told, "that having thus given the Soul one Attribute of the Divinity, another *Egyptian* Doctrine soon taught them to make a perfect God Almighty of it." And how is this made out? Why thus. "We have observed, says he, that the Mysteries were an *Egyptian* Invention, and that the Secrets of them were the Unity of the Godhead."—Sure, it should be, the *Secret* of them *was* the Unity of the Godhead; and in what follows, it should be expressed; not, "These were the grand ἀπόρρητα,"—but, *This was the grand ἀπόρρητον*, "in which we are told the Kings and Magistrates, and a select Number of the best and wisest were instructed."—It were greatly desirable Mr. Warburton had acquainted us, *where* this is said.—But the next Observation is of much greater Importance. He tells us elsewhere \*, and with great Pains endeavours to prove, that though indeed the *Unity of God* was a grand, or the grand Secret of the *Mysteries*,

\* Book 2. Sect. 4. p. 133.



yet that there was another *Secret*, of equal importance to Society, communicated in the *Mysteries*; and that was, the *Immortality of the Soul*, and a *future State of Rewards and Punishments*; nay, and adds, that these were of the *Essence* of the *Mysteries*. This cannot be denied. How then *now* comes the *only* Secret of the *Mysteries* to be the *Unity of God*?—But still it is much worse to observe, that whereas, before, the *Mysteries* were mentioned *only* on Account of, and with Respect to, a *future State of Rewards and Punishments*, and a long Dissertation is added on Purpose to prove, that they were a political Contrivance, directly to inculcate in a most forcible Manner, the Doctrine of such a State; they are now mentioned *here* again, as intended to inculcate another Doctrine; which, in it's Consequences, too easily led every one to a *Disbelief* of that *first* Doctrine of a future State. This is the Manner in which the *Mysteries* are mentioned *here*.

But let him proceed: “ This shews the “ Doctrine was delivered in such a Manner as “ was most useful to Society.”—It should rather have been, *This shews the Doctrine was—as was least HURTFUL to Society*.—For what is the Antecedent to *This*? Is it not, The Doctrine's being privately communicated to a *select* Number? Had the *Unity of the Godhead* been openly divulged, while *Polytheism* universally prevailed, it would have met with such inveterate Prejudices, as must have occasioned the most violent Opposition and Civil Disorder.

There-

Therefore it was made an ἀπόρρητον, and some proper and well-prepared Minds only were let into it. — But in what follows it is insinuated, as if the Doctrine of the τὸ ἐν was included in the *Egyptian* Notion of the *Unity* of the Godhead. For (though it must be owned the Connexion is infinitely obscure) thus he goes on. — “ But the Principle of the τὸ ἐν is as destructive “ to Society as Atheism can make it.” — Allow it ; but how is this Principle related to the other ? The *Egyptian* Mysteries said, *God was one* : Could it possibly from hence follow, or could any Mind from hence collect, *That God was every Thing* ; or that *every Thing was God* ? This Doctrine of the *Unity* was inculcated in the Mysteries, as he himself had before asserted, in particular and express Opposition to the *Polytheism* that prevailed, and was the vulgar and established Religion every where : And yet this very Doctrine was the *Occasion* of the most learned Men’s saying and asserting, “ that every “ Thing was God, and God every Thing :” And so, though *Polytheism* was indeed an Error ; yet *Jupiter* and *Juno*, with all the rest of the Gods and Goddesses, whether greater or less, above or below ; nay, Crocodiles, Cats, Onions and Garlick ; and, in a Word, every individual Thing was *God* : Notwithstanding that it was expressly and directly in Opposition to the Godship of these Things, that the *Unity of God* was asserted and inculcated in the *Mysteries*.

This is plainly to make the Doctrine of the *Mysteries* infinitely more absurd than the most vulgar

vulgar *Polytheism* could possibly be; for which yet it was intended as the most effectual Remedy.

But, notwithstanding this Insinuation, he is forced to acknowledge, that the *Egyptians* “ however had no gross Conceptions of the “ Divinity, when they had found him, but “ represented him, as we are told by the Ancients, as a Spirit diffusing itself through the “ World, and intimately pervading all Things.” And is not this a good tolerable Representation of the Immensity and Omnipresence of God? And in calling him a *Spirit*, there certainly is no Harm.—“ And thus, in a figurative, moral “ Sense, saying that God was all Things.”—*And thus?* What is the Meaning of this Transition? Here, it must be; either, *that God’s being all Things*, is another Manner of expressing the same Thing; as when it is said, *God is a Spirit, pervading all Things* (which most certainly is not true): Or, else, that the one is a Consequence of the other; and so evident a one, that he that owns the one, cannot but, must of Necessity, see the other. And is this true? These are the only Ways in which I can account for that Transition; and are both equally false.

But, it seems, there is an *Authority* for the *Egyptians* saying, that *God was all Things*. For thus Mr. *Warburton* translates the following Words of an Ancient: Δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς δίχα Θεῶν μηδὲν ὅλως συνεστάναι; which yet, methinks, any one else would, and *Cudworth* does, render



*Divine Legation of Moses.* 225

more literally, and with better Sense, "They think that nothing at all consists, or subsists, without God." How Mr. *Warburton* came to give us such a Translation of a Passage in itself so plain, and so full of good Sense, is not to be accounted for otherwise than by a fond Desire of connecting it, some-how or other, with the Doctrine of the τὸ ἐν; and so shewing how the one might lead to the other: Which is done thus; "The *Egyptians* having said, in a figurative, moral Sense, God was all Things, the *Greeks* drew the Conclusion in a literal and metaphysical, that all Things were God; and so ran headlong into Spinosism." Had the *Egyptians* said, in any proper Sense, that *God was all Things*, it must needs have followed, in the same Sense, that *all Things were God*. —It does not appear (as was just observed) that the *Egyptians* ever said any such Thing, as is here said for them. And I shall now observe, it no more appears, that the *Greeks* ever said, *All Things were God*. The Passage here cited falls as much short of the Purpose, as that other in the Case of the *Egyptians*. In the *Writings*, says he, going under the Name of *Orpheus*, we find these Words; ἐν τὶ τὰ πάντα \*. "All Things are one." This is not, *All Things are God*. That strange Doctrine of the

\* Those who have a Mind to see a great deal more concerning these Manners of speaking concerning God and Nature, may consult the learned *Cudworth*, *Intell. Syst.* c. 4. where great Numbers are to be met with (and particularly all those, I think, which Mr. *Warburton* has here mentioned) and the Doctor's Sentiments concerning them.

τὸ ἓν is not to be always understood, wherever the Word ἓν is met with, put absolutely, as it is here. For is there no other Sense in which it is thus used? Yes; several. And *here* it may mean this: “That there is an universal Relation of all Things to one another, as Parts of an Whole; so that they all make one System, one Constitution, one Universe; and, in this Sense, *one Thing*.” What Objection can be made to such a Construction of the Word, ἓν, here, I know not. But certainly this is as different from *Spinosism*, as *black* is from *white*. The same Construction may be put upon the *Latin Phrases*, cited here, *Omnia unum, Unum omnia*.—And upon the whole, I think it no ways appears, that either the *Egyptians* said, that *God was all Things*; or the *Greeks*, that *all Things were God*. And, I imagine, Mr. *Warburton* has, in no Respect, done what he undertook under this Head, *viz.* “To shew what were those *Egyptian Principles*, which led the *Greeks* into the monstrous Doctrine of the τὸ ἓν.”

“But, lastly, says he, the Books going under the Name of *Hermes Trismegistus*, having given the greatest Credit to this Opinion, it will be proper to explain that Matter.” The Sum of his Explication is this: That these Books are an arrant Forgery, begun, carried on, and finished at various Times, and by as various People: Begun under the *Ptolomies* by the *Egyptian Priests*, to support their own Credit by a false Pretence of retaining still among them

them the *old Egyptian Wisdom*; but carried on by the *Platonists*, in Opposition to Christianity; and finished by *Christians*, in their own Defence, and in Opposition to those very *Platonists*.—This is Mr. *Warburton's* Account of the Matter; and thus, he has made a mere *Farrago* of these Books of *Trismegistus* (as others had done before him; and not without Reason :) Such a one as consists, not only of various and heterogeneous Parts, but even opposite and contradictory ones. And therefore upon such Books, no Stress ought to be laid any Way. Yet it may not be amiss, just to hint one Thing. Since several of these Books do, confessedly, relate to Times long after the Reigns of the *Ptolomies*, the whole ought to be supposed to have been written after their Times; unless there is plain Evidence to the contrary. But of such Evidence Mr. *Warburton* has produced absolutely nothing: And, consequently, how much *Spinosity* soever there may be in these Books (and there is some rank enough) they will do nothing towards determining at all, whether the Doctrine of the τὸ εἶν was originally *Egyptian* or *Grecian*; which yet was the Point undertaken to be cleared up.

And I think, upon this Review, it must appear, that Mr. *Warburton* has, after all that has been said, left the Point just as he found it, viz: uncertain what was the *Original* of that absurd Doctrine of the τὸ εἶν; and not only so, but likewise whether the *ancient Egyptians* or *Greeks* knew any thing at all of it.



## PART III.

*Mr. Warburton's Notion of moral Obligation considered.*

THE Notion which Mr. *Warburton* has advanced concerning *moral Obligation* \*, being liable, as I apprehend, to much Abuse, and to some very absurd Consequences (none of them, I dare say, intended, or seen by him) he will allow me to consider it with the same Coolness and Impartiality, as he himself has offered it to the Publick †.

Proposing to *trace up moral Duty* (Obligation) *to it's first Principles*, he in the first Place observes, that *as every Animal has it's Instinct*

\* See *Div. Legat.* p. 35.

† It will not be amiss to observe, here at first, upon what Occasion Mr. *Warburton* introduces this Notion into the *present Work*. It is in an incidental Dispute with Mr. *Bayle*; who, for Reasons better known to himself, than any one else, thought fit, in his *Various Thoughts occasioned by Comets*, to step so very far out of his Way, as to endeavour to shew, that neither the Doctrine of *Epicurus*, nor that of *Strato*, was necessarily destructive of Society: And for this Reason particularly, “Be-  
“ cause an Atheist, whether *Epicurean* or *Stratonicean*, might  
“ have an Idea of the moral Difference between Good and  
“ Ill.” It is here Mr. *Warburton* enters the Lists with *Bayle*, and, in Opposition to him, (and not only to him, but, what is infinitely more considerable, in Opposition likewise to all those who found Morality in the *Nature and Reason of Things*) advances that Notion of *moral Obligation*, which is here considered. And the present Consideration of it is so intirely confined to the *Notion itself*, that neither *Bayle* nor his *Fatalists* are ever mentioned, but purely when and as it may be necessary or requisite to set Mr. *Warburton's* Sentiments and Reasonings in the easiest and truest Light.

*implant-*

*implanted by Nature to direct him to his greatest Good, so Man has his; to which—\*.* By Good here must be meant *Happiness*, and by an Animal's *greatest Good*, his *greatest Happiness*. Put this Word then instead of the other. Man then, as well as other *Animals*, has an Instinct implanted by Nature, by which he is *directed to—his greatest Happiness.—To which* Instinct, modern *Philosophers* have, he says, given the Name of the *Moral Sense*: And this he immediately calls, *an instinctive Approbation of Right, and Abhorrence of Wrong, prior to all Reflexion on their Nature, or their Consequences.* Where, in two Sentences, we seem to have two different Accounts of this *moral Sense*. First, it is an Instinct whereby we are directed to our *greatest Happiness*; and, Secondly, it is an *instinctive Approbation of Right, and Abhorrence of Wrong, prior to all Reflexion on their Nature, or their Consequences.* The Meaning of these two Words, *Right* and *Wrong*, is in this Place very obscure. If he means, as one would think he must mean, in the Sense of *Morals*, one would be willing to know, how a Man's *greatest Happiness* is concerned in approving *Right*, and abhorring *Wrong*. Every one sees this must depend upon Mr. *Warburton's* Notion of *Morality*.

As to the *moral Sense*, a Thing so much talked of, I shall neither affirm nor deny it: But if it were granted, it must yet be hard to conceive how there can be any *Virtue* merely

\* P. 36.

in following such an instinctive Impulse. There must be a *Reason* for following it, and this Reason must be seen and attended to, before any Action in Compliance with it can be truly called *Virtuous*: Otherwise Men are liable, without Remedy, to all the Reveries of a disturbed or crazy Imagination.

Concerning this *moral Sense* he observes, that it is the *first Inlet to the adequate Idea of Morality*; which is a Manner of Speaking not very intelligible: But when he adds, *and plainly the most extensive of all, the Atheist as well as Theist having it*; this is surely wrong. Fill up the Sentence,—*the most extensive INLET of all.*—The Meaning is, that more Men have *this Inlet* than any other. The very next *Inlet* he mentions, is the *Reasoning Faculty*. Now there are not, sure, more Men that have the *moral Sense*, than the *reasoning Faculty*. Or, should it be otherwise, and it were possible for a Man to have that Instinct, called *moral Sense*, without the *rational Faculty*, would he be a Subject capable of Virtue? And whereas he thinks it a Reason for the superior *Extensiveness* of this *Inlet*, that an *Atheist* has it as well as a *Theist*; does he not know, that an *Atheist* has the *rational Faculty* as well as a *Theist*? And, on the other hand, whereas neither *Atheist* nor *Theist* will deny his having such a *Faculty*, he cannot surely but know, that *Atheists* to a Man, and *Theists* in great Numbers, will deny or question this *moral Sense*; in any other Meaning of the Phrase than only “an Instinct where-  
“ by



“ by Men as well as other Animals are led to  
“ their greatest Good.”

But he proceeds from the *moral Sense* to,

Secondly, *The reasoning Faculty* ; which improves upon the *Dictates of the moral Sense*. For this finds a *Difference in the Qualities of human Actions*—and consequently, that the *Love and Hatred* excited by the *moral Sense* were not capricious in their *Operations*.— —I think it should be, and consequently, that the *Love and Hatred* excited by the *moral Sense* were not capricious either in themselves or in their *Operations*: And then the Reason that follows is good ; for that the *essential Properties of their Objects* had a *specific Difference*. This *specific Difference* being what determined, and being steadily observed by, these Affections of *Love and Hatred*, is the Evidence that these Affections themselves are not capricious.

But Reason, says he, having gone thus far it stopped—stopped? Why? Was it because it could go no farther? Reason plainly found out and saw A *Difference* in the *Qualities* of human Actions: And was this *all* that Reason did or could do? Saw only that there was A *Difference* ; but neither attended to nor saw the *Nature* of that *Difference*? Why so? Surely, it might (and indeed could not avoid it) as well see what this *Difference* in itself was, as see, in the general, that there was A *Difference*. Now, if this *Difference* was a different *Tendency*, of one Action to produce *Good, Happiness* ; of another, to produce *Evil, Misery* ; is not here an

adequate Object to determine the *Will* to Choice and Action?

This is what Mr. *Warburton* has too much overlooked; (how he came to do it is hard to say) and it has occasioned great Obscurity and Inconclusiveness in all that he has said in Answer even to *Bayle's* Argument.

He proceeds; *Reason having gone thus far—it stopped; and saw, that to establish the Morality, properly so called, of Actions, that is, an Obligation or Injunction, on Men, to perform some and to avoid others, there was need of calling in other Principles to it's Assistance.* Here is a new Sense of the Word, *Morality*; very much peculiar, as I take it, to Mr. *Warburton*. *The Morality, properly so called, of Actions is an Obligation or Injunction on Men, to perform some and to avoid others.* And by *Obligation or Injunction*, is meant the positive Will or Command of a *Superior*. For so he explains himself under the

Third Head: *Nothing can thus oblige but a superior Will.* Suffer me to ask: Is there nothing in the Actions themselves to determine the *Will of this Superior*, to command one and to forbid another? If so, it will follow that it was, antecedently, indifferent which was commanded; and which forbidden: And that, whereas one Sort of Actions have been commanded, and another forbidden; the latter might have been commanded and the other forbidden. And then it will follow too, that it must be absolutely impossible for any Man by  
any

any mere Light of Nature to know what are the Commands and Prohibitions of this *superior Will*. For in investigating Morals by the Light of Nature, there is no other Way of coming at the *Will* of the superior Being, but by first finding out the Reasonableness or Unreasonableness of such and such Actions; and *from thence* concluding the divine Pleasure with Relation to them. Let Mr. *Warburton* likewise farther consider, whether God is not a *morally good* Being; whether he has not *morally good* Dispositions, or *moral* Attributes; and, lastly, whether he does not act *morally* well. Nothing of this can be denied. Let it then be farther considered; whether the divine *Morality*, the Morality of God's Attributes and Actions, can be founded in *Will*. Not the Will of a *Superior*; for he has none: Not *his own* Will; for this, in Mr. *Warburton's* own Opinion, cannot constitute an Obligation upon *himself*. And others will say, *not his own Will*; because this *Will* must be determined by some Reason or no Reason: If by some Reason, then it is that Reason that constitutes the Morality: If by no Reason, then the Determination is precarious; and whereas God is said to be *just* and *good*, he might have been, and may at any Time be, quite the Reverse. But if the Morality of the supreme Being is not founded in *Will*, but in something very different, *viz.* the Reason of Things; why may not the Morality of inferior Beings be so too? It must be so, unless mere *Finiteness* makes a Difference: Which  
how



how it should do here, no one will be able to say.

And Mr. Warburton is surely mistaken, when he says, that from *Will*, and from *this only* arose a *moral Difference*; as also in what follows; *from this Time*, viz. from the Time of discovering the *Will of God*, human *Actions* became the *Subject of Obligation*, and not till now. For though *Instinct* discovered a *Difference in Actions*; and *Reason* proved that *Difference* to be founded in the *Nature of Things*: Yet it was *Will only* that could make a *Compliance with that Difference* a *DUTY*. I am sorry the Sentence ends with this *Word*; which, in it's constant Use, implies *Submission to the Will of a Superior*. For which Reason we never speak of the *Duty of God*; who has and can have no Superior. But we speak freely of the *moral Goodness* of God; of the *Morality* of his Attributes and Actions. It had therefore been better, and the Language had been more uniform too, if, instead of the *Word Duty*, the *Word Obligation*, had been used. This is the real Meaning, and the necessary Meaning, agreeably with the Tenor of Mr. Warburton's Discourse here; though by such a Change of the *Word* what is said here has somewhat more the *Appearance* of Reason than otherwise it would have.

It will be right however to restore the proper *Word*; *It is Will only that can make a Compliance with the Difference of Things an OBLIGATION*. And then he may please to say, how mere *Will* can make an *Obligation*. And I suppose,

pose, he will say, that it is not mere *Will*, but the *Will* of a *Superior*; and by a *Superior* he must mean a Being who has it in his Power to do us Good or Hurt, as we regard or slight his Will. The Will of *such a Being* constitutes an *Obligation* upon us to obey it, *i. e.* in acting according to the *Differences in the Nature of Things*. And who will question it? But then it may be said on the other Hand, that as it is not a mere *Difference* of Actions, or Difference at large, that is pretended to be the Ground of Morality, but a particular Difference; *viz.* (as the Generality will say) the Tendency of some to Good, Happiness; of others to Evil, Misery; this is as real a Ground of Obligation, as any superior Will can be: and indeed, exactly in the *same Manner*. Happiness and Misery are what they are, and the same to those that have them, whether they are the natural or the positive and artificial Consequences of Action: And if, or when, so, will equally oblige.

In what immediately follows he appears to run into a double Inconsistency.

*On these three Principles then, namely, the moral Sense—the essential Difference in human Actions—and the Will of God, is built the whole Edifice of practical Morality: Each of which Principles hath it's distinct Motive to enforce it.*

—When he had said before, that the *moral Difference* or the *Morality* of Actions is an *Obligation* or *Injunction* to perform some and to avoid others, it cannot be very consistent to say, that *Morality* is built upon these three Principles,  
*moral*

*moral Sense—the essential Difference—and the Will of God*: Since, according to him, there is no *Morality* in acting according to either *moral Sense* or *Reason*: It consists wholly and only in acting according to the *Will of a Superior*. This alone can constitute a *moral Difference*; this alone can make an *Obligation*.

Neither is it more consistent to say of each of these Principles, that it hath *it's distinct Motive to inforce it*. *Obligation* appears to be nothing else but a *Motive to inforce Compliance*. If each of these Principles has a distinct Motive to inforce Compliance, do they not each of them *oblige*? That is, according to the Strength of their respective Motives, whatever that is? But the Dispute here is about *Obligation* itself, and not about the different Force of Obligations. *Compliance with the moral Sense is attended with a grateful Sensation*: Will not that *oblige*?—*With the essential Difference, which is promoting the Order and Harmony* (add, Happiness; for so he might and should have done) *of the Universe*: Surely, this will *oblige* too. And *Compliance with the Will of God* obliges no otherwise, than as we obtain thereby *Reward* and avoid *Punishment*. For separate these intirely, suppose them quite away, and there is no Strength in the *Will* of any Superior to *inforce Obedience* to it.

Nor, lastly, can I see the Consistency, with what went before, of his Answer to an Objection, which follows here, *viz. That the true Principle of Morality should have the worthiest Motive*



*Motive to inforce it : Whereas the Will of God, which he makes that Principle, is inforced by the View of Rewards and Punishments : On which Motive Virtue hath the smallest Merit.* There seems to be something not a little surprising in the Answer given to this Objection. He, first of all, allows it to be right, that the *genuine Principle of Morality must have the worthiest Motive to inforce it* : But then, in the next Place, asserts, that this is true of his *Principle* ; and gives this Reason for it : For *the legitimate Motive to Virtue on that Principle is Compliance with the Will of God : Which, says he, has the highest Degree of Merit.* His Principle of Virtue is the *Will of God* : What inforces this Will, or Obedience to this Will ? The Objection says, *Rewards and Punishments.* He himself had immediately before given this Account of this *third Principle* : *The third, which resolves itself into the Will of God AND TAKES IN all the Consequences of Obedience and Disobedience is principally adapted to the common Run of Men.* And the Objection immediately follows, grounded directly upon this Description of his own Principle. Nothing can be plainer, than that even according to himself, *Rewards and Punishments* are what inforce this third Principle of Virtue, the *Will of God.* Yet, what inforces it now ? Why, *Compliance with the Will of God.* What is this but to say, that Compliance with the Will of God inforces, or is a Motive to, Compliance with the Will of God ? If he would have a peculiar Emphasis laid upon the Word,  
 God :

*God*: He should at least have expressed himself in such a Manner, as might have led us to it: Which might easily have been done. Had he said, Compliance with the Will of *such a Being as God*,—he had been easily understood; and had in some Measure avoided the Charge of Inconsistency: Yet, I am afraid, not altogether. For if the Word, *God*, be explained, he must mean, either a *perfectly moral Being*, or an *infinitely powerful one*. If the latter only; then the Reason of, or Motive to Compliance with such a one's *Will*, can be only the Object of mercenary Hope or servile Fear. If the former; it is impossible to form any Notion of a *morally perfect Being*, if what he has said before be true, that Obedience to the Will of a Superior is the *Morality* of Actions: That it is such a *Will*, and that only, that makes a *moral Difference*. And to take in both will only add to the Perplexity and Absurdity.

He goes on; *But this, viz. Compliance with the Will of God, not being found of Force sufficient to take in the Generality, the Consequences of Compliance or Non-compliance to this Will, so far as relates to Rewards and Punishments, were first drawn out to the People's View*. Here a great many Doubts offer themselves.—When was the Time that a Trial was made of the Efficacy of that Principle of *Compliance with the Will of God*, merely? If a Trial never was made, then the insufficient Force of it could never be found. And then such Experience could never be the Occasion or Reason, for drawing

*out the Consequences of Compliance or Non-compliance to the People's View.* Neither have we any Account *when* this was done, or by *whom*. On the contrary, it is certain, that in all Ages and Countries, and among all People, when and where and among whom Morality was practised, as being agreeable to the *Will of God*, it was so with a View to what he could and would do—for them, if they obeyed him—against them, if they did otherwise. And as for the *Similitude*, which follows, to illustrate this last Observation, the principal Part of Likeness seems quite to have been mistaken. For the *Mathematician's* teaching his Pupil the *Utility of a Theorem*, in order to induce him to ingage in the Demonstration of it, has nothing to answer to it in the Case here mentioned. But if it be altered and put thus, that a Paper of Plumbs is the Engagement one Way, and a Ferula the other, it will exactly correspond.

And from what has been said, I believe, it will appear, that, as to the Complaint which follows here against those, who in their Discourses upon *Morality* have, as he is pleased to express it, *sacrilegiously untwisted this threefold Cord, and each run away with the Part he esteemed the strongest*, many will think that he himself has given as much Occasion for making it as any Body else. For though he mentions indeed three Principles of Morality, *viz.* the moral Sense, the Reason of Things, and the Will of God; he plainly gives up the two first, and sticks



sticks only to the last : Which he says can alone constitute *Obligation* and *moral Difference*.

But, as he endeavours to shew distinctly the Extravagance and Absurdity of each of these *Untwisters*, it might not be amiss to follow him, and observe in what Manner he represents their Notions. I shall omit however intirely the first Sort, and only just touch upon what is said to the other two.

To them of the second Class, who found Morality in the *essential Differences of Things and their natural Fitness or Unfitness to certain Ends*, he says, p. 39. *Then, i. e.* according to the Opinion of these Men, *Morality is solely founded on these Differences*.—Which is, not a Consequence, but their Opinion itself; yet it is here mentioned as a Consequence, and no very good one neither. In what follows, there is a Consequence; and, though he has expressed it not very handsomly, let it but be clothed in somewhat decenter Language, and no Body will need to be startled at it.—*And God and his Will have nothing to do in the Matter*. This is but a vulgar, rude Manner of Expression, and somewhat shocking as here applied. Therefore change the Language, and say, “ Since Morals  
“ are founded in the Nature of Things, just as  
“ Metaphysics and Mathematics are, the mere  
“ *Will* of any Being whatever has no more  
“ any Concern with them, than with metaphy-  
“ sical or mathematical Truth;” and few People will reckon this any hard Consequence.

And

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And the next Consequence may be admitted, both in itself and in the Language in which it is represented: *viz. Then the Will of God cannot make any Thing morally Good and Evil, Just and Unjust* (only it should have been expressed disjunctively, good *or* Evil, just *or* unjust).—This, it must be owned, is a necessary Consequence; and it must be as hard to find the Absurdity of it; any more or any otherwise, than if it should be said, that the Will of God cannot make a true or a false Proposition in speculative Truth, Metaphysics or Mathematics.

But then the next Consequence is none at all—*nor consequently can the Will of God be the Cause of any Obligation on moral Agents.*—This does not follow from their Opinion, who think Morality is founded in the Nature of Things: And I think, he cannot but know that they distinguish between a *natural*, or *moral*, Obligation, and a *positive* one; and they say, that though the *Will* of no Being whatever can make or cause the former, the Will of such a Being as God may make the latter, and is indeed the only Cause of it, where no other Reason (as may happen in many Cases) can be discerned and assigned by Men, or other reasonable finite Beings. Not that there is not a Reason in the Nature of Things for whatever *God wills*; but this Reason may be absolutely in the Dark to every finite Being whatever. Yet, though it be in the Dark, the Command of such a Being as God will oblige to Obedience; if revealed in a satisfactory Manner.

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As for Mr. Warburton's Reason with which he makes his Adversaries support this Consequence, which they do not hold, it is a very insufficient one, and the latter Part of it is expressed invidiously. *Because the Essences and Natures of Things, which constitute Actions Good and Evil* (surely, not simply Good and Evil, but *naturally or morally* Good and Evil) *are independent of the Will of God; which is FORCED to submit to their Relations, like weak Man's.* This Reason does not prove the Consequence, viz. *That the Will of God cannot be the Cause of ANY Obligation whatsoever* (though a positive one) *on moral Agents*; it only proves that the Will of God cannot be the Cause of a *moral* Obligation: But there are *positive* Obligations, as well as moral or natural ones: The Consequence takes in both; but the Reason reaches only to one: Therefore is plainly insufficient. And what an Expression is that?—*Which is FORCED to submit to the Relations of Things, like weak Man's.* To submit to these Relations is no Sign of *Weakness*. On the contrary, it is owing to the absolute Perfection of the moral or intellectual Nature of God, that he always and perfectly wills and acts according to these Relations. And just so far as Men and other finite intelligent Beings discern, and in their Wills and Actions conform to the same Relations, in the very same Degree they are sound, healthful and strong; and in what Degree soever they deviate from them, distempered, weak, imperfect.



But to go on with his Consequences.

The next is so darkly and ambiguously expressed, that one knows not easily what it is: But so far as it is intelligible, it seems to be little different from what has been said before.

*And therefore if there was no natural Justice, that is, if the rational and intellectual Nature was of itself undetermined and unobliged to any Thing, and so destitute of Morality, it was not possible, that any Thing should be made morally Good or Evil, obligatory or unlawful, or that any moral Obligation should be begotten by any Will or positive Command whatsoever.* First of all; this Explication of *natural Justice* is very dark: *It is the rational and intellectual Nature's being, of itself, determined and obliged to something.*—

What is this *rational and intellectual Nature*? Is it the Nature of God, or intellectual Nature at large? And, what is meant by being determined and obliged *of itself*? Can intelligent Nature be determined and obliged *by itself*? Or, is it determined and obliged only by the Truth and Reality of Things? And, if intelligent Nature does not determine and oblige *itself*, must it therefore be *destitute of Morality*? Why, do not the Moralists, whom he is here pressing with his Consequences, constantly say, that the *Morality* of all intelligent Beings, consists in their being determined by, and acting agreeably to, the Nature and Truth of Things? Not in their being *determined and obliged* by, or of, themselves to any Thing. Well; but supposing they had said it (which they do not) what fol-

lows? Why then, *it is not possible that any Thing should be made morally Good or Evil, obligatory or unlawful (morally so), or that any moral Obligation should be begotten by any Will or positive Command whatsoever.* Nor any Harm do I see in such a Consequence as this. It is no more than what was before mentioned, and it has been already considered: Only let me just add farther, that it is in itself an immediate plain Absurdity, to say that *positive Will or Command* can be the Cause of any more than a *positive Obligation*. But a *positive Obligation* is essentially different from a *natural or moral* one. And it is a *natural or moral Obligation* only that is now considered.

The last Consequence is; *and then our Knowledge of moral Good and Evil is solely acquired by abstract Reasoning; and to talk of their coming any other Way into the Mind is weak and superstitious, as making God act unnecessarily and superfluously.* Some foolish Freethinkers may have expressed themselves to this Purpose. However he cannot but know, it is no genuine Consequence from the Notion, that Morality is founded in the Nature of Things, just as Metaphysics and Mathematics are. Yet as to these, it is generally known and allowed, that positive Information, Instruction, is necessary enough to lead Men into the Knowledge of them. And may not positive Instruction then, whether ordinary or extraordinary, be as serviceable in the other Case? And more necessary, as the Matter is of greater Importance.

But it must be owned, that, however severe Mr. Warburton is in loading the *Rationalists* with bad Consequences, he is to the full as severe upon his own Party: I mean, those who found Morality in the *Will of a Superior*; yet, as it should seem, without any the least Suspicion, that he is condemning himself at the same Time.

*A third*, says he, p. 40. *who proposes to place Morality on it's TRUE Bottom, the Will of a Superior, acts yet on the same exterminating Model. He takes the other two Principles to be merely visionary.*—If the TRUE Bottom of Morality be, as he himself thinks it is, the *Will of a Superior*; the other two Principles may not seem to have any Relation to it; and every one that is really of that Sentiment must *act upon* (as he phrases it) *the exterminating Model: i. e.* he must reject the other two; at least the latter of them, and absolutely so. As for the *moral Sense* indeed, it is not necessary, that either he or the Rationalist should be quite against it: Because there is no Inconsistency in allowing such a Sense, and yet founding Morality either in *Will*, or the *Nature of Things*. Therefore if any *Religionist* goes so far, as, in order to support his own Scheme of Morals, to deny and explode the *moral Sense*, he plainly runs too far, and takes Pains to no Purpose. Because Morality may be founded in the *Will of God*, and yet the *moral Sense* may be, (over and above the *Faculty of Reason*,) a particular and special Means both of Discernment of, and Compliance with it. Therefore,



passing over what he makes the *Religionist* to say with Reference to *this Principle* (where he will seem to many to have indulged himself in a *Stile* that comes too near a *Rant*); let us see what he says to the *Rationalist*. Here, it must be owned, there is a real Opposition and Inconsistency. If Morality is founded in the *Nature of Things*, then not in *Will*: And if in *Will*, then not in the *Nature of Things*. And surely, here he makes the *Religionist* run beyond all Manner of Bounds.

*He not only denies*, says Mr. Warburton, *all moral Difference in Actions, antecedent to the Will of God, which* (as we shall shew anon) *he might very well do; but likewise all specific Difference.*—— As for the *moral Difference* of Actions, in themselves considered, the *Religionist* must needs deny it, consistently with his own Principle. But as for a *specific Difference*, or a Difference in any other Respect, surely no Man in his Wits can possibly question it. For what would this be but to say, that Love and Hatred are the same Temper; a kind and a malicious Action, the very same Action; and that it is a foreign *Will* only that can make any Difference between them, or make them not to be the same? Most certainly, a Man that has wrought up himself to assert and believe such an Absurdity as this, is not to be argued with, or indeed treated any otherwise than as a Lunatick. And nothing that such a one can say after this, needs to be at all the Subject of Wonder: Therefore it cannot be in the least surprising, that he should affirm,  
that

that the Notions of fit and unfit proceed, not from this Difference, but from the arbitrary Impositions of Will only.—For this is no more than saying the same Thing in other Words that had been said before; viz. that there is no Difference at all between relieving a poor Man and oppressing him. But in what follows, the Assertion is extended to *other Sorts* of Truth: And indeed, it is no more than a just Consequence, if it be extended so as to take in even *all* Sorts of Truth. And so it will follow, that the Truth of the divine Existence itself depends upon *Will*, in the very same Manner as the Truth of the Equality of 2 and 2 to 4 does.—But this is all pure Exaggeration; and, whatever some crazy People have done (and there are Madmen of all Parties) the *Religionist* sure is not under a Necessity of denying a *specific* Difference of Actions, merely because he denies the *moral* Difference, separate from *Will*: As is evident from even Mr. Warburton's own Example; who, though a true *Religionist*, denying all *moral* Difference of Actions separate from *Will*, yet cannot deny a *specific* Difference, or that 2 and 2 are equal to 4. Possibly indeed, this may, in the long run, be a necessary Consequence of his Notion concerning *Morality*; but he does not however at present see it; nay, he denies it. And yet, such is the plain direct Tendency of his own Notion, that he is often betrayed, unawares, into such a Manner of expressing himself as would equally hint, that *Will* is as much

the Principle of Truth as of Morality This he does in the very next Sentence.

Thus have Men, says he, *born away by a Fondness to their own fanciful Systems, presumptuously broken in upon that triple Barrier with which God has been GRACIOUSLY PLEASED to cover and secure Virtue.*—Is not this, plainly, to subject the *specific* as well as the *moral* Difference of Actions to the *Pleasure*, i. e. to the *Will* of God; and so to run into that very Extreme, which he had just before been reproving some *Religionists* for? If it be GRACIOUS PLEASURE that has formed this *triple Barrier*, the whole is depending upon *Pleasure*: Consequently the *specific* Difference of Actions, which is one *Barrier*, is dependent upon *Pleasure*: And if this, why not all Truth whatsoever?

At the End of the same Paragraph we have another Instance to the same Purpose. Taking Notice that of late Years a *Deluge* of moral Systems, in which either the moral Sense or the essential Difference makes the sole Foundation, have overrun the learned World, he resembles this *Deluge of moral Systems*, to *Aristophanes's Chorus of Clouds*, and adds, that the Αἰνάοι Νεφέλαι, the ETERNAL RELATIONS, are introduced into the Scene, with a gaudy Outside, to supplant Jupiter; and to teach the Arts of Fraud and Sophistry; but soon betray themselves to be empty, obscure, noisy, impious Nothings. Here is certainly a great deal of false Imagery, and wrong Insinuation. If the eternal Relations and essential Differences of Things are nothing, independent



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dent of *Will* and *Pleasure*, then *Truth* itself is dependent upon *Pleasure*; and the Author himself as really denies the *specific* Difference of Actions, as any of those Zealots of his own Party can do, whom he had just before found Fault with.

Hence he proceeds to a direct Answer to Bayle's Argument; which he reckons, after this Preparation, will be easily and clearly refuted.

And he asserts \*, 1<sup>st</sup>, That an *Atheist* cannot know the *Morality* of Actions, properly so called. And, 2<sup>dly</sup>, That though he may have the *moral Sense*, and know the *essential Differences* of Actions, yet that these in *Conjunction* are quite insufficient to influence Society to the Practice of Virtue.

Upon which Positions I would briefly remark, before I come to his Enlargement upon the *first* of them, (which is the only one I have properly to do with in these Reflections;) that the *first* is certainly true upon his Notion of *Morality*. For if the *Morality* of Actions be their Conformity to the *Will* of God, those who do not acknowledge a God, can know nothing of his *Will*; and, consequently, can know nothing of *Morality*, in this Sense of the Word. As to the *Second*, it may be either true or false, (partially so) according as the Differences of human Actions are understood. If these essential Differences of Actions be their *Tendencies* to promote the Order, Harmony and Happiness of the World, on one hand; and on the other, Con-

fusion, Discord and Misery ; if the *Atheist* can have any Knowledge, any proper Apprehension of these *Tendencies*, why may not such Knowledge influence to the Practice of Virtue, and Detestation of Vice ? And here it may be observed too farther ; that though Mr. *Warburton* often speaks of the *specific* Differences of Actions, their *essential* Difference, and the like ; he never, or hardly ever mentions the *particular* Difference, upon which those who are for founding *Morality* in the *Differences of Actions or Things*, ground the Distinction of Virtue and Vice ; but satisfies himself *too much* with talking in the general, of *essential* and *specific* Differences. Whereas he may, and, I think, cannot but, know, that many of these Moralists (all, I reckon, in Reality) do make this Difference to be the *different Tendencies* of different Actions to create and promote Happiness or Misery.

Now, whoever can have a Notion of *Happiness* and *Misery*, and of *human Action*, and of the different *Tendencies* of two opposite Actions to produce Happiness or Misery ; every such Man may, according to the Sentiments of these Moralists, have a Notion of *Morality* ; and such a one too as may, and will ordinarily, have some Influence upon Practice.

But the great Difficulty here is, to conceive how any Man, that is really an *Atheist*, can have any proper Notion of *Action* ; which, in it's own Nature, supposes and implies *Freedom*. But how an *Atheist* can conceive *Freedom* to be any where ; indeed, how he can come by the  
Idea

Idea of it, I do not know. If he cannot, what Notion can he have of *Actions*, or the *Differences* of *Actions*? Surely, to a real *Atheist*, all Things universally must appear only under the dismal unvaried Gloom of rigid Fate and Necessity. And this, again, must be sufficiently inconsistent both with the Welfare of Society, and with every Notion of Morality whatsoever.

But to return to the first Position.

Mr. Warburton says, he will make it good against Bayle's Arguments to prove that the Morality of human Actions may be demonstrated on the Principles of a Stratonicean.

Bayle says, a Stratonicean may have a Notion of the *specific* Differences of Things; of the Difference of *Truth* and *Falshood*, *Gratitude* and *Ingratitude*; in the same Manner as he knows the Difference between *Fire* and *Water*. This Mr. Warburton grants; and he grants too, what Bayle asserts in the next Place, that as there are these *specific* Differences of Things, which the Stratonicean may have a Notion of as well as other Men, so likewise that there are *Rules* of Reasoning concerning these *specific* Differences, which are certain and independent of human Will, and which a Stratonicean may use and be concluded by, in the same Manner as others are. But then, Bayle advances farther, and says, that if there are certain and immutable Rules for the Operation of the Understanding, there are also such for the Determinations of the Will. This Mr. Warburton denies absolutely; without appearing to have any Apprehension of



of the Obscurity of the Expression, or attempting at all to fix the Meaning of it. But the Meaning seems to be this; “ that as there are  
 “ certain Rules in Nature for the Direction of  
 “ the *Understanding* with Respect to *Truth*; so  
 “ there are certain Rules according to which  
 “ the *Will* may be influenced with Respect to  
 “ *Action*; and that, as the former may direct  
 “ the *Understanding* of a *Stratonicean*, the other  
 “ may influence his *Will*; in the same Manner  
 “ as the Understanding and Will of any other  
 “ Man may be directed and influenced.” Then  
*Bayle* instances the most general of these Rules,  
 respecting Action; viz. “ That Men ought to  
 “ will what is most agreeable to right Reason :”  
 And supports it in this Manner. “ For there  
 “ is no Truth, says he, more evident than this,  
 “ that it is fit a reasonable Creature (*Being*)  
 “ should conform to right Reason, and unfit  
 “ that such a Creature (*Being*) should recede  
 “ from it.” The Sense of which I take to be  
 this; that there is as real a Congruity or Agree-  
 ment between a reasonable Being’s willing and  
 acting according to right Reason, as there is be-  
 tween the Subject and Predicate of any specula-  
 tive true Proposition whatsoever; and that as a  
*Stratonicean* may, confessedly, see the latter A-  
 greement, it must be owned he is equally ca-  
 pable of seeing the former. Consequently, here  
 is a general Rule for the Determination of a  
*Stratonicean’s Will*.

To this it is replied, 1st, *That the Rule is quite  
 obscure with Regard to a Stratonicean.*—And,  
 2dly,

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2dly, (which is indeed to the Purpose, and beyond it) *That was it as clear to him as to the Theist, it could neither serve him, nor ANY ONE else, in the Discovery of Morality.* As to the first, it may be owned, the Rule is *obscure* enough; whether to a *Stratonicean*, or any one else; merely because it is too indeterminate, and does not say, what is the *moral Reason* of Action. With Respect to this, Men are divided in their Sentiments; at least in their Manner of expressing themselves. Some say, it is the Agreeableness of an Action to *moral Sense*; some, to the *Fitness of Things*; others, to the *Will of God*: Yet *all* will unite in this Sentiment, that, in general, it is acting agreeably to *right Reason*; i. e. it is acting when there is a *good Reason* for Action: But when they proceed to give this *Reason*, then they talk differently; one assigns one Thing; another another.—Now the great Question, or the only Question here is; whether in looking into, and examining all the Properties of what are called *moral Actions*, some general one, in which they all agree, may not be assigned, which a *Stratonic Fatalist*, or any *Fatalist* at all, may see, acknowledge, and (if it be not a Contradiction; as it surely is) be influenced to Action by.

Mr. *Warburton*, to be sure, cannot, upon his Principles, allow of any such Thing; no, nor so much as that there is a *moral Property* inherent in any Actions at all. He must say, that there is no such Thing as a *naturally moral* or *immoral Action*; that with Regard to this  
same



same Quality, called *Morality*, they are all naturally destitute of it: Since it is an extrinsic Quality, superinduced by the *Will* of God.

*Bayle* therefore, was he living, could possibly have no Dispute with our Author about his *Fatalist*, nor in the least endeavour to convince him, that such a one might know the *Morality* of Actions, and in such a Manner as to be influenced in Practice. They must be other Sort of People he had in his Eye; and, particularly, those who say, that the *Morality* of Actions is a real inherent Quality of them.

But let us return, and attend to what Mr. *Warburton* says, to support his *first Assertion*.

He says, *The Rule is obscure*: But must not every one be sensible of a much greater Obscurity in what he says upon this Head, than in the *Rule*, the Obscurity of which he complains of?

In Support of his Assertion, that a *Stratonicean* cannot know what is agreeable or disagreeable to right Reason in the Determinations of the Will, though he may in the Operations of the Understanding, he says;

“ That in the Determinations of the Will,  
 “ the specific Differences of Things, and their  
 “ Relations, not only as they are in themselves,  
 “ but as they refer to the Determiner, are to  
 “ be taken in and considered. And this latter  
 “ Set of Relations are in common Life so op-  
 “ posite generally, and contradictory to the for-  
 “ mer, that this Rule of acting conformably to  
 “ right Reason, would be a very uncertain, if  
 “ not



“ not an useless Direction to him. For what  
“ would be according to right Reason in any  
“ Action, were there only the essential Difference of Things themselves, and their Relations amongst one another, to be considered,  
“ may not be according to right Reason, on  
“ the Principles of a *Stratonicean*, when their  
“ Relations to the Considerer are taken in:  
“ And to reconcile these Contrarieties, there is  
“ need of another Principle, from whence may  
“ be deduced a Coincidence and Concomitancy, intentionally produced, between these  
“ jarring Relations; in order to determine  
“ steadily the Acts of the Will: Which Coincidence (*why not Concomitancy too?*) he  
“ who regards himself as the Effect of a fatal  
“ unintelligent Nature, is forced to deny \*.”

Here is the Argument at full Length. I was unwilling to abridge it, for fear of being thought to contribute any Thing to it's Obscurity. What others may think of it, I cannot say; but, for my own Part, I must needs own, I have seldom met with any Thing darker and more enigmatical. I shall do what I can to open the Sense of it; and if I fall short, I may hope for an Excuse.

Mr. *Warburton* distinguishes between the Relations of Things; viz. between those to and among one another, and those which respect the Determiner; and says, that in the *Operations of the Understanding*, the former only are considered; but in the Determinations of the *Will*, the

*latter are to be taken in, and considered. Taking in, and considering, are Operations of the Understanding; and if these latter Relations are to be taken in, and considered, it must be done by the Understanding: And I add, that (if I guess what is meant by them) they are as really and as much to be considered by one that will know the Nature and Reason of Things, as any other; since these Relations are as real as the other; nay, of the very same Nature with the other. For surely, the Determiner here is as real a Thing or Being as any other; and, in considering the Relations of Beings and Things to one another, the Relations of them to the Determiner (where there are any) are as much the Objects of the Understanding, and as much to be considered, in order to form a right Notion of them, as any other.*

But, indeed, it is not uncommon to distinguish in some such Manner, as is here done; because we often consider Things, their Natures, Properties, Relations, without any Respect to ourselves. Thus it is in investigating speculative, metaphysical, or mathematical Truth. But then, there is other Truth; which cannot be considered, without a Respect to ourselves: Such is *moral* Truth. In investigating this Sort of Truth, the Relations of Things to ourselves and Fellow-Creatures are necessarily to be considered. These Relations are as much the Objects of the Intellect, as any others. And since a *Fatalist* is allowed to have the same Understanding as other Men; if it be but allowed he has a  
*Will*

*Will* too, capable of being wrought upon, influenced and determined, as the *Wills* of other Men, (which ought not to be allowed;) why, then if these Relations are of such a Kind, as to reach and affect the *Wills* of other Men, they may do the same in the Instance of the *Fatalist*.

Mr. *Warburton* appears to be greatly mistaken, when he supposes an *Action* may be according to right Reason, though the *Essential Difference of Things*, and their Relations to one another only are considered; *i. e.* exclusive of their Relations to the Agent. Right Reason, in *Ethics*, takes in the whole, and the latter Relations particularly; and an Action agreeable to Right Reason, is an Action proceeding from the Consideration of the latter Relations principally. Of these latter Relations, he says, they are in common Life so opposite generally and contradictory to the former (to the Relations of Things as they are in themselves, rather as they are to one another) that the Rule of acting conformably to right Reason, would be a very uncertain, if not an useless Direction to him—the *Stratonicean*.

Though the whole of what he says concerning these Relations be exceeding obscure (as every one will be sensible that reads him with Attention;) yet, upon farther Consideration, and particularly attending to the last cited passage, and the Reason which he gives immediately to support his Assertion in it, I suspect some Mistake of his Sense in what I have said above; and that his Meaning, after all, and in plain Words, is this; (if it be not this, I must



own myself utterly incapable of saying what it is;) "That though Virtue, or acting agreeably to right Reason, be in the general good and beneficial to Mankind, yet that the Practice of it may be, in many Cases, not for the Interest of, on the contrary, that it may be prejudicial to, Particulars." This is what I suspect, after all, he means in saying, the *latter Relations are opposite and contradictory to the former*: (Though, by the Way, he expresses himself, sure, much too violently, when he says, that this Opposition and Contrariety is *general*, i. e. takes in the greatest Number of particular Cases, and reaches even to *common Life*; of which more afterwards.) The Reason given to support this Assertion is as follows. *For what would be according to right Reason in any Action were there only the essential Difference of Things—and their Relations among one another to be considered, may not be according to right Reason, on the Principles of a Stratonicean, when their Relations to the Considerer are taken in.—* That is; "Allowing the Rule of acting according to right Reason to be in itself and in the general a good Rule, yet in a thousand Cases such Action may be wrong for Individuals; and, in such Cases, acting according to the general Rule, must appear to the Agents contrary to right Reason." Then he adds; *And to reconcile these Contrarieties, there is need of another Principle, from whence may be deduced a Coincidence and Concomitancy, intentionally produced, between these jarring Relations, in order to*

*determine steadily the Acts of the Will.*—What those Words, *Coincidence* and *Concomitancy* here signify, I suspect, no Body knows; or how there can be a *Concomitancy* BETWEEN two Things; and much less will any one be able to conceive, how any Principle can induce a *Coincidence* and *Concomitancy* between *jarring and contrary Relations*.—The Meaning, in gross, seems to be; “That since Virtue, though in  
“ the general good for Mankind, will very often be prejudicial to Particulars, such Particulars, in order to be determined to, and supported in, the Practice of Virtue, will want  
“ some farther Principle, or Consideration, than what arises from merely attending to the Nature of Virtue.”

But then, on the other hand, it may, and it ought to be observed, that as these Exceptions to the Practice of Virtue are only particular, Mr. Warburton's Reasoning here, by no Means reaches the general Practice of it. And though he expresses himself indeed, as if the *Relations of Things to the Considerer* were, even in common Life, and generally, *opposite and contradictory* to the other *Relations of Things* among themselves; yet, I believe, this will be looked upon as too violent a Manner of Representation; and no Man will allow it, who calmly and justly considers, that Virtue is undoubtedly the Means of securing the Peace of the World, and carrying up the Happiness of Men, and all other reasonable Beings, to what Height it is capable of. Were all Men virtuous, Mankind would

then experimentally know their best Estate. Therefore all the possible Discouragements of Virtue must arise from the Neglect of it somewhere or other. And though it is true, in Fact, that such Neglect is become too general, and, in the same Proportion, Difficulties and Discouragements are thrown in the Way of Virtue; yet there are such and so many Considerations to be taken even from the Nature of Things, as may satisfy any reasonable, thinking Man, that Virtue is still his best Interest, and support him in the Practice of it, notwithstanding those Difficulties and Discouragements.

It is allowed, that *Compliance with the moral Sense is attended with grateful Sensation*. This *Sensation*, it may be allowed, is not *less*, but rather *more grateful*, the greater the Discouragements are, with which Virtue is attended in any particular Case.—It is allowed too, that Compliance with the *Essential Differences* of Things, is *promoting the Order and Harmony of the Universe*. If these are not other Words for *Peace and Happiness*, yet, certainly, Peace and Happiness must be the Consequence of Order and Harmony. And he that contributes hereto by his own virtuous Temper and Behaviour, must, cannot but, ordinarily, partake of those good Effects; and always, and necessarily, must have a pleasing Consciousness, that he is doing what, universally practised, would most surely make him and every one else secure and happy.—Then farther; any one may know, that as all the chief Miseries of Life arise from Men's foolish



foolish and vicious Behaviour, should *all* Men be equally foolish and vicious, the Miseries of Life would be raised in an equal Degree; that is, there would be universal Misery; and the Degree of this Misery would be exactly as the Degree of Men's Wickedness. The plain Consequence of which is, that if no one should make a *Stand*, and practise Virtue, though under great Discouragements, the Misery of *all* would be greater than that of a virtuous Man labouring under such Discouragements.—And farther: any one may see, that *Happiness* is a quite separate Thing from external Acquirements; such as Power, Riches, Honours, or even mere sensible Gratifications: Because these may be supposed in any Measure, consistently with any Degree of Misery, in a vile, turbulent, ill-balanced Mind. But as no Body, in any Case, gets any Thing else by Wickedness, but such Externals, these are the only Things that can be lost by the Practice of Virtue in the extremest Cases. Or however; the worst that can be said is, that Life itself may be sometimes lost in the Pursuit of Virtue. And may it not be truly said, (as it may be very justly thought) that there are many supposable Cases, where Life itself is not worth having? And if it is not worth having, *e. g.* on Condition of being all the while upon the Rack with the Gout or Stone,—what must it be, how much more vile, upon Supposition of an inwardly tormenting, vexatious State of Mind? Such a one particularly

ticularly as *Tiberius* \* (in *Suetonius*) describes to be his own.

These and such like Reflections deserve to be attended to more than they commonly are; and may be capable of supporting a Man greatly, even in the most extraordinary Cases, in the Practice of Virtue.

But to return from this seeming Digression.

In what follows here under this *first* Position, there is, I think, no better Reasoning than in what went before; and I have pursued him thus far, merely on Account of his wrong Notion of *moral Difference*.

But, as under the next Position, we shall have what is more directly in Defence of his own Notion of the *moral Difference* of Actions, I shall go directly to it.

2. But, Secondly, says he, admit the *Stratonic Atheist* might know what is agreeable to right Reason in the Acts of the Will; we then tell him, that he could not from thence establish the *moral Difference*. And here again he distinguishes between a *natural* and a *moral Difference* of Things; and says, the former will create a *Fitness in the Agent to act agreeably thereto*; but the latter, the *moral Difference*, creates, besides this *Fitness*, an *Obligation likewise*. And he

\* *Quid scribam vobis P. C? aut quomodo scribam? aut quid omnino non scribam hoc tempore? Dii me, Deique pejus perdant, quam quotidie perire sentio, si scio.* *Suetonius* giving us this Beginning of one of his Letters to the Senate, rightly observes how emphatical a Description it contains of the extreme Wretchedness of his Mind. *Postremo semet ipse pertasus, talis epistolæ principio, tantum non summam malorum suorum professus est.* *Tib. 11. Caf. c. 67.*

adds,

adds, *when therefore there is an Obligation in the Agent, there is a moral Difference in the Things, and so on the contrary.* (Is not that, "when there is no Obligation, there is no moral Difference?" But then what will be the Meaning of the Reason that follows? *For they are inseparable.* Perhaps he meant, and we are to read, *vice versâ*, or, *and so the other Way*; i. e. *where there is a moral Difference, there is an Obligation.*) *For they are inseparable* \*. *Inseparable* indeed! For in his Opinion, and according to his Manner of expressing himself every where, they are the very same. 'Till the *Will of a Superior* is discovered, there is no moral Difference in Things; i. e. there is no Obligation to act agreeably to the *natural* Differences of Things, or to right Reason judging of those Differences. But what can be meant, when it is said, *the natural Differences of Things will create a Fitness in the Agent to act agreeably thereto*, and yet create no Obligation? And that Obligation can be created only by the *moral* Difference? This certainly is a surprising Manner of using Language; and utterly indistinct and unintelligible.

Well; but he will prove, that *right Reason alone cannot properly oblige.* And his first Reason is †;

1. *That Obligation in general necessarily implies an Obliger: And the Obliger must be different from, and not one and the same with the Obliged.*—Under this Head he speaks of Oblig-

\* P. 46.

† P. 47.



gation *in general*, or all Sorts of Obligation, and plainly insinuates, there are several. And under the next Head he speaks of *moral Obligation*, i. e. of a *free Agent* (where, by the Way, we have a new Notion of *moral Obligation*, different from all that has gone before, and no less inconsistent.) This however appears to be a Distinction without any Difference; and the whole of even his own Enlargement under the *first Head* shews, that he is speaking of the Obligation of *moral Agents* only; not one Sentence of it being applicable to any other Sense of the Word: And besides, this is the only Sense of it, when used with any Propriety. For when applied to any other Beings, it merely denotes, *Necessity, Force*: And the other Obligation is distinguished from this, in the first Instant, by calling it *moral*. To proceed:

*Obligation implies an Obliger, i. e. a Being or Person who obliges. And this Being or Person who obliges, must be different from the Being or Person obliged. If it be said, right Reason will oblige; this is absurd: Because Reason is only an Attribute of the Person obliged; his Assistant to judge of his Obligations, if he have any, to any other Being. But, because Mr. Warburton knew, that this was not the Meaning of the Expression, right Reason, he therefore goes on and says; If by Reason is meant, not every Man's particular Reason, but Reason in general; we reply, that this Reason (Reason in this Sense) is a mere abstract Notion, which hath no real Subsistence; and how that which hath*

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*no real Subsistence should oblige, is still more incomprehensible.* By *Subsistence* cannot be meant Substance, Being, Person, because then he would oppose only his own Shadow. Those who say, *Reason*, or *right Reason*, will oblige a rational Being, mean by it, that there are in Nature *Reasons* for or against a Man's acting so or so: And add, that these *Reasons*, which are real in the Nature of Things, (though not actually observed and attended to by this or the other intelligent Being) do in the general oblige all intelligent Beings to a particular Method of Conduct. These *Reasons* are to be sought out and attended to by every such Being. And when they are actually seen and acknowledged by any Mind, that Mind is formally, actually and particularly *obliged* to such a Method of Conduct; and is (which is the most immediate and weightiest of all Obligations) self-condemned, if he does not comply with them. Now, is there not a real Meaning in all this? Or, are these *Reasons* nothing, because they are not *Persons*? Or, if they are all comprized under one general Term, *right Reason*, will that reduce them to nothing? Or, lastly; is an *abstract Notion* nothing? If I say, *Man is an Animal*, have I no Meaning? To say, a Triangle has such and such general Properties; that the Parts are equal to the whole; or, that it is impossible for a Thing to be and not be at the same Time: Is this to say nothing; because universal Triangles, Wholes, and Things no where *subsist*? If then the Phrase, *right Reason*, has a Meaning, a real one, why  
may

may not it be good Sense to say, *right Reason obliges*; or, an intelligent Being is obliged by right Reason? Mr. *Warburton* must needs say at last (if he will say any Thing) it is because right Reason is no Person, no Being, and no *Obliger*; but *Obligation implies an Obliger*; i. e. a Being or Person that obliges.

Let us inquire a little,

Suppose *Obligation* does imply an *Obliger*: And an *Obliger* must be a Being, a Substance, a Person; the Obligation does not arise from the mere Being, Substantiality or Personality of the Obliger: For then *all* Being, Substantiality, Personality will oblige equally. No; but it is the Being, Substance, Person of a *Superior*. Then it is not Being, Substance, Person that obliges; but the *Superiority* of a Being or Person. But this *Superiority* is no Being, Substance or Person, but merely a *Quality* or Property of the Being, who, by Virtue of it, obliges; and will at any Time lose his Power of obliging, by losing that *Quality*. Yet neither is mere *Superiority*, (which denotes only a *physical Power* of doing more Good or Hurt than the Being is capable of receiving from the other, to whom he is said to be *superior*) sufficient to create immediately an *Obligation*: Since a Being may be conceived as having such *Superiority*, i. e. such natural Power, without any *Inclination* either Way: i. e. to do either Good or Hurt. But without such *Inclination*, *Superiority* in Point of mere Power can have no Effect at all: Therefore cannot *oblige*. There is  
confe-



consequently more required in Order to constitute an *Obligation*: And that is, that this superior Being should, some Way or other, declare his Pleasure with Relation to the Conduct of his Inferior, and withal, his Resolution to exert his Power, according as he is or is not obeyed, to the Good or to the Hurt of such Inferior. Thus then we at last come to the *Obligation* of one Being to another. It is not founded in, nor does it arise from Being, Personality, or Superiority; nor from *Will*: But from the Prospect of Good or Mischief, as this Will of a superior Being is obeyed or counteracted. What is it then, in a Word, that constitutes and fixes the *Obligation*? Is it not the Hope of Good and dread of Mischief? For suppose these away, and the Shadow of an *Obligation* will not arise from all the rest.

Now this coincides exactly with their Notion of *moral Obligation*, who say, it is acting agreeably to *right Reason*. For *right Reason* will comprehend every *Motive* for Action; and even positive Rewards and Punishments, when once proposed and known, may and will be included among the rest. But he goes on, and says,

2. That *moral Obligation*—farther implies a Law—but a Law is the Imposition of an intelligent Superior, who hath Power to exact Conformity thereto. p. 48. What has been remarked under the last Head, and elsewhere, already, might be sufficient to obviate what is said here; yet it may not be amiss to take a cursory View  
of

of what he advances under this *second* Position. *Moral Obligation* does indeed imply a *Law*, taking that Word in a large Sense; nor yet larger than it is very often, and therefore properly enough, used in. But then the Word, *Law*, signifies much the same as *Obligation*, and the one is used indifferently for the other: And therefore, properly speaking, *Obligation* does not imply a *Law*, in any other Way, or Sense, than as any Thing may be said to imply itself. Which is really saying nothing.—But Mr. Warburton plainly takes the Word in the narrowest and strictest Sense; viz. for a *positive* Declaration of a Superior's Pleasure; and if he will say, that nothing can *oblige*, but such a *Declaration*, he manifestly gives up the *Law of Nature*, and confines all to *Revelation*. This, I doubt not, is more than he intends; and yet he too plainly says it, when he defines a *Law to be the IMPOSITION of an intelligent Superior*.—This seems plainly to reduce all Laws to merely positive, express Declarations; and consequently, to set aside the *Law of Nature*, by taking away all Distinction between *natural* and *positive* Laws. Which yet is a Distinction most real and just, and agreeable to the Sentiments and Language of all Writers. He owns, that we say indeed *the Law of Reason*, and *the Law of Necessity*; but adds, *that these are merely popular and figurative Expressions*. This is a very great Mistake. The *Law of Necessity* is just such a figurative Expression as the *Laws of Motion*, or the *Law of Gravitation*: But the *Law of Reason* is most exact

exact and proper, and the Word, *Law*, here expresses the *moral Obligatoriness* of Reason, or the moral Obligation of an intelligent Being to act according to Reason. And if he will find Fault with this Manner of Expression, he must overturn the whole System of moral Language.

But what is his own Explication of that figurative Expression, the *Law of Reason*? By this, says he, *we mean the Rule that the Law-giver LAYS DOWN for judging of his Will.* Now this Language is really no more intelligible than, nay it is the very same as, to say, that God has *made* the three Angles of a Triangle equal to two right ones; the Parts equal to the whole; or *made* it a Contradiction that a Thing should be and not be at the same Time: Whereas these are eternally necessary Truths; not the Object of Power, or subject to Will. Just so it is in the *Law of Reason*: Which is a Rule for Action no more *laid down* by any Being than *Truth* itself is, and is no more the Object of Power, or Subject to Will. It is as original, and as necessarily results from the Nature of Things, as the Equality of the Parts to the Whole. And as no Body says, the Parts are equal to the Whole, because God has made them so; so it is just as improper and unmeaning to say, that the *Law of Reason is a Rule laid down by God.* No; but as was just said, this Rule results immediately and necessarily from the Nature of Things; and, though it can with no Propriety or Meaning be said to be *made* or *laid down* by God, it is the Rule which he invariably



variably conforms his own Actions to from the immutable Rectitude of his Nature ; and from the same Rectitude as steadily wills that all his reasonable Creatures should conform theirs. A *Rule* therefore it is, and a *Law*, antecedently to the Consideration of the Being and Attributes and Relations of God ; just in the same Manner and Sense as any other Truth, whether metaphysical or mathematical, is Truth, without taking in the Consideration of the same Existence, Attributes and Relations. And when Mr. Warburton subjoins ; *But how any Thing except a Law, in the proper, philosophic Sense* (rather in his own Sense of the Word ; *the Imposition of an intelligent Superior* ; and this is, not the *philosophic*, but *forensic* Sense of it) *can oblige—is utterly inconceivable* ; he seems to betray a Suspicion of the Weakness of his own Argument under this Head : And indeed the whole Amount of what he says appears to be nothing. As to this *Inconceivableness*, I think I have shewn the contrary under the last Particular ; and believe I shall presently shew it in such a Light, as that *he himself* will see it.

Here he breaks off the Thread of his Argument, to shew, what has been done already, the *Occasion* of Bayle's Mistake. But what this can signify, till it is proved there was really an Error in the Argument, I do not see. And I apprehend he has not done this, nor any Thing like it ; and reckon what he says farther upon this Account is as little satisfactory as all the rest : *If it be not quite wrong* ; which yet it seems to be.

be. He says, Bayle too hastily concluded the *essential Differences of Things*, as they are the *adequate Objects of the Understanding*, to be the *adequate Objects of the Will* likewise. Because, though they are indeed the former, and therefore the *Understanding is necessitated in it's Perceptions*, and under the *sole Direction of these necessary Differences*, the *Will is not necessitated in it's Determinations*.—What follows? Therefore the *essential Differences of Things* are not an *adequate Object of the Will*; the *Law of a Superior must be taken in*.—It is not easy to fix the Meaning here, and every one, I think, must be sensible of an Obscurity in the Language.—He seems to say, that since the *Differences of Things* do not *necessitate the Will*, as they do the *Understanding*; therefore they are not the *adequate Objects of the Will*; and something else must be *taken in*.—For what? To make these *Differences adequate to the Will*, *i. e.* to *necessitate the Will*; as they do, of themselves, *necessitate the Understanding*? This *must*, I think, be the Meaning; if there is any. And is the *Will* then to be *forced*? What, in *Morals*? And, what is yet stranger; can there be no *Morality*, or no *moral Obligation*, without this *forcing*? How easily may it be replied with Truth; the only Guide of the *Will* is the *Understanding*; and that the *Will* should always be determined by the Judgment which the *Understanding* makes of the *Differences of Things*; and, lastly, that *this* only is the *Will* of a reasonable Being, rightly guided, directed and determined.

terminated. Surely, to talk of forcing or necessitating the *Will* is perfectly absurd; since it is plainly to take it away: And whenever a rational Being is thus forced or necessitated, he has properly no *Will*. If this *forcing* is universal, he has no *Will* at all: If it is partial, *i. e.* reaches only to some particular Instances, he is *so far, i. e.* in those Instances, *without Will*.

Well; but since the *Differences of Things* are not of themselves the *adequate Objects* of the *Will*, and so the *Will* is not *necessitated* by them, and something farther must needs be *taken in*, to make them *adequate to and necessitating* upon the *Will*; what is it that must be added for this Purpose? Why, the *Law of a Superior* must be *taken in*.—And will this do what is contended for? Then, this *Law of a Superior*, added to the *Differences of Things*, will—Do what? Make them the *adequate, i. e.* the *necessitating* Objects of the *Will*? This is indeed what he should say, but does not. Surely, the Conclusion is much too low: *The Law of a Superior must be taken in, to constitute Obligation in Choice, or Morality in Actions*. If this be all, it will be said, *the essential Differences* of Things might and should have done thus much, without including the *Law of a Superior* at all. And if any intelligent Being, whether finite or infinite, had attended to these Differences of Things, judged of them and been determined by them in Choice and Action, would there have been no *Obligation* to such Choice, no *Morality* in such Action? And must *Obligation* and *Morality* be



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be intirely owing to *positive Will*? To be sure, the exprefs *Law of a Superior* added to the *Differences of Things* will always add great, *very great*, Weight to them: But this is not the Way so much as to *increase*, much less to *constitute Morality* in Actions.

And here I am sorry to find Mr. *Warburton* going out of his Way, p. 49. to pay a transient Compliment to *Hobbs's* Sagacity, and for a Tenet of his, which has hitherto been generally esteemed the very Quintessence of his Errors. He saw, Morality was nothing in the Nature of Things; that it was merely owing to *Will, Command, Law*; meaning *positive Will, Command, Law*; and having found that there was *no God*, he fixed it in the Will and Command of the civil Magistrate. In *this* indeed he was wrong; but in the other, *viz.* that Will constituted *Obligation* and *Morality*, he was right and saw farther than other People, (according to Mr. *Warburton*.) Though it is too plain, that the *first* Error was too much the Occasion of the other.

However he does not dwell upon this; but goes on to something more material: Which is, to answer an *Objection* against his own Notion, and in Favour of the *Stratonicean*. It may be said, that, “ as there is an *allowed* Fitness and “ Unfitness in Actions discoverable by the essential Differences of Things; and as this Fitness and Unfitness implies Benefit and Damage to the Actor and others—this will be “ sufficient to *make Morality* in the *Stratonic* T “ World.”—

"World."—To this he replies; that in that *World* whatever advanced human Happiness would be only a natural Good, and Virtue as merely so as Food and Covering.—Natural, in Contradistinction to moral, or such a Good as one would be obliged to seek or promote.—

However strange a Manner of using Words here may seem to be, Virtue in the *Stratonic* World is only A natural Good, natural in Opposition to moral, or such A Good as one would be obliged to seek or promote; yet a Distinction is hinted here of natural and moral Good, which I could wish more generally obtained in *Ethical* Language, for the Sake of Clearness and avoiding ambiguous Words and Phrases. Natural Good is Good, (Benefit, Advantage, Happiness) coming and produced *naturally*, without any Agency of the Being that has it, and in the ordinary Course of Things: Moral Good is Good (Benefit, Advantage, Happiness,) produced by *moral* Means, *i. e.* by Free-Agency. And morally good Agency, and morally good Action will be such Agency and such Action, as tends to produce Good; *i. e.* Benefit, Advantage, Happiness.

If then in the *Stratonic* World there can be such Things as Agency and Action with any Propriety so called, Virtue in that World will be no more *natural* Good than in any other, but as essentially distinguished from it as in any other.

But Mr. Warburton's Fallacy seems to lye here. Virtue cannot be *moral* Good in the *Stratonic*

*tonic* World, because in that World there can be no Morality; the Reason of which is, because that World does not acknowledge a *superior* Being and Will. But, surely, this must be merely begging the Question, and not so much as the Shadow of an Answer to the Objection. If in the *Stratonic* World there may be a Notion of *Fitness* and *Unfitness* in *Actions*, and such *Fitness* and *Unfitness* implies *Benefit* and *Damage* to the Actors (neither of which he denies; though he should have denied one at least, if not both); the Inference is, the Apprehension of this *Fitness* and *Unfitness*, implying *Benefit* and *Damage*, will be an *Obligation* to act in such and such a Manner; meaning by it (nothing else can be meant) that this will be a *Motive*, which in Reason should have some Influence to such and such Action.—Now does Mr. Warburton deny this? No; but he says, Virtue thus influenced is only *natural Good*, as merely so as *Food* and *Covering*.—Besides the Absurdity of this in itself; what is such an Answer to the Purpose? It is said; that in the *Stratonic* World, the Prospect of *Benefit* and *Damage* will sway Free-Agents (if such there are or can be) to a particular Behaviour: The Answer is; Behaviour so influenced will be only *natural Good*. This is plainly no Answer at all to the Question: Whether a *Stratonic* may not be influenced to a particular Manner of acting by the Prospect of *Benefit* and *Damage*? May not this be a reasonable *Motive* to Action with such a one?—Well;



if it be, such *Action* will be only *natural Good*, says Mr. Warburton; and *natural* in contradiction to moral, or such a Good as one would be obliged to seek. The Reason for this: For, says he, till it be made appear, that Man hath received his Being from the Will of another, and so, depending on that other, is accountable to him for it, he can be under no Obligation to prefer Good to Evil, or even Life to Death. I think, every one will see, that this is merely sticking to his old Position, that Will constitutes Obligation, and asserting it over and over, without End. But Assertion is no Argument.

The Question *here* is: Whether the Prospect of Good and Evil may not influence to Action, and reasonably so? He answers; such a Prospect cannot oblige. For till it be made appear, that Men are derived Beings and accountable to him from whom they derive, they can be under no Obligation. Is this any more than saying, it cannot oblige, because it cannot? But I ask again; may it not influence to Action, and reasonably so? To say, it cannot, is to confound the Ideas of *Life and Death*, of, *Good and Evil*, and to say there is no Dictinction between them.

He goes on;

*From the Nature of any Action Morality cannot arise, nor from it's Effects. Not from the first, because being only reasonable or unreasonable, nothing follows, but a Fitness in doing one and an Absurdity in doing the other.*—One would think this was enough to constitute an Obligation on every Being that was capable of observing that  
*Fitness*

*Fitness* and that *Absurdity* : And every such Being must be immediately self-condemned, that does not in his Action submit to the one and avoid the other : And this Self-condemnation must be brought yet, if possible, more home to him, and greatly increased, when by such unreasonable Behaviour he rejects Happiness and intails actual Misery upon himself.

But these are *Effects* ; and that is the other Member of the Author's Division : And he says—*not from the Effects ; because did the productive Good or Evil make the Action moral, Brutes, from whose Actions proceed both one and other, would have Morality.* If Brutes were intelligent Beings, real Agents, and, so, capable of Action properly so called, *i. e.* Action proceeding from Understanding and Choice, they would be capable of Morality, as well as Men or Angels. But to us they appear to have neither Intelligence nor Freedom : Therefore are no Agents, and cannot *act*. Consequently, to talk of their *Actions*, is to use Language with great Latitude and very unphilosophically. And, though indeed it is common enough, that Commonness has proceeded from the Penury of Words, and has not been unattended with some bad Effects, both in the philosophic and in the moral World. As for Mr. *Warburton*, he was certainly under no Strait, no Difficulty here ; I mean under no Necessity of talking of the *Actions* of Brutes ; but to ground a Consequence upon this improper Use of the Word, is surprising enough. And I would farther say, that

it is not the mere actual Production of Good and Evil, that makes an Action in any Being *moral*. Since an Action may be *morally good* in any Degree, though the Good intended by it does not follow; (which may be, and often is the Case;) and another may be *morally Evil* in any Degree, though the intended Evil is prevented, (and this too may be, and often is, the Case). But those who make the Objection now under Consideration will say, that no Action can come under a *moral* View, where neither Good nor Evil, neither Happiness nor Misery are intended.

Here comes in another Objection; p. 50. to which Mr. *Warburton* returns a double Answer. As I do not understand the proper Force of the Objection, I should have passed both it and the Answers intirely over; only under the *second Head*, there is an Observation, *by the Bye*, as it is expressed, addressed to the *Theist*, which is of too much Importance upon many Accounts to be overlooked.

Having asserted, that an *uniform perfect whole*, is the plain Image and Impression of one intelligent, self-existent Mind, he then adds; And even in such Case (to observe it—to the *Theist*, who founds Morality in the natural, essential Difference of Things) it will be found, that Will precedes Obligation. Now, whether what is called eternal Verities, be dependent on the Will of God or no—yet all Parties hold this; that the Happiness and Perfection of the Universe, consequent to the acting conformably to those eternal Verities, is dependent thereon.—The former Assertion



tion is obscure ; but there is no Occasion to stay to elucidate it : The latter is surely wrong, and what, no Party that founds Morality in the *Difference of Things* will or can allow him. They do not hold, neither is it a Consequence from their Opinion, that the *Happiness and Perfection of the Universe, consequent to the acting conformably to those eternal Verities*, is at all dependent upon *Will*. This is so far from being their Opinion, or a Consequence of it, that it is directly contrary to it. They allow, that the intellectual Universe, as the material, had a Cause, and is dependent upon the Pleasure of that Cause for it's Continuance ; and more, that it is the Pleasure of this Cause, that it should conform in it's Actions to the *eternal Verities* : But then they hold likewise, that this is not any *arbitrary Pleasure* (which, for any Reason to the contrary, might have been the reverse of what it is) but *rational Will* ; i. e. Will founded in Reason, an antecedent Reason taken from the Nature of those *eternal Verities* : And they hold too, that the intellectual Universe acting agreeably to the *eternal Verities*, must, cannot but, be immediately and necessarily happy. Such good Consequence of such good Action they hold to be as immediate, as necessary, as the Effect of any Cause whatever ; and therefore is not dependent upon *Will* : And he quite mistakes them and their Notions, when he says, *that they all hold the Happiness and Perfection, consequent upon the acting conformably to the eternal Verities, is dependent upon Will* : So far from

holding this, they hold just the contrary: Those, I mean, who found Morality in the essential Differences of Things. They say, *Happiness* and *Perfection* are the *Consequences* of virtuous Action: What? meaning the *arbitrary* Consequences? Consequences owing to *Will* and *Pleasure*? This, sure, would be saying, they are only *Consequences of Will*, and in no real Sense at all Consequences of *Action*. But they hold, that they are *Consequences of Action*, properly so; and as properly as any Effect can be the Consequence of it's Cause. He proceeds \*;

*Now this Tendency*, (the Tendency of acting conformably to the eternal Verities to produce Happiness and Perfection) *being what occasions the OBLIGATION in God himself to observe these Relations*, (the eternal Verities) *and Will constituting that Tendency*, it follows, that *Will is prior to all Obligation*. Where Mr. Warburton (so far as I can understand him) asserts two Things to prove that *Will is prior to all Obligation*. One is, that the *Tendency*, viz. of acting conformably to the eternal Verities to produce Happiness and Perfection, *occasions an Obligation in God himself to observe them*; and the other is, that it is *Will, which constitutes that Tendency*. And if these are true, it must necessarily follow, that *Will is prior to all Obligation*, universally; not only the Obligation of derived, dependent Beings, but of God himself; and that Word, ALL, is to be taken in the largest, i. e. the truest and properest Sense. For if it is that

\* P. 51.

*Tendency*, that occasions the *Obligation* in God himself,—and it is *Will*, that constitutes that *Tendency*; it is plain, that *Will* is prior to even the *Divine Obligation*. And if it is prior to this, no Body will dispute it's being prior to the *Obligation* of other Beings; and so prior to *Obligation*, as to constitute it: For this is the only Sense in which the Word can be used with any Force or Propriety here. Thus then, *Will* is the Cause, the Reason of *Obligation* in God himself.

And from hence it follows, (this *Will* being God's *Will*) that the *Obliger* and the *Obliged* are one and the same Person. But Mr. Warburton knows, *this is the highest of Absurdities in the Matter of Obligation*; and that where the *Obliger* and the *Obliged* are one and the same Person, there all *Obligation* is void of Course, or rather no *Obligation* would be begun. And thus, he himself runs into that very *Absurdity*, which he charges the *Stratonicean* withal, when he talks of *Actions* being moral or obligatory: And one may reason with him, as he does with the *Stratonicean*: What Being can he find whereon to found this *Obligation*? Will he say, *Will*? That is the very *Absurdity* complained of; because *Will* is only an *Attribute* of the Person obliged.—To make this the *Obliger*, is to make a Person (God) oblige himself; which is the highest of *Absurdities* in the Matter of *Obligation*.

The Occasion of his falling into this Inconsistency is, (the Mistake above taken Notice of)  
his



his making the *Tendency* of acting conformably to Reason to produce Happiness and Perfection, a merely *arbitrary* Thing, intirely dependent upon *Will*. Which is just the same Absurdity, as it would be in a Mathematician, after having drawn a *Triangle*, to say the Properties of that *Triangle* are dependent upon *Will*, because the making that *Triangle* was so. Whereas the plain Truth is, that when a *Triangle* is made, such and such Properties will necessarily and immediately arise, and will subsist, in spite of all *Will* whatsoever, so long as the *Triangle* itself exists. This exactly represents the Case of all intellectual Beings whatever with Relation to *moral* Conduct. These Beings may exist differently; some of them arbitrarily; some (*ONE*) necessarily. But let them exist in what Manner they will, while they do exist, *Happiness and Perfection* must necessarily arise from a certain Method of Conduct; and, on the other hand, you cannot separate, even in Idea, *Misery and Imperfection*, from a contrary Behaviour. The not observing this, and perhaps too warm a Pursuit of his own Notion, (the one probably the Occasion of the other,) betrayed the Author into that extreme Absurdity, that *Will is prior to all Obligation* whatever: And yet at the very same Time that he says this, he had the *Obligation of God* to moral Action before him, and had his Eye too, particularly, upon it. Yet again, he seems to have received a sudden Check here from his own Reflections, and to have had some Apprehension of the

the

the Unreasonableness of such a Conclusion,  
“ That Will is prior to all Obligation, not ex-  
“ cepting even that of the supreme Being him-  
“ self;” since in the very next Sentence he as-  
serts what is wholly inconsistent with it: For  
thus he goes on;

*And as it is of the Nature of the independent  
first Cause to be obliged only by his own Wisdom,  
so it seems to be of dependent intelligent Beings to  
be obliged only by the Will of the first Cause. This  
is plainly finding a different Ground from Will  
for some moral Obligation: And then it follows,  
that Will is not prior to all Obligation; which  
yet he had asserted in the preceding Sentence;  
and by all Obligation must mean the Obligation  
of all Beings whatever, whether dependent or  
independent. And yet in this latter Assertion  
he as plainly contradicts again all that he has  
hitherto been labouring so hard, viz. To prove  
that Obligation is founded in Will, and even op-  
poses his own very Manner of Arguing.*

*Obligation, said he, necessarily implies an  
Obliger: The Obliger must be different from,  
and not one and the same with, the Obliged:—  
where the Obliger and Obliged are one and the  
same Person, all Obligation must be void of course,  
or rather no Obligation would be begun.—And  
upon the Force of this Reasoning he asks the  
Stratonicean; What Being he can find whereon  
to found his Obligation? And, supposing that  
he will answer, right Reason; he goes on thus:  
That is the very Absurdity we complain of; be-  
cause Reason is only an Attribute of the Person  
oblig-*

obliged, his Assistant, to judge of his Obligations, if he have any from any other Being.—Now, (to pass over too all that he says under the next Head, to prove that *Obligation supposes a Law*) is not all this flatly contrary to, and contradicted by, what he asserts here, that *God* may be and is *obliged by his own Wisdom*? For here *Obligation* is without an *Obliger*; or the *Obliger* and the *Obliged* are *one and the same Person*. And, whereas before nothing but a *Being*, and a *separate Being*, could oblige; now, a *Quality*, a *Property*, an *Attribute* will oblige, and oblige the same *Being* of whom it is a *Quality*, *Property* or *Attribute*. And *Mr. Warburton* will not bring himself off by saying, that he was there only considering the *Obligation of Men* to moral Action; or, at the most, of *finite intelligent Beings*; because, he argues against *Obligation* in itself considered; therefore against *all Obligation*, or against the *Obligation of all Beings* whatever: For, *à quatenus ad omne valet consequentia*. If *Reason* cannot oblige, as he asserts, one or more intelligent Beings; it cannot be the true Ground of *Obligation* to any. And, on the contrary, if it obliges *one*, it must oblige *all*. The supreme Being is obliged by his own *Wisdom*, i. e. by his own *Reason*. Are not finite intelligent Beings then obliged by their *Reason*? *Mr. Warburton* must say, No. But then his *Reason* for this will not be, that their *Reason* is derived and finite; (to which the Answer would be, that it is the *best* they have;) but,



but, according to his Manner of arguing hitherto, *Obligation implies an Obliger.*

And now, at last, upon *another* Account ; which follows in the next Words :

*For we cannot so much as conceive an intelligent first Cause, whether eternal Verities are dependent or independent of him, without conceiving at the same Time a Will, that enjoins all his intelligent Creatures to act in Conformity to those Truths.* This is a Reason, not of the first of the two Assertions in the preceding Sentence, *viz. That it is of the Nature of the independent first Cause to be obliged only by his own Wisdom ;* (this Assertion stands naked and intirely unsupported ;) but of the latter, *viz. that it seems to be of the Nature of all intelligent dependent Beings, to be obliged ONLY by the Will of the first Cause.* Now, supposing it be allowed, (and none but Atheists will refuse to allow it ;) that *we cannot so much as conceive an intelligent first Cause, — without conceiving at the same Time a Will that enjoins, &c.* it will not follow, that *intelligent finite Beings can be obliged ONLY by the Will of the first Cause.* The Will of the first Cause may be, and undoubtedly is, an *Obligation*, whenever known. But it is not therefore the *only* Obligation. For may there not be *several* Obligations ? The Will of God is one ; allowed to be so by all but Atheists. How does it follow, that (or is this the least Shadow of a Reason why) there are *no* more ? And, particularly, why may not the *Wisdom* (or the Reason) of dependent, intelligent Beings, *oblige* them,

them, agreeably to *their Natures*, as the *Wisdom* (the Reason) of the first Cause obliges him, agreeably to his Nature? The Nature of both is to be intelligent, rational: If *Wisdom* (Reason) obliges one, it must as really oblige the other. I think, he will not say, that Derivation, Finiteness, Dependence, can make any Difference *here*. For surely the best Use should be made of Reason, such as and whatever it is. If he can give a Reason, why a finite, intelligent, derived Being is not obliged to be under the Conduct of his Judgment, formed upon, and guided by, the Differences of Things, while yet the independent first Cause is obliged by *his* Judgment, *his* Reason or Wisdom; this will be doing something, greatly to the Purpose. But then this Reason must not be, "that a derived Being is obliged by the Will of him from whom he derives:" Because this may be true, and the *other* likewise; and *Theists* may, and do, consistently, acknowledge the Obligation of Will, and the Obligation of Reason too.

But Mr. *Warburton*, in order to set his Point in the *clearest Light*, will proceed to consider, *two or three other Objections against Morality's being founded in Will*.

1. Obj. The first is; "That as every Creature necessarily pursues Happiness; it is that which obliges to moral Observance, and not the Will of God. Because it is to procure Happiness that we obey the Will of God."

To this the Answer is: *That when it is said, Morality is founded on Will, it is not meant, that every*

every Will obliges, but that nothing but Will can :  
 — And by Will here is meant Will so and so circum-  
 stanced. Thus ; it must be the Will, not of  
 an Equal, much less an Inferior, but of a Su-  
 perior, and a Superior seeking our Good. And  
 then he says ; And why it is not as much Will  
 that obliges, when it is the Will of a Superior  
 seeking our Good, as when it is the Will of a Su-  
 perior simply, he is yet to learn. To which it  
 may be replied ; that it is not Will simply that  
 obliges in either Case : No, nor (as he himself  
 now allows) in any Case. For in all Cases the  
 Obligation arises from Will so and so circum-  
 stanced. And if, after these Concessions, the  
 last more especially, he had said ; “ And why  
 “ it is not as much Will that obliges, when it  
 “ is the Will of a Superior, and of a Superior  
 “ seeking our Good, as when it is Will simply,”  
 every one, I imagine, would have been pre-  
 sently sensible of an Inconsistency. Will obliges  
 and does not oblige.—But even as he himself  
 has put it, there is an evident Inaccuracy. For  
 though Will should as really oblige in the one  
 Case as in the other, yet surely it is, in the for-  
 mer Case, Will one Degree farther removed  
 from mere Will, than in the latter : Since in  
 the former there is one more Circumstance ad-  
 ded to the Will, than in the latter. In this it is  
 the Will of a Superior ; in the other, the Will  
 of a Superior seeking our Good : In this other  
 therefore Will is farther removed from Simpli-  
 city, or mere Will. And when it is the Will  
 of a Superior seeking our Good that obliges, it



is *less* Will that obliges than when it is the Will of a Superior only ; therefore *not so much* Will. And it is not *Will* that obliges, if it must be the Will of a *Superior*, and of a Superior *seeking our Good* ; or, if it is any Thing else but *Will simply*. And if *such* Will obliges, then mere Will universally, without any Regard to Inferiority, Equality or Superiority. But he himself denies, that *mere* Will can oblige ; and yet, though it must be Will *so and so circumstanced*, he asserts, *that nothing but Will can*. This surely has too much the Appearance of a Contradiction : Since what is it but to say, “ that these Circumstances are necessary, and at “ the same Time not necessary to constitute “ Obligation ; that Will must be *so and so circumstanced* to make Obligation, and yet need “ not ; for after all, *nothing but Will can oblige*.” —I think, he should have expressed it ; nothing *without* Will can oblige. Thus, one may suppose a *Superior* in any Degree, and such a one *seeking our Good* too in any Degree, without the Notion of *Obligation* : But, when the *Will*, or *Pleasure*, of such a Being signified to us, is added, then *Obligation* immediately commences. —Had he had said this, there had been no Inconsistency ; but then too it had not been to the Purpose, and he had answered and opposed no Body.

But, says he, *To say then* (on Supposition of the Qualifications he mentions) *that it is Happiness and not Will that makes the Obligation, seems to me like saying in Mechanics, that when*  
*a Weight*

*a Weight is raised by an Engine, the Wheels and Pullies are not the Cause, but that universal Affection of Matter called Attraction.* This Similitude perhaps he will recal, when he reconsiders, that there is no Likeness, but, on the contrary, the greatest Dissimilitude; and that he himself is mistaken in the very Case he puts. For surely he must be a sorry Mechanic indeed, that cannot see, that Attraction is so far from being the Cause of an Engine with it's Wheels and Pullies raising a Weight, that it is on the contrary, the only Reason why any Force at all need be applied. And if the Similitude be taken away, what of Argument might be included, will of Course go along with it.

But if *it be still farther urged, that one can be no more called the Obliger than the other; because though Happiness could not oblige without Will; on the other Hand, Will could not oblige without Happiness:* This, he replies, *is a Mistake;* and gives this Reason: *Will could not indeed oblige to Unhappiness: But it would oblige to what should produce neither the one nor the other, though all Consideration of the Consequence of obeying or disobeying were away,* p. 52. Now, besides that this cannot be true; since in such a Case Men would want every Motive that could be supposed to influence to Action; it is inconsistent with what was just before granted, *viz.* that it is not *Will simply* that obliges, but *Will so and so circumstanced, i. e.* the Will of a Superior seeking our Good: And again, it is inconsistent with it-

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self;

self; nor can he assign any Reason, "why Will  
 "can oblige to a Thing purely indifferent and  
 "without proposing any Reward to Obedience,"  
 which will not equally prove, "that it may  
 "oblige to Unhappiness." Nay, it is in a  
 Manner the very same Thing. Since to be  
 obliged to act without any Prospect of the least  
 Good in any Respect, must be Unhappiness  
 enough, and a great deal too much. But the  
 best of it is, it is a Sort of Unhappiness that is  
 impossible, and no reasonable Being can be sub-  
 ject to it.

Obj. 2d. The next Objection is; "That if  
 "the Will of God is determined by the eternal  
 "Relations of Things, they are properly those  
 "Relations (as Dr. *Clark* would have it) that  
 "oblige, and not the Will of God." Which  
 is illustrated by a familiar Instance in Physics;  
 "If A impel B, and B, C, and C, D; it is A,  
 "not C, that properly impels D." It should  
 be observed, that this is only a *Similitude*, and  
 brought, as Similitudes should be, not to prove,  
 but merely to illustrate; to cast some Light up-  
 on a Thing and help Conception. Had he at-  
 tended to this, he would not have had the *Sus-  
 picion* he speaks of, and upon which he grounds  
 his Answer intirely. He suspects the Objection  
*confounds natural Cause and Effect, with moral  
 Agent and Patient.* The Objection itself, cer-  
 tainly, does no such Thing: And if the Simi-  
 litude is not liked, it may be given up, with-  
 out any Detriment. What Dr. *Clark* and his  
 Followers



Followers say, is this : " That as the divine Intellect judges of, is guided and determined by the eternal Relations of Things, and God himself is, from the Perfection of his Nature, invariably determined to will and act agreeably to those Relations : So it is the proper Business of all finite intelligent Beings to inquire into those Relations ; and, as their Understandings discern and judge of them, it is their Obligation (most naturally and originally so) to will and act agreeably to them."

Mr. Warburton himself has allowed, that from hence arises an *Obligation* upon God himself : Must he not, consistently, allow the same with respect to finite intelligent Beings ? What should make a Difference ? *Finiteness* cannot ; because it is not owing merely to the *Infiniteness* of the divine Being, that he is *obliged* to conform his Will and Actions to the essential Differences and Relations of Things : But because he is an intellectual and proper Agent. Therefore wherever there is Intelligence and Agency, there must be the same *Obligation*. Finite, derived, intelligent Beings are to inquire, in the best Manner they can, into the Relations of Things, and ought to conform to them in their Conduct to the Extent of their Power. And this is to be *morally* good, not only because it is the Will of God they should be so ; but for the same Reason as he himself is so.—As there is nothing in the Author's Answer accommodated to this Sense of the Objection, (which yet is the

only true Sense of it) I shall pass it over; and go on to the next and last, p. 53.

Obj. 3d. "It is said, that not the Will of God obliges, but the Difference of Things; because if it be asked, why we should obey God's Will, the only Reply is, that it is *fit* we should do so. But *Fitness* arises from the essential Difference of Things. Therefore, &c." It may be owned, this has something of the Air of a Quibble, and might very well have passed without Notice, after what has been already said. But if Mr. Warburton would produce it, I cannot think but he should have returned a better Answer than what he has done.

*Can any Thing, says he, be more pleasant, than to make that very Consciousness that Will, and Will only, can oblige, an Argument that Will cannot oblige? For this Fitness is just that very Consciousness, and nothing else. Fitness, in the Objection, and in the Language of every one that uses it in Morals, expresses something absolute and real: A Correspondency between Actions and Things, as real as between Things and Things. To say then, that this Fitness is Consciousness, is no better than to resolve all the Agreements and Differences of Things into Consciousness. But, as he knows very well, there must be such Differences and Agreements in Things themselves, before we can know any Thing of them: So there must be a Correspondence between the Will of God and our Obedience to it, before we can be conscious of*

such Correspondence or the Obligation arising from it. And this Correspondence is as real in the Nature of Things, as the Agreement between the Angles of a Triangle with two right ones.—But in what follows he may perhaps seem to mend his Answer. *Farther, when we say it is fit God should be obeyed, we do not mean, it is fit an Inferior in Power or Wisdom should obey his Superior.—But it is fit a Creature should obey his Creator: Because the first has only a natural Fitness, the latter a moral.* p. 54. He is very right in saying, that by the Expression, *it is fit to obey God*, is not meant, merely, *it is fit an Inferior in Power or Wisdom should obey a Superior*; but is wrong in saying, *here is only a natural Fitness*, (distinguishing between a *natural* and *moral* Fitness): For there is *no* Fitness between Obedience and mere Superiority of Power or Wisdom. It must be known, how such Power and Wisdom will be *directed* with Respect to the Inferior, before it can be said at all, that such a one's *Obedience is fit*. And I am utterly at a Loss to account for that Distinction of *natural* and *moral* Fitness, upon this Occasion: Since if I know what he means by *moral* Fitness, wherever there is *natural* Fitness of Action, there must be a *moral* one. At least however, he cannot but know, this is the Sentiment of those who make the Objection; that a *moral* Fitness immediately arises from a *natural* one. And for this Reason, they will by no Means allow him, that there is any *na-*



*tural* Fitness between one Being's acting and the merely *superior* Power and Wisdom of another: Nor will they, or any one else, be able to understand his Language, when he says, *it is naturally fit an Inferior should obey a Superior*, and distinguishes such *natural* Fitness from *moral*, denying it to be *morally* fit; when yet, Obedience to a *Superior* is acting agreeably to the *Will* of a Superior, and such Action must be *moral*; since according to himself, *Will* constitutes Obligation, *i. e.* Morality. And still farther (which is yet more abundantly surprising) he supports this Distinction of *natural* and *moral* Fitness, with a Reason, which excludes the *Will* of a Superior, even in the Case of an Inferior's obeying him. For thus he goes on: *For in the first Case, i. e.* when it is said, an Inferior in Power or Wisdom should obey his Superior, *there being no Proof that our Perception of these essential Differences was intentionally given; Will, from whence comes Obligation, is not concerned; therefore no Morality in this Fitness.* On the contrary; I say, the very Case supposes a Command given to be obeyed; which is a *Will intentionally* manifested; therefore the *Fitness* to obey a Superior must be *moral* (upon his own Notion of Morality) if any Thing can be so. The very Case, as he himself puts it, supposes a *Will*; and therefore the *Fitness* must be *moral*. — But in the latter Case, as he goes on, *viz. the Fitness of a Creature's obeying his Creator, the Perception of these essential Differences*

*Divine Legation of Moses.* 295

*rences is supposed to be intentionally given: Will is therefore concerned; is still prior to Obligation, and makes this Fitness moral.* It is allowed, that here the *Perception of the essential Differences* was intentionally given: What follows? Therefore the *Fitness* of complying with them in Action is *moral*. Granted: But then does it follow, that, if this is *moral*, the other is not? It is *morally* fit a Creature should obey his Creator; may it not be *morally* fit too, that an Inferior should obey his Superior, without particularly including the Relations of Creator and Creature; Will not Benefactor and Beneficiary be a Ground of *moral Fitness*, as well as the other? And, above all, what is the Ground of moral Fitness in the Actions of God? Is it not the Conformity of them to his Perception of the Nature and Reason of Things? He has no Superior to command him, and no Will of a Superior to conform his Actions to. His *Perception* too could not be intentionally given: Nor given in any Sense: Yet his Actions are *moral*, and perfectly so. There is therefore nothing else to account for the *Morality* of them, but their Conformity to the Nature and Reason of Things. Must not one think then, that the same Thing will constitute the *Morality* of other intelligent Beings? Merely their being *finite* and *derived* can make no Difference here. They are to judge of the Differences of Things as well as they can: And, to act agreeably to their finite Apprehensions of them will make

them ~~morally~~ good Beings; as, and in the same Sense as, the Supreme, underived intelligent Being is morally good by conforming his Actions to his perfect and all-comprehending View of the Nature and Reason of Things.

It is really not a little surprising to see Mr. Warburton, even when he is endeavouring to answer his Opponents, so often doing it upon the Supposition, that *Will* is the Ground of moral Obligation. This is the very Thing his Opponents object to; yet in his Answers, and by way of Answer, he often asserts the same Thing. Thus here; speaking to the *first Case*, and endeavouring to shew there is no *Morality* in it, he concludes thus; *Will, from whence comes Obligation, is not concerned; therefore no Morality in this Fitness.* Is it not here taken for granted, that *Obligation comes from Will*? And yet this is the very Point in question.

Lastly; under this Objection he complains of the *Poverty of Language*; and thinks it is owing intirely to that, that we make no more Distinction between *Fitnesses*; but equally say, it is *fit a Creature should obey his Creator*; and it is *fit an Inferior should obey his Superior*; and so in a *thousand* other more particular Instances, it is *fit* this or that or the other should be done; and even say, it is *fit* an underived and independent Being should (as he always and invariably will) conform his Actions to the essential and unalterable Nature of Things. Whereas, says he, there is an *infinite Difference* in these



these *Fitnesses*. Difference in the *Fitnesses* themselves there is none, any more than there is in *Truth*, judged of by a finite and infinite Mind: But Difference enough there will be in the Judgments that are made by such Minds. Yet, so far as the Perceptions of a *finite* Mind can go, they will be real; and the *moral* Fitness of conforming, in Action, to such Perceptions, the same in Nature and Kind, (though plainly not in Extent) as that of an underived Being's conforming his Actions to the perfect, all-comprehensive Ideas, which such a one cannot but have of the essential Differences of Things.

Mr. Warburton having thus gone through the *Objections*, comes, at last \*, to account for it, how it has happened, that this most evident *Truth*, that *Morality* is founded in *Will*, has been long controverted even among *Theists*. And he is so fair as to lay the Fault in a great Measure upon the *Defenders* of it; who have generally, he says, thought themselves obliged to deny (in order to support their Cause) the natural, essential Differences of Things, antecedent to a *Law*; imagining the *Morality* of *Actions* would follow this Concession. But, adds he, this is a *Mistake*, which the rightly distinguishing between Things naturally and morally separable, as has been explained above, will rectify †. I am glad he does, as here, so every where else, allow of eternal *Verities*, and the essential Differences of Things; which hardly any *Theist* before him,

\* P. 54.

† P. 55.

who founded Morality in *Will*, would ever do. Nay, they have constantly made it the great Objection to their Adversaries, "that by their Doctrine of *eternal Verities*, and the *essential unalterable Nature of Things*, and the *Differences* between them, according to which the divine Intellect and Conduct are guided, they have fairly made something, nay, innumerable Things, prior in Nature to, and independent upon God, who yet created all Things out of nothing." Mr. Warburton sees farther into this Matter, and is more equitable; yet I cannot think that his *Distinction* will rectify the Mistake at all. If what has been just now remarked upon it, under the last *Objection*, and in other Places, be just, the *Distinction* is of no Significancy in the present Case. But, after giving a Reason why his *Distinction* has been so much *unobserved*, (which Reason, I confess, I do not understand;) he proceeds to shew, on the other hand, the Mistake of his and their *Adversaries*, viz. Those who found Morality in the *essential Differences of Things*. They too being in the same Prepossession that one inferred the other, when they had clearly demonstrated the natural, *essential Difference*, never gave themselves any farther Trouble, but delivered this as the Proof of the moral Difference; though these be, in Reality, says he, as we have seen above, two distinct Things, and independent of one another. The natural, *essential Difference* is one Thing, *Action* is another. The former is absolutely

lutely independent of the latter; since it is prior to, and may subsist without it. *Action* necessarily supposes the other; *morally good Action* is Action conformed to it. Thus he himself allows it to be in *God*; and there is no other possible Rule to be assigned for the Measure of the *divine* Conduct. And why then it should not be the same Ground of Morality in the Conduct and Action of finite intelligent Beings, as he has never particularly considered hitherto, I am fully persuaded he can assign no Reason. And when the Differences of Things are seen and judged of, by a finite intelligent Being, if he does not conform his Conduct thereto, he is immediately *morally* culpable; if he does, he acts *morally* well; in the very same Sense, though in a much lower Degree, as we say concerning the independent Being, that his Conduct, his Action is *morally good*, as being conformed to the same *essential Difference*. And upon this Account it is we say, that *moral Goodness* is the *same* every where; Justice, Beneficence, Veracity, the *same* morally good Qualities in all Beings whatever.

Though, to be ingenuous, I cannot but, in passing, observe and acknowledge, that too many of those, who have founded *Morality* in the *Differences of Things*, have laid their Foundation *too wide*; since the same Foundation may (and must) be laid for all Sciences and Arts, and, in a Word, for all Truth whatsoever. It had surely been better to have distinguished



guished of these *Differences*, and shewn, more particularly, what those *Differences* are, which an intelligent Being cannot be *morally good*, unless he conforms his Actions to.—However, this only in passing. It is not what Mr. Warburton blames these Writers for; but both them and his own Party, for *not considering this natural, essential Difference of Things, as what, says he, it must be confessed by both Parties to be, the Rule which God hath GIVEN his Creatures to bring them to the Knowledge of his Will.* Had this been attended to, the *Dispute* had been at an End.

It must be owned, this is a ready Way of ending the *Dispute*: But the worst of it is, before *one* of the Parties can be brought to acknowledge it, it must be prevailed with to renounce it's own Principles. They, (that is, those who maintain the *natural, essential Difference of Things*, and found *Morality* there,) cannot, consistently, own that this is a *Rule GIVEN by God*.—They say, it is an eternal Rule in the Nature of Things; not GIVEN, not made by any Being whatever; any more than any other *eternal Verities* can be said to be GIVEN, or made.—It is the Rule to which the supreme Being, *as morally perfect*, invariably conforms his own Actions, and *wills* indeed that all his reasonable Creatures should conform theirs; but that, it is a *Rule* immediately and necessarily obligatory upon all finite, rational Beings, in the same Manner as he himself must own it to be  
upon

upon the Supreme : But to say, it is GIVEN, makes it positive, and the Result of Pleasure ; which they can never own.

However, he seems to think them capable of coming into this Compromise ; and hereupon says, that if they had done it before, *they had employed this Difference, not as the Atheist does, for the Foundation of Morality, but as all true Theists should do, for the Medium to bring us to that only sound Foundation, the Will and Command of God.—Not as the Atheist does.—*

This is invidious ; and there was not the least Occasion to bring in an *Atheist* here. The *Atheist* may own, *the Parts are equal to the whole* ; but this should not be mentioned to cast a Reflection on that Axiom. So, though a *Stratonicean* may say, that the *essential Difference* is the *Foundation of Morality* ; if it be true, it may surely be in the same Manner *employed* or applied by any Body : If it be false, Mr. *Warburton* may shew it : Which he has not yet by any Means done.

However, he would have it otherwise employed, viz. *for the Medium to bring us to that only sound Foundation, the Will and Command of God.* This may, perhaps, in the Opinion of light, cursory Readers, seem to cast some Shade upon the eternal Rule of right Reason ; but, in Reality, it is a very high Commendation of it : Since (except in the Case of a positive Revelation) it is *only* by this Rule, first seen, judged of and approved, in the Nature of Things, that

we can know what the *Will of God* is, with Relation to the Conduct of finite, derived, intelligent Beings; and we are sure, that he cannot but conform his own *Will* and Commands to it; *i. e.* we are sure, it is *his Will and Pleasure* they should conform to it, as being, or because it is, essentially, in itself, **JUST and RIGHT and GOOD.**

# FINIS.





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